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I begin the dissertation by elucidating Hume’s 
conception of time as a compound abstract idea and explain 
why Hume believes time must be discrete and atomistic. I 
then explore the ways in which Hume’s theory of causation 
rests upon this atomistic conception of time, and place 
special emphasis on Hume’s argument that all causes qua 
causes must precede their effects in time. I claim that 
this argument is inconsistent with Hume’s critique of the 
causal maxim, a principle which states that whatever begins 
to exist must have a cause. After exposing and examining 
this inconsistency, I investigate the degree to which 
Hume’s account of the process of induction also depends 
upon his discrete, discontinuous conception of time. I end 
the dissertation by summarizing what I accomplished in 
earlier chapters, and by discussing potential areas for 
future research.      
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Chapter One  
The Nature and Existence of Time in Hume’s Treatise 
 Introduction 
Hume’s critiques of causation and inductive reasoning 
are some of the best known – and most widely studied – 
aspects of his philosophy. In contrast, his views of the 
existence and nature of time are perhaps the most obscure 
and least studied aspects of his philosophy. The primary 
purpose of this dissertation is to prove that Hume’s 
theories of causation and induction presuppose and require 
a certain conception of time, and that a thorough 
understanding of the former necessitates a solid grasp of 
the latter.   
I will present my argument for this claim over the 
course of five chapters.1 The current chapter, Chapter One, 
will explore what exactly time is for Hume, and whether the 
process by which we form the idea of time violates the Copy 
Principle, one of the most important principles in Hume’s 
epistemology. Throughout this chapter, I will argue that 
time for Hume is a compound abstract idea, and that all 
                                                          
1
  My sixth chapter will consist in a brief summary of the previous chapters.   
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concerns that this idea violates the Copy Principle are 
unfounded.   
A compound idea for Hume is an idea that contains 
other ideas as its parts. This means that the idea of time 
as Hume describes it consists of parts. Hume insists that 
these parts are not and cannot be infinitely divisible. In 
my second chapter, I will analyze the arguments Hume 
provides to support this claim, and defend them from the 
various objections that have been raised against them in 
the literature on this subject. These objections reveal 
significant misunderstanding not only of Hume’s arguments 
themselves, but also of his overall purpose in developing 
them. According to my interpretation, this overall purpose 
is primarily phenomenological. In other words, Hume is far 
more interested in studying the experience of time than he 
is in engaging in metaphysical speculation about the nature 
of time, although some consideration of the latter is 
obviously unavoidable.   
Hume’s phenomenological approach to time leads to what 
I call the Temporal Priority Argument, the argument by 
which Hume attempts to prove that all causes must precede 
their effects in time. My third chapter will consist in a 
thorough explanation as to why Hume thinks “the utter 
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annihilation of time” results from a denial of the temporal 
priority of causes to their effects. I will argue that some 
of the reasoning Hume employs in his arguments against the 
infinite divisibility of time also plays a key role in the 
Temporal Priority Argument, and that the latter argument 
depends upon the former.   
While my third chapter will focus on the Temporal 
Priority Argument, my fourth chapter will concentrate on 
another aspect of Hume’s theory of causation – his critique 
of the causal maxim. The causal maxim states that whatever 
begins to exist must have a cause. Hume rejects this maxim 
by making a strong distinction between the idea of a 
beginning of existence and the idea of a cause of 
existence. I will argue that Hume’s rejection of the causal 
maxim is logically inconsistent with his Temporal Priority 
Argument.   
One of the consequences of the Temporal Priority 
Argument is that distinguishing between causes and effects 
requires temporal minima. Hume’s reason for thinking so, if 
followed to its logical implications, allows one to 
conclude that Hume’s account of induction also requires 
temporal minima. The purpose of my fifth chapter is to 
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explain why the process of induction as Hume characterizes 
it necessitates the discreteness of time.       
The only Humean text I will discuss throughout my 
entire dissertation is A Treatise of Human Nature 
(hereafter referred to as Treatise).2 This is because 
Treatise is the only text out of all of Hume’s published 
works that contain detailed and in-depth discussions of 
time. Hume wrote next to nothing about the topic in all of 
his subsequent works. Hume’s most extensive discussions 
about time appear in Book One, Part Two of Treatise, but he 
does briefly mention time again sporadically in later 
sections of that work, such as when he explains what effect 
time has on the passions in Book Two, Part Three, Section 
Seven. Even his comments there, however, are based upon his 
arguments featured in Book One, Part Two. Any thorough 
exploration of Hume’s theory of time, therefore, must 
clearly focus on Book One, Part Two of Treatise. According 
to my interpretation, this part of Treatise describes time 
as a compound abstract idea.       
 
                                                          
2
  Hume, David.  David and Mary Norton, ed.  A Treatise of Human Nature.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000.   
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Necessary Preliminaries  
Before attempting to prove that time for Hume is a 
compound abstract idea, however, I must briefly summarize 
what Hume thinks impressions and ideas are, and how they 
relate to each other. For Hume, the term “impression” 
includes “all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as 
they make their first appearance in the soul” (T 1.1.1.1)3.  
These impressions are strong, vivacious, and lively.  
Ideas, in contrast, are much weaker. Ideas are “the faint 
images” of impressions “in thinking and reasoning” (T 
1.1.1.1).   
 Hume claims that both impressions and ideas can be 
further divided into simple and complex. The latter are 
divisible into smaller, distinct parts; the former are not. 
Complex impressions and ideas are composed of simple ones. 
For example, perceiving or experiencing an apple involves 
experiencing its color, taste, smell, and texture. Each of 
these alone is a simple impression, but all of them 
                                                          
3
   The “T” in this citation stands for A Treatise of Human Nature, the only work in which Hume discusses 
time.  Each citation of a passage from the Treatise in this dissertation will consist of four numbers: the 
first is the book number, the second is the part number, the third is the section number, and the fourth is 
the paragraph number. This is the standard method of citing the Treatise, and is used by most Hume 
scholars.   
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combined constitute the experience of the apple as a whole 
(T 1.1.1.2).   
Because complex ideas and impressions are composed of 
simple ideas and impressions, the mind cannot experience 
complex ideas and impressions unless it first experiences 
simple impressions and ideas. Hume believes that the mind 
cannot form a simple idea until it first perceives a simple 
impression that corresponds to and resembles that idea.  
The idea copies, or resembles, the simple impression, and 
is derived from it. Every simple idea has a correspondent 
impression, and vice-versa. This principle, which Hume 
scholars call the “Copy Principle,” is an essential aspect 
of Humean epistemology, and presupposed throughout the 
Treatise. Hume formulates the Copy Principle in this way: 
“all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d 
from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, 
and which they exactly represent” (T 1.1.1.7).   
 When providing arguments to convince readers that the 
Copy Principle is true, Hume discusses the fact that 
impressions are both temporally and causally prior to 
ideas, meaning that they always precede ideas in time, and 
cause the ideas that resemble them. People always 
experience impressions before they experience ideas; they 
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never experience ideas prior to experiencing impressions. 
Whereas experiencing impressions always involves 
experiencing their corresponding ideas, merely thinking of 
the ideas will not cause one to experience the impressions 
they resemble. If one wanted to give a child an idea of the 
color orange, for example, one must actually show the child 
something that is orange, so that the child can have an 
impression of the color orange. If the child has never 
perceived the color orange before, it would obviously be 
absurd to attempt to make the child perceive orange merely 
by discussing the idea of orange with the child (T 
1.1.1.8). Likewise, “we cannot form to ourselves a just 
idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually 
tasted it” (T 1.1.1.9). Hume thinks these examples clearly 
show the causal dependency of ideas on impressions. The 
causal relationship between impressions and ideas is 
strictly unidirectional, with impressions serving as the 
cause, and ideas serving as the effect.   
 Thus there is a causal and a temporal relationship 
that obtains between impressions and ideas – impressions 
cause ideas and always precede them in time. There are also 
specific causal and temporal relationships that obtain 
between two different types of impressions, which Hume 
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refers to as “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of 
reflection.” Hume describes the relationships between these 
two kinds of impressions by providing a more detailed 
account of how the process mentioned in the Copy Principle 
works:   
 
An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes 
us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure 
or pain of some kind or other.4 Of this impression 
there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after 
the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This 
idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the 
soul, produces the new impressions of desire and 
aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be call’d 
impressions of reflection because deriv’d from it.  
These again are copy’d by the memory and imagination, 
and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give 
rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the 
impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their 
correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of 
sensation, and deriv’d from them (T 1.1.2.1).   
 
As described above, the process mentioned in the Copy 
Principle clearly involves a temporal sequence. The mind 
experiences impressions of sensation first, which lead to 
corresponding ideas of sensation. These ideas of sensation 
then produce impressions of reflection, which in turn 
generate corresponding ideas.   
                                                          
4
   These are impressions of sensation.   
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While explaining and defending the Copy Principle, 
Hume thinks of a counterexample to it. Suppose a man, who 
has seen multiple colors of various shades throughout his 
thirty years of life, encounters an arrangement of several 
shades of blue with one particular shade missing – a shade 
of blue that this man has never previously seen. Hume 
claims that, despite never having perceived any impression 
of this shade of blue, the man’s imagination can still form 
of an idea of what that missing shade of blue must look 
like. Hume believes this counterexample is too trivial to 
cast the Copy Principle into doubt (T 1.1.1.10).  
In addition to explaining what ideas are and 
describing the processes by which they are formed, Hume 
also discusses what the possible content of ideas could be.  
He firmly believes “that the mind cannot form any notion of 
quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the 
degrees of each” (T 1.1.7.3)5. The arguments Hume uses to 
defend this claim employ two other principles that play a 
crucial role in his thought.   
One of these principles is often called the 
Separability Principle. This principle states “that 
                                                          
5
   This passage is italicized in the original text.   
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whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the 
thought and imagination……these propositions are equally 
true in the inverse……whatever objects are separable are 
also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are 
distinguishable are also different” (T 1.1.7.3). This 
principle challenges the Lockean theory of abstract ideas.  
Locke’s view is that we form an abstract idea by 
encountering many things that are similar, determining what 
they all have in common, and then developing an idea which 
has only those features and not the ones which distinguish 
them from each other. For Locke, abstraction involves 
separation; it involves forming an idea that has only the 
common qualities that enables it to represent other 
particular things that have the same features, and 
separating these common qualities from all the features 
that distinguish the thing in question from all of the 
other things which share the common qualities.6 Hume, 
following Berkeley, argued that it is impossible to form an 
idea of an object that has only those qualities it has in 
common with other objects, and none of the qualities that 
distinguish it from those other objects. The distinguishing 
                                                          
6
  Locke discusses his theory of abstract ideas in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
particularly at 2.11.9,  2.12.1, 3.3.6-9, and 3.6.32.    
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qualities an object possesses, argues Hume, cannot be 
separated from it, and so any idea of that object must 
contain those qualities as well. 
 Another principle that plays a crucial role in Hume’s 
thought is often known as the Conceivability Principle. 
According to the Conceivability Principle, what is 
conceivable is possible. If something is conceivable, then 
it is possible. When Hume applies this principle to 
abstract ideas, he puts a Cartesian spin on it. He claims 
that if something is “absurd in fact and reality, it must 
also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form 
a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible” (T 
1.1.7.6). It is not possible for an object with only 
indeterminate qualities to exist. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conceive of such an object. Since abstract 
ideas as Locke describes them are ideas of objects with 
only indeterminate qualities, it is impossible for such 
ideas to exist or to be conceived. This is especially the 
case since, as Hume argues, forming an idea of an object 
and forming an idea are one and the same act; there is no 
distinction between them (T 1.1.7.6).   
 The Conceivability Principle and the Separability 
Principle are closely connected. For example, Hume claims 
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that a line cannot be separated from its particular length.  
A line and its precise length are indistinguishable; they 
cannot exist separately in reality. Consequently, it is 
also impossible to conceive of a line that has no 
determinate length (T 1.1.7.3).   
 It is important to note, however, that none of the 
arguments Hume advances against the Lockean conception of 
abstract ideas prove that abstract ideas are impossible 
simpliciter. Hume does believe that abstract ideas exist; 
he just does not think it is possible to form abstract 
ideas that imply a separation from distinct, determinate 
qualities. Hume, following Berkeley,7 says that “all general 
[abstract] ideas are nothing but particular ones, annex’d 
to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive 
signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other 
individuals, which are similar to them” (T 1.1.7.1).        
Hume has a theory to explain how we are able to form 
ideas of things that represent many other things. We 
experience many particular things that share certain 
qualities. We form a habit of using the same term to refer 
to all of these particular things, even though they differ 
                                                          
7
  For more information on Berkeley’s theory of abstract ideas, see his introduction to his A Treatise 
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.   
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in some ways. When the habit becomes strong enough, merely 
hearing the term generates an idea of one of these objects, 
and the mind quickly recalls other particular things that 
share the same qualities (T 1.1.7.7).     
If one uses the term “triangle,” for example, one 
might think of an equilateral triangle. The distinguishing 
characteristic of an equilateral triangle is that all of 
its angles are equal. If the mind attempts to identify this 
characteristic as one that belongs to all triangles qua 
triangles, it will also recall scalene and isosceles 
triangles, which lack this property yet are still 
triangles. This process causes one to use the same term 
“triangle” to refer to those kinds of triangles as well (T 
1.1.78). In order for the mind to think of a triangle, it 
must think of a particular kind of triangle, one that will 
have features that distinguish it from all other kinds of 
triangles. The mind is aware of these distinguishing 
features, but ignores them whenever it thinks of a triangle 
qua triangle. Under a Lockean conception of abstract ideas, 
however, the abstract idea of a triangle qua triangle lacks 
any characteristics that distinguish it from any other kind 
of triangle; these distinguishing characteristics are 
separated from the common properties that all triangles 
14 
 
share, and the idea of triangle qua triangle contains only 
these common properties. Hume thinks the distinguishing 
characteristics cannot be separated from the common 
properties; instead of separating the distinguishing 
characteristics, the mind simply chooses not to pay 
attention to them (Baxter 18-19).    
 Three Different Definitions of Time  
 After discussing abstract ideas, Hume dedicates Part 
Two of the first book of the Treatise to the ideas of space 
and time and how we form them. Many of his comments 
regarding time strongly suggest that time is an abstract 
idea. Consider, for example, the following passage:   
 
The idea of time, being derived from the succession of 
our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as 
impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as 
sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract 
idea, with comprehends a still greater variety than 
that of space, and yet is represented in the fancy by 
some particular individual idea of a determinate 
quantity and quality (T 1.2.3.6).   
 
 
Hume reinforces this view of time in the very next 
paragraph:  
15 
 
 
As ‘tis from the disposition of visible and tangible 
objects we receive the idea of space, so from the 
succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea 
of time, nor is it possible for time alone ever to 
make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the 
mind……whenever we have no successive perceptions, we 
have no notice of time, even tho’ there be a real 
succession in the objects……time cannot make its 
appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with 
a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d 
by some perceivable succession of changeable objects 
(T 1.2.3.7).   
 
Notice the use of the Separability Principle here; time 
cannot be separated from particular successions. It is just 
as impossible to conceptualize time without successive 
perceptions as it is to conceptualize a line without any 
particular length.     
Thus far, Hume is characterizing time as an abstract 
idea derived from succession of impressions of every kind.  
This is not the only way he describes time, however. Some 
of his comments cast doubt on the notion that time is an 
abstract idea at all. While he repeatedly insists that the 
idea of time cannot be separated from successive 
perceptions, he also claims that “The idea of time is not 
deriv’d from a particular impression mix’d up with others, 
and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises 
16 
 
altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to 
the mind, without making one of the number [of 
impressions]” (T 1.2.3.10). To clarify in what sense time 
can be conceived of as a “manner,” Hume uses an example 
that is very well known to those who study Hume’s theory of 
time:  
 
Five notes play’d on a flute give us the impression 
and idea of time; tho’ time be not a sixth impression, 
which presents itself to the hearing or any of the 
senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind 
by reflection finds within itself……here it [the mind] 
only takes notice of the manner, in which the 
different sounds make their appearance; and that it 
may afterwards consider without considering these 
particular sounds, but may conjoin it with any other 
objects. The ideas of some objects it certainly must 
have, nor is it possible for it without these ideas 
ever to arrive at any conception of time; which since 
it appears not as any primary distinct impression, can 
plainly be nothing but different ideas, or 
impressions, or objects dispos’d in a certain manner, 
that is, succeeding each other” (T 1.2.3.10).   
 
Here Hume clearly identifies time with the manner in which 
ideas, impressions, and objects appear to the mind, a 
manner which is successive. Later, Hume makes the same 
point even more bluntly when he asserts that “time is 
nothing but the manner, in which some real objects exist” 
(T 1.2.5.28).     
17 
 
The passages quoted above pose considerable 
interpretative difficulties for scholars attempting to 
study Hume’s theory of time, because Hume appears to work 
with three different definitions of time. He seems to 
believe that all of the following definitions of time are 
correct:  
1. Time is an abstract idea derived from successions of 
every kind.   
2. Time is different ideas, impressions, and objects 
appearing in a certain successive manner.  
3. Time is the manner in which some real objects exist.  
Hume scholars tend to argue that one of these definitions 
articulates Hume’s conception of time more effectively than 
the others, but as one would expect, they disagree as to 
which definition is the best one.  
 Baxter’s Interpretation of Hume   
 In what is probably the most extensive and detailed 
study of Hume’s theory of time to date, Hume’s Difficulty: 
Time and Identity in the Treatise,8 Baxter mentions these 
disagreements, and then argues that conceptualizing time as 
                                                          
8
  Baxter, Donald.  Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise.  New York: Routledge, 2008.   
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an abstract idea comes closer to capturing Hume’s thought 
than conceptualizing time as a manner.    
 According to Baxter, many well-known Hume scholars, 
such as Kemp Smith, tend to describe the idea of time as 
the idea of “the manner in which successions are arrayed” 
(Baxter 21).9 Baxter claims that viewing time as “the idea 
of succession in general” is more consistent with Hume’s 
theory of abstract ideas than viewing time as a manner 
(Baxter 21).   
 Baxter writes,  
For Hume, time is an abstraction from the successions 
we experience (T 1.2.3.6-11, 1.2.4.2). That is to say, 
the idea of time is an abstract idea of any succession 
qua many things in succession. Likewise I will propose 
that the idea of a moment is the idea of a member of a 
succession qua member (Baxter 17).   
 
We develop the idea of time the same way we develop 
abstract ideas about anything. We encounter many particular 
successions, and we use the term “succession” to refer to 
them. Whenever we hear the term “succession,” we call to 
mind many other particular successions. We can use the 
Separability Principle and the Conceivability Principle to 
                                                          
9
  See Kemp Smith, Norman.  The Philosophy of David Hume.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1941,  p. 
274.   
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show that time cannot be separated from the idea of 
successiveness. Just as it is impossible to form an idea of 
a line with no particular length, so it is impossible to 
conceptualize time in isolation from a particular 
succession (Baxter 19).       
 In addition to claiming that viewing time as an 
abstract idea “of any succession qua many things in 
succession” is more consistent with Hume’s theory of 
abstract ideas, Baxter also argues that his interpretation 
has an additional advantage over the more common view that 
time for Hume is best thought of as the manner in which 
perceptions appear to the mind. Baxter’s interpretation 
enables time to consist of parts, but other interpretations 
do not. This is important because, according to Hume, “’tis 
evident, that time or duration consists of different parts: 
For otherwise we cou’d not conceive a longer or shorter 
duration” (T 1.2.3.9). Baxter claims that successions have 
parts called moments (Baxter 20), but manners do not have 
parts (Baxter 21). Thus viewing time primarily as a manner 
– any kind of manner – makes it difficult to conceptualize 
time consisting of parts10.  Conceptualizing time as the 
                                                          
10
   I think Baxter is wrong about this.  Hume can very easily explain how manners can have parts.  The 
parts of a manner are the objects arranged in that manner.  I am surprised that Baxter does not consider 
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abstract idea of any succession qua successiveness, which 
Baxter’s interpretation requires, can easily enable one to 
form ideas of parts of time.  
When Hume asserts that “time or duration consists of 
different parts,” he seems to be using the terms “time” and 
“duration” interchangeably. He continues to use these terms 
synonymously in several places in Part Two as well. Baxter 
also uses them synonymously, with one minor qualification:  
 
Hume seems to use “time” and “duration” 
interchangeably within T 1.2.3.6-11……This makes sense 
when speaking of a duration. Thus “time,” “a 
succession,” and “a duration,” when used generally, 
are interchangeable for Hume. However “duration” can 
also be used to convey more the manner than the sort, 
more successiveness than a succession. Hume tends not 
to use it in this sense but commentators often read it 
this way, perhaps influenced by Kemp Smith (Baxter 
19).  
 
Whenever the mind thinks of a succession, it is thinking of 
something that has duration. Based on the way both Baxter 
and Hume conceive of duration, it follows from this that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this possibility, since he claims, “For Hume, there is no distinction between the idea of a manner and the 
general idea of objects arrayed in that manner” (Baxter 21).  Such a distinction would violate Hume’s 
theory of abstraction.  Claiming that the parts of a manner are the objects arrayed in that manner, 
however, would be perfectly consistent with Hume’s notion of abstract ideas.  Hence Baxter needs a 
stronger argument against the “time is a manner” interpretation that he opposes.   
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all successions are temporal. After all, “since the idea of 
duration is the idea of a succession qua successive,” says 
Baxter, “it applies to any succession” (Baxter 21).   
 This idea of duration also implies that nothing can 
have duration except for successions. Anything lacking 
successiveness cannot be said to have duration.  
Consequently, unchangeable objects, which Hume calls 
steadfast objects, cannot and do not serve as the basis for 
the idea of duration. Unlike changeable objects, which are 
really multiple things in succession, steadfast objects are 
just single objects that only exist for one moment. Since 
they are not successions themselves and lack 
successiveness, steadfast objects lack duration, and the 
idea of duration can never be derived from or applied to 
them (Baxter 21). Hume goes so far as to say that applying 
the idea of time to a steadfast object involves a fiction 
(T 1.2.3.11).    
The problem, however, is that we very often do apply 
the idea of duration or time to steadfast objects.  
Whenever we make mistakes of this sort, we confuse two 
similar ideas and apply the wrong idea to the object we 
perceive or contemplate. In this particular case, Baxter 
thinks the two ideas that get confused are the idea of the 
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steadfast object and the idea of “a succession of things 
exactly resembling the steadfast object” (Baxter 44). Only 
successions of changeable objects can have duration (T 
1.2.3.11), so to attribute duration to steadfast objects, 
which are unchangeable by definition, always involves a 
mistake.    
 “Because we are constantly experiencing succession,” 
Baxter claims, “we tend to think of an object experienced 
at one time……and that object experienced at a later 
time……not as one steadfast thing but as many things in 
succession” (45). No steadfast object can be many things in 
succession, however, because that would make the steadfast 
object a changeable object, which it cannot be by 
definition. Baxter thinks that what we really experience is 
a single steadfast object coexisting with several moments 
of a succession, not a succession of objects that exactly 
resemble this steadfast object. The act of experiencing a 
single steadfast object coexisting with some or all of the 
members of a succession of changeable objects is 
phenomenologically very similar to experiencing a 
succession of changeable objects, and the failure to 
distinguish between these two types of experiences leads to 
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the misapplication of the idea of duration to a steadfast 
object (Baxter 44-45).    
 Baxter is well aware that the idea of a steadfast 
object coexisting with some or all members of a succession 
is esoteric, so his book contains lengthy and detailed 
explanations of and defenses for this position. His overall 
argument appears to be as follows. Steadfast objects, by 
definition, do not change. All changeable things are many 
things in succession. Since only successions can have 
duration, and steadfast objects are not successions, 
steadfast objects do not and cannot have duration. Hume 
believes that both successions and steadfast objects exist.  
Therefore, successions coexist with steadfast objects.   
 Baxter expands upon this basic argument to arrive at 
far more radical and counterintuitive conclusions, namely, 
that moments of time can coexist with other moments of 
time, and that a single moment of a certain length can 
coexist with several briefer moments. These 
counterintuitive notions are consequences of his claim that 
successions coexist with steadfast objects. After all, 
anything that exists in time must exist at least one 
moment. Since steadfast objects are not successive, they 
cannot exist at more than one moment. Thus they only can 
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only exist at a single moment. Once one adds the premise 
“if things coexist, then the moments they exist at 
coexist,” one must conclude that the single moment at which 
a steadfast object exists happens to coexist with several 
distinct successive moments (Baxter 31). Put simply, the 
crux of Baxter’s interpretation of Hume’s theory of time is 
that moments of varying lengths of time can coexist with 
each other.  
 To clarify his ideas, Baxter provides several examples 
of steadfast objects coexisting with successions. For Hume, 
the term “object” often includes perceptions. Hence 
“steadfast object” can easily mean “steadfast perception.” 
Baxter thinks there are many places in the Treatise where 
Hume discusses steadfast perceptions coexisting with a 
succession. One such place is T 1.2.3.7, where Hume says 
that a man preoccupied with a single thought is not aware 
of the passage of time. This must mean that the man is not 
aware of any successions. Baxter claims that successions 
are still occurring, however – the man just is not aware of 
them. These successions coexist with the single thought, 
which entails that the moment at which the thought exists 
happens to coexist with the moments of all of the 
successions taking place at the same time (Baxter 32).     
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 Baxter also believes that successions themselves, and 
not just the moments that compose them, can coexist as 
well. He claims that “a temporal succession coexists with 
another just in case each moment in one coexists with some 
moment in the other, and vice versa” (Baxter 41). As an 
example of coexisting successions, he invites the reader to 
imagine Hume experiencing a change in mood while he listens 
to a bird singing (Baxter 38). The sounds of the bird 
singing constitute one succession; the various moods Hume 
feels constitute another, and he experiences both 
successions simultaneously. 
 Coexistent successions play such an important role in 
Baxter’s interpretation of Hume that he claims they are the 
source of the idea of time. He states that “we experience 
time by experiencing various coexistent successions of 
objects. It is the ideas of these we use to form the 
abstract idea of time” (Baxter 37).  
 I strongly disagree with this claim, for two main 
reasons. I very highly doubt that we do, in fact, 
experience coexistent successions. Even if we do, I think 
one can argue, on Humean grounds, that we can never derive 
the idea of time from them.    
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Hume’s description of coexistence, and the process by 
which the mind experiences coexistent things, lead to a 
problem for Baxter’s belief that we experience coexistent 
successions. At T 2.3.7.5, Hume contrasts the process of 
experiencing space with the process of experiencing time, 
and asserts,  
 
……space or extension consists of a number of co-
existent parts dispos’d in a certain order, and 
capable of being at once present to the sight or 
feeling. On the contrary, time or succession, 
tho’ it consists likewise of parts, never 
presents to us more than one at once; nor is it 
possible for any two of them ever to be co-
existent. These qualities of the objects have a 
suitable effect on the imagination. The parts of 
extension being susceptible of an union to the 
senses, acquire an union in the fancy, and as the 
appearance of one part excludes not another, the 
transition or passage of the thought thro’ the 
contiguous parts is by that means render’d more 
smooth and easy. On the other hand, the 
incompatibility of the parts of time in their 
real existence separates them in the imagination, 
and makes it more difficult11 for that faculty to 
trace any long succession or series of events. 
Every part must appear single and alone, nor can 
regularly have entrance into the fancy without 
banishing what is suppos’d to have been 
immediately precedent. 
  
                                                          
11
  This word is italicized in the original text.   
27 
 
I will discuss this passage in more detail in later 
chapters. For my purposes here, however, I will concentrate 
on Hume’s claim that the experience of coexistent things is 
easier for the mind than the experience of successive 
things. The nature of coexistence makes whatever is 
coexistent easier to experience than something which is not 
coexistent.  
Consequently, if Baxter is right, coexistent 
successions must be easier to experience than ordinary, 
non-coexistent successions. Unfortunately for Baxter, this 
is not the case. An examination of some very common kinds 
of experiences shows that the more intensely the mind 
focuses on one succession, or member(s) of a succession, 
the less aware it becomes of any other members of any other 
successions. Many people have had the experience of driving 
to a familiar location, one they have driven to countless 
times, and arriving at their destination without 
remembering the drive there. While they were driving, they 
obviously experienced a constant succession of impressions 
from the other cars on the road, traffic lights, road 
signs, and all of the other myriad impressions necessarily 
associated with the act of driving. Yet, because they were 
preoccupied the succession of thoughts or feelings they had 
28 
 
while driving, they were not fully aware of those 
impressions; if they were, they would have been able to 
remember the trip.  
A similar phenomenon is well known to students of all 
ages, and often occurs while reading a page from a textbook 
or some other material required for class. Students 
frequently engage in a train of thought as they begin to 
read the page, and then arrive at the bottom of that page 
without knowing or remembering anything that they read. In 
this case, the sequence of thoughts students engage in as 
they read constitute one succession, and the perceptions of 
the words they read constitutes another. If people can 
experience coexistent successions, it is hard to understand 
why these types of examples – the one discussed here and 
the driving example discussed above – occur at all, let 
alone why they occur so often. A much more plausible 
explanation for these very common phenomena is that the 
mind’s concentration on one succession prevents it from 
experiencing other successions.    
Hume’s remark that “A man in a sound sleep, or 
strongly occupy’d with one thought, is insensible of time” 
(T 1.2.3.7) strongly suggests he would deny the possibility 
of experiencing coexistent successions. If it were truly 
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possible to experience coexistent successions, then there 
is no reason why being preoccupied with a single thought or 
a succession of thoughts would prevent a person from being 
aware of a temporal succession. Obviously, if preoccupation 
with one thought makes awareness of a single succession 
difficult, then it would make awareness of two or more 
coexistent successions even more difficult.      
People in sound sleep are not conscious, and hence 
cannot have any successive perceptions. Concentration on a 
single thought precludes one from perceiving, or even being 
aware of, any succession. If it were truly possible to 
experience coexistent successions, then the mind must be 
able to experience at least two moments simultaneously, as 
well as the thoughts, impressions, ideas, or perceptions 
which exist at those moments. Obviously, if the mind could 
accomplish such a feat, contemplating just one item in 
consciousness – which it does whenever it becomes 
preoccupied with a single thought – would not prevent it 
from also being aware a part or multiple parts of a 
succession which coexists with it. Hume’s denial that the 
mind can be aware of successions while it focuses on a 
single thought strongly suggests, therefore, that Hume 
would also deny the possibility of experiencing coexistent 
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successions. It also strongly suggests that experiencing 
coexistent successions is much more difficult than Baxter 
seems to think it is.  
Another problem facing Baxter follows from his 
description of coexistent successions. Recall that, 
according to Baxter, “a temporal succession coexists with 
another just in case each moment in one coexists with some 
moment in the other, and vice versa” (Baxter 41). Thus if X 
and Y are distinct coexistent temporal successions, it is 
impossible for some moments of one succession to fail to 
coexist with any moment or moments of the other succession. 
This means that only completed successions can coexist. A 
succession is complete when its last moment will not be 
followed by another moment; no more moments can be added to 
a complete succession.12 If a moment is added to succession 
X, for example, and that new moment does not coexist with 
any of the moments in Y, then X and Y are no longer 
coexistent successions. 
                                                          
12
  To clarify this notion of a completed succession, consider the years 2009 and 2010.  Since it is currently 
August of 2009 as I write this, there are several more days, weeks, and months left to 2009.  At the time 
of this writing, the temporal succession that we refer to as the year 2009 has not yet been completed.  
Once December 31
st
 of 2009 ends, however, the year 2009 will be complete, and there will be no more 
days, weeks, and months left to 2009, since all of them would have already transpired.  Once December 
31
st
 2009 ends, the temporal succession we refer to as the year 2010 will begin.  The year 2010 will not be 
complete until December 31
st
 2010 ends, at which point 2010 would become a completed succession.     
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Incomplete successions lack some of their moments. For 
this reason, such incomplete successions fail to conform to 
Baxter’s definition of coexistent successions. Since they 
lack some of their moments, it is obviously not the case 
that “each moment in one [succession] coexists with some 
moment in the other, and vice versa.”    
The problem, however, is that whether or not one can 
be accurately described as experiencing completed 
successions depends upon how one interprets one’s 
experience. Consider Baxter’s example of Hume experiencing 
a change in mood as he listens to a singing bird. Suppose 
for the sake of argument that one bird chirps for a while, 
flies away, and is replaced by another bird that chirps for 
a while. Is that one succession of birdsong, or two?  
Should we consider the song of each bird as a completed 
succession in itself, or is only the singing of both birds 
taken together a completed succession? Clearly, similar 
questions could be raised about virtually any succession.   
By acknowledging that successions are able to have 
sub-successions (Baxter 46), Baxter unknowingly strengthens 
this objection to his own position. It is very easy to 
conceive of many, if not all, successions as being members 
of a larger succession. A succession that lasts a minute, 
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for example, could be part of an hour-long succession, 
which could be part of a day-long succession, etc. Baxter 
leaves himself vulnerable to this possibility when he 
claims that, although “all coexistent successions flow 
relative to each other……we can take some external 
successions, like the ticking of clocks, to be the standard 
by which we judge the rate of other successions” (Baxter 
42). The “ticking of clocks” involves an intersubjective 
standard consisting of measurable units of time. Since for 
any finite, measurable unit of time that humans can 
experience it is possible to conceive of a longer unit of 
time (a century is longer than a decade which is longer 
than a year, etc) the length of time for which a certain 
set of coexistent successions exist can be considered part 
of a much longer succession, meaning those coexisting 
successions would be members of a single, longer 
succession.   
If sets of coexisting successions are all members of a 
larger succession, however, they cannot be coexistent.  
This consequence follows from Hume’s insistence that the 
parts of time cannot be coexistent, since coexistence is 
the distinguishing characteristic of extension, not 
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duration.13 Baxter acknowledges this fact, but claims Hume 
only prohibits members of the same succession from 
coexisting with each other, not one succession coexisting 
with another (Baxter 43).14 Obviously, then, if all 
coexistent successions are actually members of a single, 
longer succession, then they would be moments of that 
single succession, and hence could not coexist with 
anything.  
While Baxter does directly address the issue of the 
means by which one can determine which moments belong to 
which succession, his comments on the subject fail to 
liberate him from the possibility of interpreting any pair 
of coexistent successions as constituting a part of a 
larger succession, which would preclude them from being 
coexistent. After posing the question, “What makes moments 
members of the same succession of moments?” Baxter claims, 
 
                                                          
13
   I will explore Hume’s reason for thinking this way in my next chapter.   
14
  See also page 41, where Baxter writes, “A succession of moments is several moments such that for any 
two, one of them is later than the other, and such that for any two, either no moment is between them or 
any moment between them is one of the several. Thus distinct coexistent moments are not in the same 
succession, though in principle they could be in different successions which otherwise have all the same 
moments.”  
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The experienced unity of successions of objects is a 
result of the principles of associations of ideas……In 
all cases, temporal contiguity plays a role. Sameness 
of place helps unify some successions. The successions 
of things in no place, however, must be united by the 
help of resemblance or causation. So, if Hume enjoys 
the succession of tastes in a sip of a complex claret, 
their resemblance as tastes and their having a common 
cause helps unify the succession. If Hume 
simultaneously listens to a birdsong and feels a 
change in mood, each of these two successions of 
perceptions likewise are unified without appeal to 
sameness of place. (Though, it must be said, Hume will 
naturally attribute place to each to ‘compleat the 
union’ [T 1.4.5.12; SBN 237]-he will hear the song as 
in the bird’s throat and feel the moods as in his own 
breast.) The abstract idea of time abstracts from the 
particular natural relations unifying a succession, 
just retaining their being unified some way or other 
(Baxter 37 -38).   
 
In the passage from the Treatise that Baxter references, 
Hume claims that the taste, smell, color, and tangibility 
of a fruit are inseparable qualities, and always coexist in 
their appearance to the mind. These qualities are related 
to the fruit via the relations of causation and contiguity 
in the time and place of their appearance, but the 
qualities themselves do not exist in any place. The fruit 
exists in a particular place, of course, but the qualities 
do not. Hume thinks that the coexistent qualities of any 
extended object should not be attributed to the extended 
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object.15 Although the coexistent qualities do not exist in 
any part of the extended object, or in any place at all, we 
have a tendency to attribute a new relation, a “conjunction 
in place” to the other relations, to make it easier for us 
to transition from the thought of the extended object to 
the thought of the qualities. It is much easier for the 
mind to understand how the coexistent qualities of the 
extended object relate to the extended object if it 
conceptualizes the qualities as belonging to, that is, 
contained in, the extended object.   
Hume claims “’tis a quality, which I shall often have 
occasion to remark in human nature……that when objects are 
united by any relation, we have a strong propensity to add 
some new relation to them, in order to compleat the union” 
(T 1.4.5.12). The mind’s experience of the qualities of a 
fruit, mentioned above, is one example of this principle.  
As another example, Hume says that “from the relations of 
causation and contiguity in time betwixt two objects, we 
feign likewise that of a conjunction in place, in order to 
strengthen the connexion” (T 1.4.5.12). Based upon these 
comments, it seems that Baxter’s speculation as to how Hume 
would opt to unify the succession of birdsong and the 
                                                          
15
  For his arguments in support of this position, see T 1.4.5.13-14.  
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succession of moods – by somehow attributing place to them 
– is plausible. 
There are other ways of unifying the successions, 
however. By using the philosophical relations Hume 
discusses,16 one can compare the length of the coexistent 
successions to a longer succession. Some of Hume’s comments 
enable one to unify the successions in this manner. 
Consider, for example, Hume’s remark that “‘Tis evident, 
that time or duration consists of different parts. For 
otherwise we cou’d not conceive a longer or shorter 
duration” (T 1.2.3.8). The coexistent successions of 
birdsong and moods obviously have a particular duration. 
One can surely conceive of a duration being longer than the 
duration of those coexistent successions. One can also say 
that the moments of the successions resemble each other 
insofar as they all belong to the same succession – the 
longer succession.   
Suppose, for instance, that Hume really did hear birds 
singing one day, and also felt a simultaneous change in 
mood. Obviously, if Hume did have an actual experience like 
                                                          
16
  According to T 1.3.1.1, the seven philosophical relations are resemblance, identity, relations of time 
and place, proportion in quality or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation. The natural 
relations Baxter mentions in the passage I quoted are resemblance, contiguity, and causation (T 1.1.4.1). I 
will mention these relations again briefly in Chapter Four.   
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that, then it must have occurred during one of the years he 
was alive. Suppose that Hume had this experience in the 
year 1737. The year 1737, like any year, is clearly a 
temporal succession; it is temporal succession of 365 days. 
As Hume himself makes clear, the year 1737 cannot coexist 
with another temporal succession:  
 
‘Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a 
manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts 
succeeds another, and that none of them, however 
contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same 
reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the 
present year 1738, every moment must be distinct from, 
and posterior or antecedent to another” (T 1.2.2.4).    
 
The year 1737 cannot coexist with the year 1738 because 
1738 cannot begin to exist until 1737 is complete, and 
therefore no longer existent; the very existence of any 
part of 1738 presupposes that every part of 1737 has 
already passed. The “parts” of a year are the days, weeks, 
and months which compose the year. In the above passage, 
Hume explicitly denies that the parts of time can ever be 
coexistent. I have shown above how one can “unify” 
coexistent successions by conceiving a longer duration 
which contains both successions, thus making both 
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successions components of that longer succession. One way 
to do this is to interpret one’s experience as occurring 
within a specific year, but in principle the longer 
succession could be much, much shorter as well. In all 
cases, the parts of the longer succession – which would 
include the successions Baxter would label as coexistent – 
cannot coexist.      
Even if Baxter could successfully defend himself from 
these objections, and could prove that we do experience 
coexistent successions, he would still need to provide a 
Humean explanation of how we derive the abstract idea of 
time from these coexistent successions. I am not confident 
that any such Humean explanation can be provided. Hume 
believes the idea of time cannot be divorced from the idea 
of a succession. The idea of time can easily be separated 
from the idea of coexistence, though, because coexistence 
is a feature of extension, not time. If the mind repeatedly 
experiences many particular coexistent successions, 
however, what will prevent it from focusing on the 
coexistence of the successions instead of their 
successiveness? All coexistent successions would exhibit 
both coexistence and successiveness, yet only the latter is 
necessary for the idea of time; the former is not necessary 
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for the idea of time at all, and is far more likely to make 
the mind think of extension instead of time.  While the 
mind can easily form the idea of time even if no coexistent 
successions ever existed, it could never form the idea of 
time if no successions of any sort existed. Thus it is very 
difficult to understand how the mind could ever form the 
idea of time from the experience of coexistent successions.   
Despite my criticisms of Baxter’s position, I agree 
with him that Hume’s conception of time is best thought of 
as an abstract idea. Even in the passages where Hume 
defines time as a manner, he emphasizes that the idea of 
time cannot be separated from a succession of changeable 
objects. Merely thinking of a manner in which something 
exists will not generate the idea of time unless that 
manner is successive in nature. Hume equates time with “the 
manner in which some real objects exist” because he thinks 
real objects exist in succession. It seems to be impossible 
to avoid the conclusion that the idea of time for Hume must 
be the idea of a particular succession that brings to mind 
other successions one has experienced, with a special 
emphasis placed on what these successions have in common – 
successiveness. 
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I also agree with Baxter that Hume uses the terms 
“time” and “duration” interchangeably. Many commentators, 
however, claim not only that “duration” has some meanings 
that are not synonymous with “time,” but also that the very 
idea of duration is itself a fiction for Hume!  
McRae and the Two Types of Fictions 
 One of these commentators is McRae. McRae’s “The 
Import of Hume’s Theory of Time”17 mentions some of the 
difficulties involved with determining precisely what Hume 
means by “duration” and whether or not “duration” is 
synonymous with “time.” Whereas Baxter argues for 
conceiving time as an abstract idea, McRae thinks it is 
more accurate to view time as “the manner in which 
impressions appear to the mind” (McRae 26). He bases his 
interpretation on the well-known passage from the Treatise 
in which Hume discusses the five musical notes of a flute, 
a passage which McRae thinks also proves that the idea of 
time violates the Copy Principle (McRae 26). As for 
“duration,” McRae claims that Hume sometimes treats “time” 
and “duration” as synonyms, and sharply distinguishes them 
at other times. When duration is thought to be “an object 
                                                          
17
  McRae, R.  “The Import of Hume’s Theory of Time” Hume Studies 6,2 (1980) in Tweyman, Stanley (ed).  
David Hume: Critical Assessments vol. III.  New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 25-34.   
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qua continuing or persevering or enduring, whether or not 
undergoing successive changes,” duration is not a synonym 
for time. Instead, that understanding of duration involves 
a fiction (McRae 26).    
 McRae devotes the rest of his essay explaining 
precisely how duration is a fictitious idea, and what 
implications this idea has for the rest of Hume’s 
philosophy. For Hume, time consists of parts.  These parts 
are not and cannot be coexistent, because coexistence of 
parts is a feature of extension, not duration. Therefore, 
the idea of time cannot come from unchangeable objects.  
The idea of duration (understood in its correct sense) can 
only be produced by “a succession of changeable objects” 
(McRae 26). It cannot ever be applied to or derived from 
unchangeable objects. Applying the idea of duration to 
unchanging and unchangeable objects always involves a 
fiction.   
 There are two kinds of fictions. The first occurs when 
the mind confuses one idea with another and then 
incorrectly applies it to an object. It consists in “the 
misapplication of an idea derived from some original 
impression to something other than its proper object” 
(McRae 29). The second type of fiction is “a pure invention 
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of the imagination designed to resolve a contradiction – a 
contradiction to which the first type of fiction gives 
rise” (McRae 29).     
 According to McRae, duration is a fiction of the first 
type. The two ideas that are confused are number and unity.  
Recall that the idea of duration can only be derived from a 
succession of changeable objects. There are two ways the 
mind can interpret its experience of this succession (McRae 
29). First, the mind can interpret the succession as 
consisting of multiple changeable objects – i.e., as there 
being a changeable object at each moment, with there being 
as many objects as there are moments in the succession. 
This way of interpreting the succession of changeable 
objects produces the idea of number (McRae 30). The mind 
can also interpret the succession as there being only one 
object that continues to exist unaltered at each of the 
moments in the succession. This gives us the idea of unity 
(McRae 30).   
 The idea of duration results from the failure to 
distinguish between these two ways of interpreting the 
experience of a succession of changeable objects. The mind 
actually experiences multiple changeable objects during the 
succession, but thinks it is experiencing a single object 
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existing unaltered at each moment in the succession.  
Obviously, however, no object can exhibit both number 
(plurality) and unity simultaneously, and thinking 
otherwise leads to a contradiction. The mind attempts to 
reconcile this contradiction by inventing the idea of 
identity, which is a fiction of the second type (McRae 30).   
 McRae then explains how the fictitious idea of 
identity generates the idea of substance. He interprets 
Hume as claiming the mind encounters an interrupted 
succession of appearances of an object and applies the idea 
of identity to it. The idea of substance arises when the 
mind confuses a succession of changeable objects and an 
interrupted succession of appearances of an object. The 
mind thinks that the object that appears at a certain 
moment after the interruption is the same as – that is, 
identical to – the object that appeared prior to the 
interruption. A contradiction arises between the identity 
of an object and the interrupted appearances of it. In 
other words, the mind experiences a contradiction between 
number and identity. To resolve this contradiction, the 
mind forms the idea of substance (McRae 31-32). The idea of 
substance is a fiction of the second type.   
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 McRae argues that the same kind of process from the 
first type of fiction to a contradiction to the second type 
of fiction back to the first type again leads to the ideas 
of soul, self, power, necessary connection, and agency.  
All of these fictions, McRae claims, derive from the idea 
of duration (McRae 34). McRae seems to think that there is 
a steady progression in the Treatise from one fiction to 
the other, and that each fiction is derived from the 
previous ones, with duration being the very first and 
primary fiction. For example, the contradiction between the 
fictitious ideas of simplicity and identity give rise to 
the fictions of soul and self, and the same sort of process 
through various fictions causes the mind to interpret power 
“as a quality in a substance which endures as the same 
substance, through undergoing change” (McRae 34). Based on 
the way McRae uses the italicized terms, he clearly 
interprets them as being Humean fictions, hence showing how 
one fictitious idea – in this case, power – arises out of 
many others. McRae goes so far as to say that if we 
eliminated all these fictions, all that would be left would 
be perceptions (McRae 34). 
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Pappas’ Response to McRae 
In “On McRae’s Hume,” Pappas raises three objections 
to McRae’s arguments.18 The first objection is that, on 
McRae’s interpretation of Hume, Hume is not consistent.  
According to this interpretation, Hume claims that we have 
an idea of time, but not an idea of duration. We cannot 
have an idea of duration because it cannot be derived from 
any impression. Yet the idea of time, according to Pappas, 
cannot be derived from an impression either. “To be 
consistent,” Pappas writes, “Hume would have to conclude 
either that there is not an idea of time after all, or that 
the reason for the lack of an idea of duration would have 
to be withdrawn” (Pappas 36-37). Pappas claims that time, 
along with the well-known missing shade of blue example, is 
another exception to Hume’s Copy Principle. The idea of 
time is invented by the imagination; it is not derived from 
any impression (Pappas 37).   
 While the first objection Pappas raises reveals an 
inconsistency in McRae’s interpretation of Hume, his second 
objection exposes an apparent inconsistency in McRae’s own 
position regarding the two types of fictions. McRae claims 
                                                          
18
  Pappas, G.S. “On McRae’s Hume” Hume Studies 7,2 (1981) in Tweyman, Stanley (ed).  David Hume: 
Critical Assessments vol. III.  New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 35-38.   
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that duration is a type one fiction, in which one idea is 
incorrectly applied to another. McRae also claims that we 
have no idea of duration. If we have no idea of duration, 
how can we confuse the idea of duration with another idea?  
McRae cannot consistently assert both that we have no idea 
of duration and that duration is a type one fiction (Pappas 
37).   
 Pappas’ third objection is that there is no room in 
Hume’s ontology for the second type of fiction. Such 
fictions cannot be ideas, impressions, mental acts, or 
dispositions. There is nothing else that Hume could 
possibly allow them to be, so Hume would have to deny that 
they exist (Pappas 37).  
A closer examination into the reasoning Pappas 
presents to support this argument reveals a flaw that 
undermines the argument’s effectiveness. When Pappas 
constructs this argument at the very end of his paper, he 
uses duration as an example of a second kind of fiction, 
because he thinks it is impossible for it to be a type one 
fiction. A second type fiction cannot be an impression, 
since impressions are not invented, and the second type of 
fiction as McRae describes it is something that is 
invented. It is very difficult to understand how duration 
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can be construed as a mental act or disposition. Pappas 
also claims – and this is where he makes a mistake – that 
duration cannot be an idea, because Hume denies that there 
is an idea of duration. Both McRae and Pappas are wrong to 
think that Hume believes we lack an idea of duration. As I 
will argue later in this chapter, duration itself is not a 
fiction; the fiction consists in believing steadfast or 
unchanging objects have duration. 
Miller’s Interpretation of Hume   
 In “Hume’s Impression of Succession (Time),” Miller 
also responds to McRae, and does so in a way that attempts 
to render the idea of time consistent with the Copy 
Principle.19 When discussing the five notes of the flute 
passage, Miller claims McRae failed to understand a very 
important aspect of that principle. Most commentators on 
Hume, McRae included, interpret Hume as asserting merely 
that every simple idea derives from a simple impression, 
and that for every simple impression, there is an idea that 
corresponds with it. Miller argues that “not only do all 
simple ideas derive from simple impressions, but that both 
the idea and the impression are also always present in the 
                                                          
19
   Miller, Jon.  “Hume’s Impression of Succession (Time)” Dialogue XLVII (2008): 603-617.   
48 
 
mind as successive pairs” (Miller 605). He calls this 
principle the “Pair Principle” (Miller 605).   
 Miller elucidates the Pair Principle and its 
implications by examining the process by which Hume thinks 
ideas are formed. Hume’s remark that an idea “remains after 
the impression ceases” (T 1.1.2.1) seems to suggest that 
impressions and ideas cannot exist together, that the 
impression must perish before the idea  can come to be.  
This would seem to falsify the Pair Principle.   
 Miller disagrees. He bases his defense of the Pair 
Principle on Hume’s insistence that the only significant 
distinction between impressions and ideas is that the 
former are much stronger and more vivid than the latter.  
At T 1.1.7.5, Hume claims that “an idea is a weaker 
impression.” These types of comments lead Miller to 
conclude that it is not necessary for the impression to 
cease simpliciter for an idea to form, but only that the 
vivacity of the impression cease. The idea that is retained 
in memory “is one in which the impression has remained with 
the idea to form a successive couplet with a shared level 
of vivacity. Consequently the impression ceases only in the 
sense that it stops being a fully vivacious uncopied 
perception” (Miller 606).   
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 In general, Miller’s interpretation of the Humean idea 
formation process seems to be as follows. The senses 
receive an impression.  The mind copies the impression, 
thus causing the impression to lose some of its vivacity.  
This weakened impression is the idea that resembles the 
impression. To help illustrate his interpretation of the 
process, he returns to the musical notes example. Suppose 
that the first note is C-sharp and the second is B-flat.  
Obviously, the notes come in a certain order in a 
succession; C-sharp is first, B-flat is second, et cetera.  
Miller, however, focuses on the fact that the mind would 
have both an impression and an idea of each note within the 
succession. Thus, the impression of C-sharp gets stored in 
memory, loses some of its vivacity, and becomes the idea of 
C-sharp. Likewise, the impression of B-flat weakens and 
becomes the idea of B-flat, and so on for the other notes.  
Hence just perceiving a single note involves a succession, 
namely, the succession from the impression of that note to 
the idea of note (Miller 606).  
 Miller points out that McRae’s interpretation of the 
musical notes example is not completely wrong:  
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McRae is still correct in his observation that 
individual perceptions do not have successiveness 
within them. But the parts of time of which both Hume 
and McRae speak are not simply the individual flute 
notes; they are also the individual impressions and 
ideas of the flute notes as they are retained within 
the memory (Miller 607).   
 
In this passage, Miller makes a link between the memory and 
the parts of time. Miller elaborates on this link in much 
greater detail in the second half of his paper. Before he 
does so, however, he tackles another issue that McRae 
discussed: why Hume uses “duration” and “time” synonymously 
when he also claims that the idea of duration is fictional.   
 On McRae’s reading of Hume, time is succession, not 
duration. They are not the same thing, nor should they be 
used interchangeably. Why, then, does Hume use the two 
terms interchangeably? Miller claims Locke’s conception of 
succession strongly influenced Hume’s. The former 
conceptualizes duration “as something that happens between 
the parts of succession” (Miller 608). Miller argues that 
Hume’s ontology has no place for anything that occurs 
between parts of a succession. The parts of successions are 
perceptions, and Hume believes that perceptions are the 
only objects that appear to the mind. The idea of duration 
cannot be derived from anything, so it is a fiction. The 
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idea of succession, however, can be derived from the 
impression of the manner in which perceptions appear to the 
mind (Miller 608-609).   
 Miller’s interpretation of duration clearly differs 
from that of Baxter. In fact, Miller raises four objections 
to Baxter’s position.20 The first of these, unsurprisingly, 
is that Baxter overlooked the fact that time and duration 
are two different things for Hume, for reasons discussed 
earlier. The second objection argues that there cannot be 
different rates of successions. Because time and succession 
are one and the same for Hume, different rates of 
succession necessitates different times that can be used to 
rate them, which is incoherent. Furthermore, coexistent 
successions, as Baxter characterizes them, could not exist 
in Hume’s philosophy of time. The only thing Humean 
ontology would allow them to be is space, since coexistence 
is a distinguishing property of the parts of space, not of 
time, which is always successive.21 Miller’s final objection 
to Baxter follows from the first. One cannot coherently 
                                                          
20
    Miller uses these objections to attack the arguments Baxter develops in an article entitled “Hume on 
Steadfast Objects and Time,” but since they are the same arguments Baxter presents in Hume’s Difficulty 
– the latter is actually an expanded and more detailed version of the former – the objections will apply 
just as well to Hume’s Difficulty as they do to “Hume on Steadfast Objects and Time.”   
21
  I will explain Hume’s reasons for thinking this way in my next chapter.   
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speak of steadfast perceptions coexisting with several 
briefer moments without employing the fictional idea of 
duration (Miller 612). In other words, Baxter’s 
interpretation of Hume cannot possibly be accurate because 
his interpretation requires the use of the fictional idea 
of duration, which renders the idea of steadfast 
perceptions coexisting with several briefer moments 
fictitious as well.      
 The remainder of Miller’s article consists in a series 
of arguments which provide reasons for thinking that the 
idea of time is consistent with the Copy Principle. Miller 
mentions some remarks Hume makes in the Treatise to the 
effect that we can perceive extension, but not the 
countless perceptions that constitute the extension. It is 
impossible for the mind to perceive the individual parts of 
extension in isolation from the extension. With time, 
however, the reverse is true: the mind can perceive the 
parts of the succession, but not the succession itself in 
isolation from its parts. The fact that the mind cannot 
perceive the parts of extension does not mean no impression 
of the individual parts exists. Simply put, Miller believes 
Hume argues as follows: the idea of extension is real. The 
idea of extension is composed of many parts that the mind 
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cannot divide or perceive. If these parts did not exist, 
extension, which is real, would be composed of entities 
which did not exist. This is logically impossible.  
Therefore the parts of extension (i.e., the individual 
impressions that compose it) are real. Miller argues that 
the same reasoning applies to time. Although we cannot 
perceive succession separated from its parts, there is 
still an impression of succession (Miller 610).  
 Miller uses Hume’s conception of memory to explain how 
we can have an impression of succession. According to Hume, 
“the memory preserves the original form in which its 
objects were presented……the chief exercise of the memory is 
not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and 
position” (T 1.1.3.3). Of course, the “original form” in 
which the perceptions appear to the mind is a successive 
order – a successive order in which ideas follow 
impressions (Miller 613).   
 Hume thinks the idea of time is always with us because 
there is always a constant succession of perception in our 
minds. Miller, basing his argument on T 1.4.6.20, 
emphasizes that only memory can make us aware of this 
constant succession. Miller argues that “the succession of 
perceptions, when first encountered by the memory, cannot 
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be a succession of distinct perceptions” because “it is the 
imagination alone that separates perceptions into distinct 
entities, not the memory” (Miller 613).22   
 This interplay between the imagination and the memory 
is crucial for Miller’s argument that we can experience 
impressions of successions. Miller explains the process as 
follows:  
 
At the earliest stage of awareness, perceptions are in 
successive pairs of impressions and their idea copies.  
The……memory becomes aware of an impression of a 
succession. The impression of succession is the 
succession of impressions to ideas. This is possible 
because the perceptions in succession (the impression 
and the idea) are not fully distinguished as distinct 
perceptions. The only fully distinct perception at 
this early stage of awareness is the impression of the 
succession of the impressions and ideas. Afterwards 
the imagination separates the impressions and ideas 
into distinct perceptions. In this way Hume’s 
empiricism shows how time can exist as a distinct 
impression of succession (Miller 615).   
 
Based upon how Miller describes it, the “impression of 
succession” must be a complex impression. The parts of this 
                                                          
22
  Miller interprets several of Hume’s comments about imagination – especially T 1.1.3.4, where Hume 
asserts, “Wherever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a 
separation” and T 1.2.4.3, where Hume writes, “wherever objects are different, they are distinguishable 
and separable by the imagination” – as supporting the idea that only imagination can separate 
perceptions into distinct entities. 
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complex impression are clearly the impressions and ideas 
that successively present themselves to the mind. It is 
very unclear, though, whether the impression is an 
impression of sensation or of reflection. If the simple 
impressions that compose it are impressions of sensation, 
then it would have to be a complex impression of sensation.  
If, however, the simple impressions that compose it are 
impressions of reflection, then the impression of 
succession must be a complex impression of reflection.   
 Clearly, the impression of succession as Miller 
describes it is indeterminate and non-particular. As his 
objections to Locke’s theory of abstract ideas illustrates, 
Hume cannot allow such indeterminate, non-particular 
impressions into his epistemology. Hume thinks it is 
impossible for the mind to experience unspecified 
impressions and ideas. The mind always experiences 
particular impressions and particular ideas. Miller 
believes that the imagination separates the perceptions 
into impressions and ideas. Merely separating them in this 
way, however, is not sufficient to make them truly 
distinct; every impression and idea must have particular, 
specific content. The impression of the succession of the 
impressions to ideas lacks such specific, particular 
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content. As Miller explains the process, the members of the 
impression of succession of impressions to ideas are not 
distinct, determinate, or particular when the mind becomes 
aware of them. The mind cannot distinguish between them. 
This means that the mind has a fully distinct impression of 
the succession, but no distinct impression of any of the 
members of that succession. The problem is that the mind’s 
ability to have a distinct, particular impression of a 
succession without having a distinct, particular impression 
of the members of that succession is inconsistent with 
Hume’s rejection of the Lockean notion of abstract ideas. 
Obviously, therefore, the impression of the succession of 
impressions to ideas is not the kind of impression Hume’s 
philosophy could allow.   
 Another problem with Miller’s position concerns his 
argument that duration is a fiction. Hume may have received 
his conception of succession from Locke, but there is no 
textual evidence in the Treatise that he uses “duration” to 
refer to what happens between the parts of a succession. 
What Miller – as well as McRae and Pappas – fail to realize 
is that, whenever Hume speaks of the idea of duration being 
a fiction in the Treatise, the fiction always consists of 
attributing duration to unchangeable objects. In other 
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words, the mistake involves thinking that the idea of time 
can be derived from objects that are not members of a 
succession, or that the idea of time can be separated from 
a succession of changeable things. At no point in the 
Treatise does Hume ever claim that duration itself is a 
fiction. These reflections show that duration and 
succession are inseparable for Hume. Consequently, every 
succession has duration, which means that every succession 
is temporal.23 This seems to suggest that duration for Hume 
just is succession, since it is impossible to separate them 
conceptually.    
 Time and the Copy Principle 
As the previous pages have shown, many of the 
commentators who have written on Hume’s theory of time have 
expressed concern that his conception of time might violate 
his Copy Principle. I think the best way to respond to this 
concern in a Humean way is to interpret time as a compound 
abstract idea. A compound idea seems to be another term for 
a complex idea, since Hume uses the terms “compound ideas” 
and “complex ideas” in a way that very strongly suggests 
                                                          
23
  This implication of Hume’s conception of duration – that all successions are temporal – will play a 
major role in the arguments presented in later chapters.  
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that the two words have exactly the same meaning, and could 
be used interchangeably.  
There are several good reasons for thinking that time 
is a compound or complex idea. Hume has claimed repeatedly 
that the idea of time cannot be separated from the idea of 
a succession of changeable objects. He also claims that 
time consists of parts. Every succession, by definition, 
must have more than one member. Having any idea of any 
succession must involve having an idea of the members of 
that succession, which are the parts of the succession.  
Hence the idea of time must be divisible into parts, which 
would make it a complex or compound idea in Humean 
terminology. Just as the complex idea of an apple can be 
divided into the ideas of the apple’s color, smell, and 
taste, so can the compound idea of time be divided into the 
ideas of the members (parts) of a succession.  
While “compound idea” and “complex idea” are 
semantically equivalent terms, Hume tends to use only the 
former when discussing the ideas of space and time. In T 
1.2.3.12, for example, immediately after explaining why the 
idea of duration can never be derived from unchangeable 
objects, Hume writes:  
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There is another very decisive argument, which 
establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas 
of space and time, and is founded only on the simple 
principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of 
parts, which are indivisible.   
In the next two paragraphs, Hume explicitly refers to the 
idea of extension as a compound idea more than once. He 
then proceeds to argue that the compound impression that 
represents extension consists of impressions of colored, 
tangible atoms. After doing so, he claims that “the same 
reasoning will prove that the indivisible moments of time 
must be fill’d with some real object or existence, whose 
succession forms the duration, and makes it be conceivable 
by the mind” (T 1.2.3.17).24     
When understood as a compound abstract idea, there is 
no Humean reason to expect time to show up as a distinct 
impression or idea distinct from the ideas of the members 
                                                          
24
   Hume does not explicitly write out the argument as it would apply to time. Based upon how he argues 
for the tangibility and color of the atoms of extension, however, it is clear that “the same reasoning” 
when applied to time must be something like what follows: The whole of something has the same 
properties as its parts. The moments which compose the idea of succession must be filled with a real 
object in order to give us the idea of succession. If moments are not filled with or occupied by a real 
object, the idea of time would not exist.  If the idea of time exists, its parts must also exist.  The idea of 
time exists. Therefore, the ideas of moments, the parts of time, exist. These ideas, the ideas of moments, 
must be filled with real objects. This argument reinforces the idea that we could never even conceptualize 
time if we never perceived objects and events occurring within successions, and thus seems to rely on 
Hume’s theory of abstract ideas. Since the argument also requires the idea of time to consist of parts – 
this is such an essential aspect of the reasoning involved that it must be a feature of any reconstruction of 
this argument for it to even be intelligible at all – it also reinforces my claim that Humean time is a 
compound abstract idea.   
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of the succession, just as there is no Humean reason to 
expect the idea of an apple to appear to the mind in 
isolation from the ideas of the apple’s color, smell, and 
taste. There is also no reason to worry about whether such 
a compound idea violates the Copy Principle, since Hume 
states that the Copy Principle only applies to simple 
impressions and ideas. The following passage makes this 
point explicitly clear: 
……I must make use of the distinction of perceptions 
into simple and complex, to limit this general 
discussion, that all our ideas and impressions are 
resembling. I observe, that many of our complex ideas 
never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and 
that many of our complex impressions never are exactly 
copy’d in ideas……I perceive, therefore, that tho’ 
there is in general a great resemblance betwixt our 
complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not 
universally true, that they are exactly copies of each 
other. We may next consider how the case stands with 
our simple perceptions……I venture to affirm, that here 
the rule holds without any exception, and that every 
simple idea has a simple impression which resembles 
it; and every simple impression a simple idea” (T 
1.1.1.4-5). 
   
Complex (or compound) impressions and ideas may conform to 
the principle, but Hume’s realization that they often fail 
to do so compels him to restrict the principle to simple 
impressions and ideas. The Copy Principle does not apply to 
time or to any other compound ideas. Hence all concerns 
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about the idea of time violating the Copy Principle are 
unnecessary and unfounded.  
Concluding Remarks  
Obviously, if time for Hume is a compound abstract 
idea, it must be divisible, since it consists of parts. 
Hume fiercely insists, however, that these parts are not 
and cannot be infinitely divisible. The division of time, 
whether real or imaginary, actual or potential, must 
eventually stop at brief moments that are indivisible 
temporal minima. These indivisible temporal minima are so 
crucial to Hume’s theory of time that it would collapse 
without them. My next chapter will analyze why and how Hume 
argues against the infinite divisibility of time and for 
the existence of temporal minima.    
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Chapter Two  
Hume’s Arguments for Temporal Minima 
Introduction  
As I made clear in the first chapter, successiveness 
is an essential feature of time for Hume. In the present 
chapter, I will explore another essential feature Hume 
attributes to time – its discreteness. Hume believes time 
must consist of discrete, atomistic moments.  
Consequentially, he also believes that time cannot be 
infinitely divisible.   
Throughout the second part of the first book of the 
Treatise, Hume employs two main strategies to support his 
atomistic conception of time. The first involves 
approaching time from a phenomenological perspective, one 
that concentrates on our experience of time and the 
necessary conditions required for this experience. The 
second strategy defends an atomistic theory of time by 
proving that the very concept of time as continuous and 
infinitely divisible leads to logical contradictions.  
Hume’s attempts to derive contradictions from the concept 
of continuous, infinitely divisible time take the form of 
reductio ad absurdums. He constructs four reductio ad 
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absurdum arguments to prove that space cannot be infinitely 
divisible. As Hume himself asserts, the first three of 
these arguments also show that time is not infinitely 
divisible. Since my project here concerns Hume’s theory of 
time, I will not discuss the fourth reductio, which 
pertains exclusively to space.25    
Before developing his reductio arguments, however, 
Hume begins his attack on temporal continuity by 
introducing two thought experiments, one involving a grain 
of sand, the other involving a spot of ink. Both of these 
thought experiments constitute a major component of Hume’s 
phenomenological approach to the divisibility of time.           
 The Grain of Sand Thought Experiment 
 The grain of sand thought experiment proceeds as 
follows:  
‘Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a 
minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which 
it cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot 
be dimminish’d without a total annihilation. When you 
tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a 
                                                          
25
  The fourth reductio argument occurs at T 1.2.2.7-10.  Hume uses his Conceivability Principle to argue 
that mathematical points – here understood to be the most fundamental, indivisible components of 
extension – are conceivable, and therefore possible. If extension were infinitely divisible, such indivisible 
points of extension would not be possible. Thus the assumption that extension is infinitely divisible  
contradicts the fact that indivisible points of extension are possible and conceivable. Dale Jacquette 
provides a detailed analysis of this argument in the fourth chapter of his David Hume’s Critique of Infinity.   
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grain of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers 
and of their distinct proportions; but the images, 
which I form in my mind to represent the things 
themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor 
inferior to that image by which I represent the grain 
of sand itself, which is suppos’d so vastly to exceed 
them. What consists of parts is distinguishable into 
them, and what is distinguishable is separable. But 
whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a 
grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable 
into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand, 
or an infinite number of different ideas (T 1.2.1.3).   
 
Hume does not ask his readers to divide the idea of a grain 
of sand. Instead, he wants his readers to form an image of 
a grain of sand, replace that idea with an idea of a 
smaller part of the grain of sand, replace that idea with 
an idea of a smaller part of the original grain, and to 
repeat this process until the mind cannot go any farther.26  
Hume argues that the mind will eventually arrive at an idea 
of one of the parts of the grain that represents the 
absolute minimum size of the grain that it can conceive.  
Any piece of the grain smaller than that minimum will be 
indistinguishable to the mind from any other piece smaller 
than that minimum. The mind would not be able to 
distinguish between a piece a thousand times smaller than 
the original grain of sand and a piece ten thousand times 
                                                          
26
  For a similar interpretation of this passage, see the footnote on page 47 of Jacquette’s David Hume’s 
Critique of Infinity.   
65 
 
smaller than the original grain. The mind can obviously 
understand what the numbers one thousand and ten thousand 
are, and it can know many mathematical properties that 
these numbers possess, but it cannot imagine a physical 
thing that corresponds to them, such as something ten 
thousand times smaller than a grain of sand.  
Although Hume does not explicitly say so, it is easy 
to see how this argument also applies to time. The mind can 
easily conceptualize many distinct units of time, such as a 
second. The mind can even conceptualize and comprehend some 
units of time shorter than a second, since people 
consciously experience such short durations.27 Beyond a 
certain point, however, the mind loses its ability to 
distinguish between extremely brief moments of time. For 
example, it is impossible for the mind to distinguish 
between a nanosecond (a billionth of a second), a 
picosecond (a trillionth of a second) and a femtosecond (a 
quadrillionth of a second). The mind obviously understands 
what the terms “billionth,” “trillionth,” and 
“quadrillionth” mean, but it cannot conceptualize or 
imagine anything corresponding to those numerical values.   
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  For example, many athletic contests – especially at the professional and Olympic levels – are decided 
on events that occur in a fraction of second. Highly skilled athletes can win or lose competitions based on 
what they do in a tenth of a second or less.   
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The Inkspot Thought Experiment 
Hume’s comments regarding the divisibility of an 
inkspot in the very next paragraph have very similar 
implications for the mind’s ability to conceptualize and 
experience extremely brief durations of time. Hume writes:  
Put a spot of ink upon paper, fix your eye upon that 
spot, and retire to such a distance, that at last you 
lose sight of it; ‘tis plain, that the moment before 
it vanish’d the image or impression was perfectly 
indivisible. ‘Tis not for want of rays of light 
striking on our eyes, that the minute parts of distant 
bodies convey not any sensible impression; but because 
they are reduc’d to a minimum, and were incapable of 
any farther diminution. A microscope or telescope, 
which renders them visible, produces not any new rays 
of light, but only spreads those, which always flow’d 
from them; and by that means both gives parts to 
impressions, which to the naked eye appear simple and 
uncompounded, and advances to a minimum, what was 
formerly imperceptible (T 1.2.1.4).    
 
This inkspot discussion has received considerable attention 
in the literature on Hume’s theory of time. Some of the 
commentators on the passage have misunderstood it. In 
Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, for example, Laird asks, 
“What is the ‘spot’ if the ‘impressions’ form a series? If 
the ‘image or impression’ were perfectly indivisible, how 
could a pair of binoculars ‘spread’ it?” (Laird 68-69). In 
response to Laird’s questions, Flew asserts that “quite 
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clearly the spot is the spot of ink, which is the cause of 
the whole series of impressions; and the minimum is the 
last impression in the series” (Flew 261). As for the 
Laird’s question about the binoculars, Flew interprets Hume 
– correctly, in my opinion – as claiming that physical 
devices do not act on the impressions, but rather spread or 
magnify the rays of light that are already there. Doing so 
makes the impressions visible (Flew 261).   
 One might be tempted to ask why someone could not just 
move in closer to get a better look at the spot. After all, 
it seems that Hume’s inkspot experiment only works when one 
refuses to move in for a closer look. Jacquette explains 
the problem with this objection:  
The idea is that for the subject to change position 
defeats the purpose of the inkspot experiment, which 
is to reveal the existence of sensible extensionless 
indivisibles in every visual field. Indivisibles are 
always present, according to Hume, but are ordinarily 
not discernible, because at certain distances they 
blend in perfectly with their backgrounds (Jacquette 
49).   
 
In other words, the subject would still have the same 
limitation regardless of how close the subject gets to the 
inkspot. There will always be minimum sensibilia. There is 
a sensible threshold that impressions must pass in order to 
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be sensible or perceived by people. When impressions are at 
the threshold, they will always appear to the mind as 
indivisible. Beneath that threshold, they are not sensible 
or perceivable at all.   
 Many of Hume’s comments about time strongly suggest 
that there must be a similar threshold for the experience 
of time. Consider, for example, the following passage:  
It has been remark’d by a great philosopher28 that our 
perceptions have certain bounds in this particular, 
which are fix’d by the original nature and 
constitution of the mind, and beyond which no 
influence of external objects on the senses is ever 
able to hasten or retard our thought. If you wheel 
about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to 
the senses an image of a circle of fire; nor will 
there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its 
revolutions; merely because ‘tis impossible for our 
perceptions to succeed each other with the same 
rapidity, that motion may be communicated to external 
objects. Whenever we have no successive perceptions, 
we have no notion of time, even tho’ there be a real 
succession in the objects. Time cannot make its 
appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with 
a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d 
by some perceivable succession of changeable objects 
(T 1.2.3.7).   
 
A contemporary example which illustrates the same point 
Hume makes here is the act of watching a movie. The 
movements of characters in motion pictures seem to be 
                                                          
28
  John Locke.   
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continuous and smooth. In reality, however, a motion 
picture consists of a succession of individual motionless 
pictures that are projected onto a screen at a rate too 
rapid for the mind to notice the individual frames. The 
mind does not notice the temporal interval between each 
frame because that interval is too short for the mind to 
experience. That interval is below the threshold required 
for the experience of time. The mind cannot distinguish 
between temporal intervals that occur too quickly to reach 
the threshold, just as it cannot distinguish between a 
thousandth and a ten thousandth part of a grain of sand.  
When one watches a movie, one thinks one perceives 
continuous motion, not individual frames being projected at 
a high rate of speed. When one watches a burning coal being 
spun very rapidly, one thinks one sees a steady wheel of 
fire, not one burning coal changing location very rapidly.  
The mind cannot subdivide a movie into its individual 
frames, or the wheel of fire into the different spatial 
locations the coal occupies, because these phenomena happen 
so quickly that they fail to reach the minimum threshold 
required for the mind to experience them.    
 That threshold is the temporal equivalent of minimum 
sensibilia. Due to its very nature, the human mind needs 
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temporal minima in order to experience time. Experiencing 
time involves distinguishing between the different parts of 
time, and the mind’s ability to do this is finite and 
limited. From a phenomenological standpoint, it is 
impossible for the mind to divide time infinitely; it will 
inevitably encounter temporal minima. Clearly, then, 
temporal minima must exist for the experience of time to be 
even remotely possible.29   
The arguments presented up to this point only 
establish that a cognitive, or phenomenological, kind of 
temporal minima exist. Merely proving that the mind cannot 
be aware of or experience any duration that is briefer than 
a certain perceptual and cognitive threshold, however, is 
not sufficient to construct the robust refutation of the 
infinite divisibility of time that Hume desires. In T 1.2, 
Hume also provides purely logical reasons for holding that 
time must be only finitely divisible, and that the very 
concept of time being infinitely divisible leads to 
                                                          
29
  Various scientific studies have confirmed that there is indeed a minimum threshold for any conscious 
experience.  These studies have shown that this minimum threshold is roughly between 100 and 200 
milliseconds, or thousandths of a second. The human brain cannot be consciously aware of, or consciously 
process information about, any duration briefer than this 100 – 200 millisecond threshold. For detailed 
discussions of these experiments, please see chapter 13 of Paul Davies’ About Time: Einstein’s Unfinished 
Revolution and chapter 9 of Jeffrey Schwartz’s The Mind and The Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of 
Mental Force.  
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contradictions. These reasons take the form of three 
reductios, to which I now turn.       
First Reductio   
 Hume’s first reductio argument appears at T 1.2.2.2.  
There he writes:  
Everything capable of being infinitely divided 
contains an infinite number of parts; otherwise the 
division wou’d be stopt short by the indivisible 
parts, which we shou’d immediately arrive at. If 
therefore any finite extension be infinitely 
divisible, it can be no contradiction to suppose, that 
a finite extension contains an infinite number of 
parts: And vice versa, if it be a contradiction to 
suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite 
number of parts, no finite extension can be infinitely 
divisible. But that this latter supposition is absurd, 
I easily convince myself by the consideration of my 
clear ideas. I first take the least idea I can form as 
a part of extension, and being certain that there is 
nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude, that 
whatever I discover by its means must be a real 
quality of extension. I then repeat this idea once, 
twice, thrice, &c, and find the compound idea of 
extension, arising from its repetition, always to 
augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, &c, 
till at last it swells up to a considerable bulk, 
greater or smaller, in proportion as I repeat more or 
less the same idea. When I stop in the addition of 
parts, the idea of extension ceases to augment; and 
were I to carry on the addition in infinitum, I 
clearly perceive, that the idea of extension must also 
become infinite. Upon the whole, I conclude, that the 
idea of an infinite number of parts is individually 
the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that 
no finite extension is capable of containing an 
infinite number of parts; and consequently that no 
finite extension is infinitely divisible.   
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For Hume, a finite extension is one that contains a finite 
number of parts. An infinite extension is one that contains 
an infinite number of parts. Anything that is infinitely 
divisible must contain an infinite number of parts, 
according to his conception of infinite divisibility. If a 
finite extension is infinitely divisible, then it must also 
have an infinite number of parts, which is a contradiction.  
Therefore, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible. 
Another way of stating Hume’s insight here is that it is 
impossible to distinguish between an infinite extension 
that is infinitely divisible and a finite extension that is 
infinitely divisible. Both of them have an infinite number 
of parts, so what distinguishes them? If Hume’s reasoning 
in the first reductio is sound, the answer is that nothing 
distinguishes them.   
 Hume explicitly claims two paragraphs later that the 
reasoning he employs here and in the second reductio apply 
directly to time,30 but he never gives the temporal version 
of this argument. Clearly, however, the temporal equivalent 
of the argument must be something like this:  
                                                          
30
  “All this reasoning takes place with regard to time” (T 1.2.2.4).  
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1. Anything that is infinitely divisible contains an 
infinite number of parts.   
2. If any finite duration is infinitely divisible, then 
the assertion “this finite duration contains an 
infinite number of parts” must not involve a 
contradiction.   
3. If the assertion, “this finite duration contains an 
infinite number of parts” does entail a 
contradiction, then no finite duration can be 
infinitely divisible.   
4. I can start with the shortest moment of duration I 
can think of, and then think of the other parts of 
the duration, adding the ideas of them to my 
original idea.   
5. If I repeated this process ad infinitum, I would end 
up with the idea of an infinite number of moments.   
6. The idea of an infinite number of moments is 
identical to the idea of infinite duration.   
7. Supposing that a finite duration consists in an 
infinite number of moments entails a contradiction.   
8. No finite duration is infinitely divisible. (3,7)    
In this argument, Hume claims that it is not possible 
to distinguish between a finite duration being divided 
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infinitely and an infinite duration being divided 
infinitely, because they are the same concept. This is why 
the contradiction arises. The finitude or infinitude of a 
duration depends upon the number of parts it has; if a 
duration has a finite number of parts, it is a finite 
duration, and if it does not have a finite number of parts, 
it is an infinite duration. Since dividing something 
involves dividing it into parts, dividing a finite duration 
infinitely implies that it contains an infinite number of 
parts, which would make it an infinite duration by 
definition.  
Many commentators think the first reductio is flawed 
on multiple levels. Flew strongly disagrees with the first 
premise, which both the spatial and temporal versions of 
the argument share. Flew thinks this principle is false for 
several reasons:  
First……to say that something is divisible into so 
many parts is not to say that it consists of – 
that it is, so to speak, already divided into – 
that number of parts. A cake may be divisible 
into many different numbers of equal slices 
without its thereby consisting in, through 
already having been divided into, any particular 
number of such slices. Second……to say that 
something may be divided in infinitum is not to 
say that it can be divided into an infinite 
number of parts. It is rather to say that it can 
be divided, and sub-divided, and sub-sub-divided 
as often as anyone wishes: infinitely, without 
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limit. That this is so is part of what is meant 
by the saying, ‘Infinity is not a number!’ (Flew 
259-260).   
 
Jacquette criticizes Flew’s objection. Jacquette 
claims that Hume’s first reductio does not require anyone 
to regard infinity as a number (Jacquette 139).  The 
division process is purely abstract, not something done in 
real time to an actual entity, so Flew’s discussion of the 
cake is irrelevant. The mathematical process of dividing 
space or time is not the same kind of division that is 
involved with dividing an actual physical cake.   
According to Jacquette, Flew’s description of infinite 
divisibility suffers not only from a failure to appreciate 
the abstract nature of the divisibility process, but also 
from a faulty conception of infinity. Flew’s assertion that 
an infinitely divisible thing can be subdivided “as often 
as one wishes” is inaccurate, says Jacquette, because  
The wishes of finite beings in dividing physical 
things in real finite time cannot approximate the 
infinite divisibility of extension in the 
abstract sense to which traditional mathematics 
is committed. The added clause that these wishes 
may extend ‘without limit’ also falls short of 
infinity, since that description applies as well 
to indefinite, indeterminate, or inexhaustible, 
but still finite moments of time or wish-
instances, yielding at most indefinite, 
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indeterminate, or inexhaustible, but still finite 
sets and series of mathematical objects 
(Jacquette 140).   
 
Jacquette could have made his argument more persuasive if 
he had provided examples of truly inexhaustible, limitless 
things that are still finite. It appears that the “finite 
moments of time or wish instances” to which he refers are 
inexhaustible only insofar as they lack any known limit, 
but this is not the same type of inexhaustibility exhibited 
by infinity.   
 Jacquette also claims that Flew does not completely 
understand Hume’s conception of infinite divisibility. The 
belief that infinite divisibility involves sub-division 
into an infinite number of parts did not originate with 
Hume, but was an assumption held by the mathematicians of 
Hume’s day. Hume directed his first reductio proof against 
these mathematicians (Jacquette 140). This does not mean 
that Hume rejects that understanding of infinite 
divisibility – his claim at T 1.2.1.2 that this principle 
is “obvious” indicates that he agrees with it – but the 
fact that his philosophical opponents accept the principle 
demonstrates that Flew clearly misunderstood a crucial 
aspect of Hume’s argument.   
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Baxter also challenges Flew’s argument. Baxter calls 
the idea that divisibility entails having parts the 
“Divisibility Assumption” and the idea that infinite 
divisibility entails possessing an infinite number of parts 
the “Infinite Divisibility Assumption.” The Divisibility 
Assumption implies the Infinite Divisibility Assumption; if 
the former is true, the latter must also be true (Baxter 
23-24).   
Baxter argues that there is a difference between 
something having numerically distinct parts and something 
being divided into parts. Flew’s objections to Hume fail to 
acknowledge the possibility that “undivided parts can be 
numerically distinct” (Baxter 24). These undivided parts 
are not just potentially numerically distinct, but actually 
numerically distinct. Baxter supports this claim by 
starting with an idea he got from Bayle, which is that it 
is possible to predicate something about one side of an 
undivided whole that can be denied about the other.  Baxter 
asserts that if one divided a whole in half, some of it 
would become the left half of the whole; the rest would be 
the right half. The left half is actually on the left and 
the right half is actually on the right. What can be 
asserted about one half can be denied about the other and 
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vice-versa. This means that they must be actually 
numerically distinct from each other; otherwise, a logical 
contradiction would result. The two halves are actually 
parts of the whole. Consequently, the Divisibility 
Assumption is true (Baxter 23).31   
I agree with Baxter’s criticisms of Flew. I also have 
my own objection to Flew that resembles Baxter’s, but goes 
a step beyond it. As the above passage from Flew indicates, 
Flew’s premises presuppose that “consists of x number of 
parts” and “already divided into x number of parts” are 
equivalent concepts. In other words, claiming that F 
consists of x number of parts implies that F has already 
been divided into x number of parts, and vice-versa. Flew 
clearly thinks that the parts something has result from the 
process of division. This is not correct, however. It is 
much more accurate to claim that having parts is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of being divided. 
If something does not have certain parts, it cannot be 
divided into those parts. For example, if I never had any 
arms or legs, it would be impossible to divide my body into 
my arms and legs. Also, because I am a human being and not 
                                                          
31
  In “Hume on Infinite Divisibility,” Baxter provides a much shorter defense of the Divisibility Assumption 
that uses “the difference between the top half and bottom half of a whole piece of paper” as an example 
of the same type of reasoning employed here.  See page 136.   
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a tree, I cannot be divided into roots, leaves, and 
branches; human beings do not possess such parts, which 
properly belong to plant life. If something never had any 
parts at all, it is extremely difficult to understand how 
it would be possible to divide it into anything, even if 
the division process is purely abstract and not one that 
occurs in real time. Parts do not result from a process of 
division; they make that process possible. Consequently, 
Flew’s argument against the Divisibility Assumption rests 
upon a faulty understanding of the relationship between 
parts and the process of dividing something into parts.    
 Clearly, the reasons Flew provides for rejecting 
Hume’s Divisibility Assumption leave much to be desired. 
Since the first reductio relies upon that assumption, and 
the rest of the argument follows if that assumption is 
true, there is good reason to accept Hume’s conclusion that 
no finite duration can be infinitely divisible. Hume’s 
second reductio, however, cannot be defended as easily as 
the first – in fact, the reasoning it employs suffers from 
a significant fallacy!     
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 Second Reductio  
 The second reductio appears at T 1.2.2.3, where Hume 
argues  
‘Tis evident, that existence in itself belongs 
only to unity, and is never applicable to number, 
but on account of the unites, of which the number 
is compos’d. Twenty men may be said to exist; but 
‘tis only because one, two, three, four, etc are 
existent; and if you deny the existence of the 
latter, that of the former falls of course. ‘Tis 
therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to 
exist, and yet deny the existence of the unites; 
and as extension is always a number, according to 
the common sentiment of metaphysicians, and never 
resolves itself into any unite or indivisible 
quantity, it follows that extension can never at 
all exist……the unity which can exist alone, and 
whose existence is necessary to that of all 
number……must be perfectly indivisible, and 
incapable of being resolv’d into any lesser 
unity.    
 
Norton provides a concise explanation as to how this 
particular argument is a reductio. According to Norton, 
“Hume claims that many metaphysicians hold, at the same 
time and inconsistently, that extension is an aggregate of 
units and that, because any putative unit is divisible into 
further units, there are no such units” (Norton 436).  
The contradiction Norton articulates arises out of an 
important assumption Hume makes in this reductio: whatever 
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is divisible is many things, not one.32 For something to be 
truly unitary, it must be indivisible. Whatever is 
divisible is a plurality of things, not just one single, 
unitary thing. Unitary, single, indivisible things are 
ontologically basic; pluralities of things are dependent 
upon unitary things for their existence. Given this 
assumption, it is easier to understand why Hume thinks his 
philosophical opponents hold inconsistent beliefs regarding 
extension. They claim that extension is always a plurality 
of units and that these units are infinitely divisible, but 
units by definition are indivisible, and are ontologically 
prior to any plurality of anything. Hence extension cannot 
consist of a plurality of infinitely divisible units. 
Hume’s opponents cannot consistently assert both that 
extension exists as a plurality of units and that no 
indivisible units exist, not only because units are 
indivisible by definition, but also because all pluralities 
are ontologically dependent upon indivisible units.           
Hume believes that his second reductio, like the 
first, is directly applicable to time as well (T 1.2.2.4). 
Precisely how it does so, however, is not entirely clear, 
                                                          
32
  In Hume’s Difficulty, Baxter phrases this assumption as “anything with parts is many things, not a single 
thing” and refers to it as the Plurality Assumption. See page 25.   
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and requires some degree of speculation. I propose that a 
temporal version of this reductio would look something like 
this:  
1) Only indivisible things exist.   
2) Pluralities depend for their existence on the 
indivisible parts which compose them.   
3) Duration exists as a plurality of infinitely 
divisible moments.33  
4) If duration exists as a plurality of infinitely 
divisible moments, then no indivisible moments 
of time exist.     
5) Duration does not exist as a plurality of 
infinitely divisible moments.  (1,3,4) 
6) Duration both exists and does not exist. (3,5)   
Of course, the idea that duration both exists and does not 
exist is contradictory. Because this absurd conclusion is a 
consequence of the idea that duration is infinitely 
divisible, it follows that time is not infinitely 
divisible.   
                                                          
33
  This is an assumption made by the metaphysicians and mathematicians whom Hume opposes.   
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In “Achievements and Fallacies in Hume’s Account of 
Infinite Divisibility,” Franklin disagrees with Hume’s 
reasoning in the second reductio because  
Hume’s bottom-up perception of the world as a 
heap of atoms blinds him to the opposite 
possibility. This mistake vitiates the whole 
section. The possibility that the world is a 
whole arbitrarily divided by the mind into parts 
is symmetrical in all a priori respects with 
Hume’s opinion that the world consists of 
particles arbitrarily grouped into wholes……his 
[Hume’s] a priori atomism is wrong, since its 
consequence, the denial of even the possibility 
of infinite divisibility, provides a reductio of 
it (Franklin 96).   
 
In other words, Hume begs the question by presupposing the 
very atomism he needs to prove. The reductio requires the 
premise that only indivisible things exist, yet this is the 
same claim Hume wishes to defend. According to Franklin, 
while it is logically possible that only indivisible things 
exist and wholes are fictitious, it is equally possible 
that only wholes exist and indivisible things are 
fictitious.  Hume assumes the former obtains without even 
considering the latter. Such question-begging undermines 
his argument, thus rendering the second reductio 
ineffective.  
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While Hume’s third reductio does not commit the same 
fallacy the second does, it preserves a crucial assumption 
of the second reductio: the idea that no unitary, single 
things are divisible, because whatever is divisible is a 
plurality of things, not a single thing. In the third 
reductio, Hume uses this assumption to argue that infinite 
divisibility is logically and phenomenologically 
inconsistent with successiveness, which is essential to 
time.       
Third Reductio  
The third reductio occurs at T 1.2.2.4, where Hume 
asserts  
All this reasoning [from the first two reductio 
arguments] takes place with regard to time; along 
with an additional argument, which it may be 
proper to take notice of. ‘Tis a property 
inseparable from time, and which in a manner 
constitutes its essence, that each of its parts 
succeeds another, and that none of them, however 
contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same 
reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the 
present year 1738, every moment must be distinct 
from, and posterior or antecedent to another.  
‘Tis certain then, that time, as it exists, must 
be compos’d of indivisible moments. For if in 
time we cou’d never arrive at an end of division, 
and if each moment, as it succeeds another, were 
not perfectly single and indivisible, there wou’d 
be an infinite number of co-existent moments, or 
parts of time; which I believe will be allow’d to 
be an arrant contradiction.  
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Immediately after this passage, Hume claims that “the 
infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is 
evident from the nature of motion.  If the latter, 
therefore, be impossible, the former must be equally so” (T 
1.2.2.5).   
Very few commentators even mention Hume’s odd remark 
that the nature of motion proves that the infinite 
divisibility of space implies the infinite divisibility of 
time. Jacquette not only mentions it, but also offers a 
plausible explanation of it:  
Hume is unclear about why or how ‘the nature of 
motion’ proves that the infinite divisibility of 
space implies the infinite divisibility of time.  
Here he need have nothing more in mind than the 
fact that in classical kinematics motion, time, 
and distance are mathematically interdefinable.  
If distance or extension is infinitely divisible, 
and if time is determined by the equations of 
physics as distance divided by velocity as the 
metric of extension in space, then the infinite 
divisibility of time is equally logically 
implicated (Jacquette 156).   
 
Jacquette interprets the third reductio as ultimately 
attempting to prove that space cannot be infinitely 
divisible by proving that time cannot be infinitely 
divisible. If space is infinitely divisible, so is time, 
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but time is not infinitely divisible, so neither is space.  
Jacquette’s interpretation seems to me to be very faithful 
to Hume’s original intentions. Since my task in this 
chapter concerns only why Hume thinks time is not 
infinitely divisible, I will focus only on that part of the 
third reductio. Hume’s comment about the nature of motion 
is not directly relevant to my project here.  
The one aspect of the third reductio that has received 
the most attention is Hume’s insistence that the infinite 
divisibility of time implies an infinite number of 
coexistent moments. Why would these moments have to be 
coexistent? A passage that appears later in the Treatise 
helps shed some much-needed light on this obscure component 
of Hume’s argument.    
In T 2.3.7, Hume discusses the effects space and time 
have on the passions. Many of his comments in this section 
are highly relevant for understanding Hume’s denial of the 
possibility of the infinite divisibility of time.  
Consider, for example, the following passage:  
……space or extension consists of a number of co-
existent parts dispos’d in a certain order, and 
capable of being at once present to the sight or 
feeling. On the contrary, time or succession, 
tho’ it consists likewise of parts, never 
presents to us more than one at once; nor is it 
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possible for any two of them to ever be co-
existent……The parts of extension being 
susceptible of an union to the senses, acquire an 
union in the fancy; and as the appearance of one 
part excludes not another, the transition or 
passage of the thought thro’ the contiguous parts 
is by that means render’d more smooth and easy.  
On the other hand, the incompatibility of the 
parts of time in their real existence separates 
them in the imagination, and makes it more 
difficult for that faculty to trace any long 
succession or series of events. Every part must 
appear single and alone, nor can regularly have 
entrance into the fancy without banishing what is 
suppos’d to have been immediately precedent (T 
2.3.7.5).   
 
Later Hume asserts that it is natural for the imagination 
to pass “from one point in time to that which is 
immediately posterior to it” (T 2.3.7.8).   
Hume seems to be saying that time would cease to be 
successive if it is infinitely divisible. It would cease to 
be successive because the process by which the imagination 
traces all of the subdivisions of a single moment would 
never end, and hence the imagination could not pass from 
that moment to the one immediately following it. A moment 
must be completed before the next moment can appear, but if 
the first moment is infinitely divisible, the second moment 
would never occur, since the first moment would never end.    
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 As shown in Chapter One, successiveness is an 
essential component of time as Hume understands it.  All 
successions have parts. The passages quoted above indicate 
that parts of successions must be distinguishable from each 
other; otherwise, the imagination could not pass from one 
part to the next, and the mind would not experience the 
succession. 
 These reflections show that time could not be 
successive if it were infinitely divisible. The infinite 
divisibility of time entails that between any two moments, 
there are an infinite number of other moments. If there are 
an infinite number of moments between any two moments, then 
no moment would have an immediate predecessor or immediate 
successor. Succession could not be possible unless each 
moment has an immediate predecessor and immediate 
successor. Thus time cannot be successive if it is 
infinitely divisible.   
Consider, for example, moment A. If moment A is part 
of a temporal succession, then there must be a moment that 
immediately succeeds it, moment B. If time is infinitely 
divisible, then there would be an infinite number of 
moments between A and B, thus precluding B from being the 
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immediate successor of A.34  It is impossible to identify 
any moment as the immediate successor of A (or as the 
immediate predecessor to B) because between A and the 
moment identified, there would be an infinite number of 
moments. As we saw above, the infinite number of moments 
into which time would be divisible could not possibly exist 
successively. If they exist at all, they would have to 
coexist, since Hume’s ontology does not allow the parts of 
any compound thing to be neither successive nor coexistent.  
Hume’s assumption in the second reductio – that 
single, unitary things are indivisible, and divisible 
things are a plurality of things – provides another way to 
explain the above arguments. The infinite divisibility of 
time implies that each moment of time is infinitely 
divisible into briefer moments. No moment could appear 
“single and alone” to consciousness as T 2.3.7.5 requires, 
because there would be no moments which were single and 
alone; each moment would actually be a plurality of an 
infinite number of briefer moments, each of which would 
also be a plurality of an infinite number of briefer 
moments. Moment A could not possibly immediately precede 
moment B because, strictly speaking, there would be no 
                                                          
34
  The same reasoning also shows that A cannot be the immediate predecessor of B.   
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moment A; there would be an infinite number of moments. 
Asserting that one moment precedes or follows another 
presupposes that each of the moments in that relationship 
is single and distinct, but no moment could be single and 
distinct if every moment could be divided infinitely. Since 
Hume believes that moments cannot succeed each other unless 
they are single and distinct, and the infinite divisibility 
of moments entails that moments cannot be single and 
distinct, it is not hard to understand why Hume argues that 
infinite divisibility is incompatible with successiveness.   
At this point, one might raise an objection to the 
third reductio.35 Is the crucial issue the idea that time 
cannot consist of coexistent moments, or the idea that time 
cannot consist of an infinite number of coexistent moments? 
In other words, if it could be shown that a finite number 
of moments could coexist, would this refute the argument? 
Based on Hume’s remark above that even two moments could 
not coexist, it seems that the primary concern Hume has is 
the coexistence of moments, not the number of coexistent 
moments. If so, the finite divisibility of time may not be 
permitted either, because a finite number of moments 
succeeding each other too quickly for the mind to 
                                                          
35
  I wish to thank Dr. Tim Crockett of Marquette University for pointing this objection out to me.   
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experience will also appear to be coexistent to the mind. 
This is what happens in the burning coal example.   
Developing a strong defense to this serious objection 
requires one to realize that infinite divisibility has a 
special feature that finite divisibility does not – with 
the process of finite divisibility, the mind reaches a 
limit both because of the number of parts, and because of 
the natural limitations of the mind. If the mind were 
structured differently, it is conceivable that the mind 
might have been able to distinguish between moments at a 
much higher rate of speed. With infinitely divisible 
durations, however, the mind could never, even in theory, 
be able to distinguish the temporal location or ordering of 
the moments. This is because, for any two moments X and Y, 
there are an infinite number of moments between X and Y. 
Thus infinite divisibility necessarily entails coexistence, 
but finite divisibility does not.  
The claim that infinite divisibility necessarily 
entails coexistent moments requires comment, not only 
because it is hard to grasp in and of itself, but also 
because it is absolutely crucial for Hume’s third reductio. 
Hume’s third reductio contains many implicit premises, 
which make the argument more complicated than the other 
92 
 
two. In an attempt to comprehend and articulate Hume’s 
thinking process in the third reductio as lucidly as 
possible, I organized a 14 step proof showing how I think 
Hume derives the concept of an infinite number of 
coexistent moments from the concept of infinite 
divisibility. Of course, there is an unavoidable level of 
speculation here, but I am basing this argument off of 
Hume’s own comments. The remainder of the argument consists 
of premises that Hume needs in order for his reductio to 
work. What follows is my interpretation of the kind of 
reasoning Hume employed to arrive at the conclusion that if 
time is infinitely divisible, an infinite number of moments 
would coexist:   
1. The parts of something either coexist or exist 
successively.   
2. Time consists of parts called moments.   
3. These moments either coexist or exist 
successively. (1) 
4. For moments to exist successively, each moment 
must have an immediate predecessor and 
successor.   
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5. If time is infinitely divisible, then there is 
no briefest moment.   
6. If there is no briefest moment, then any moment 
can be subdivided into briefer moments.  
7. If any moment can be subdivided into briefer 
moments, no moment can have an immediate 
predecessor or successor.   
8. If no moment can have an immediate predecessor 
or successor, then the moments of time cannot 
exist successively. (4) 
9. If time is infinitely divisible, its moments 
cannot exist successively.  (4-8) 
10. If time is infinitely divisible, then its 
moments coexist.  (3,9)   
11. To divide something is to divide it into 
parts.   
12. To divide something infinitely is to divide 
it into an infinite number of parts.   
13. If time is infinitely divisible, then time 
consists of an infinite number of parts.  (12) 
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14. If time is infinitely divisible, then an 
infinite number of moments coexist.  (10,13)         
If the interpretation I proposed above is accurate, 
Hume has a possible way of responding to the objection I 
discussed earlier. That objection claimed that, since the 
same psychological and cognitive limitations that prevent 
us from experiencing time successively if it is infinitely 
divisible also, in some cases, prevent us from experiencing 
time successively if it is finitely divisible, Hume should 
reject the finite divisibility of time as well as the 
infinite divisibility of time. In other words, Hume should 
deny the finite divisibility of time as well as the 
infinite divisibility of time because the same cognitive, 
psychological, and phenomenological limitations that 
preclude us from experiencing infinitely divisible time as 
successive also preclude us from experiencing finitely 
divisible time as successive. Burning coal scenarios – 
situations in which time is finitely divisible, but 
successions occur too rapidly for the mind to distinguish 
the individual parts which compose them – would be 
phenomenologically equivalent to our experience of time if 
time is truly infinitely divisible. In both cases, the mind 
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could not be aware of the passage of time because it would 
not be able to experience time successively.   
The objection is correct insofar as burning coal 
scenarios and infinite divisibility would both prevent the 
mind from experiencing time successively and, consequently, 
would prevent the mind from experiencing time at all. From 
a phenomenological standpoint, infinitely divisible time 
and burning coal scenarios would be equivalent.   
The objection ultimately fails, however, because it 
does not consider the fact that the two situations are not 
logically equivalent. In all burning coal scenarios, the 
inability to experience time results directly from the 
psychological and cognitive limitations of the mind. If the 
human mind could process information faster, it could 
experience time successively even in burning coal 
scenarios. The limitations of the human mind are the only 
reason why the finite divisibility of time would prevent 
the experience of time; without these limitations, no 
degree of finite divisibility would make the experience of 
successive time impossible. 
The mind’s inability to experience time successively 
if the latter is infinitely divisible, however, is not due 
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solely to the limitations of the mind. There are purely 
logical reasons – reasons I summarized earlier in my 
fourteen-step argument above - why the infinite 
divisibility of time entails the coexistence of moments, 
and, therefore, the non-successiveness of time. These 
logical reasons are not dependent upon any limitations of 
the mind or the means by which it experiences time. Nothing 
could experience infinitely divisible time as successive 
because the infinite divisibility of time makes it 
impossible for it to be successive. Time can be successive 
if and only if it is finitely divisible.   
Hence the objection fails to challenge the third 
reductio because it erroneously assumes that the only 
factors that would prevent the mind from experiencing 
infinitely divisible time as successive would be the same 
psychological limitations that obtain in burning coal 
scenarios. Such scenarios only prevent the mind from 
experiencing time as successive. If time is infinitely 
divisible, however, time could not be successive.   
These reflections show why Hume needs the reductios to 
provide a strong defense of his discrete view of time. The 
phenomenological approach he employs only proves that there 
are psychological temporal minima – in other words, that 
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there is a minimum temporal threshold which moments must 
reach in order for the mind to be aware of them and to 
experience them. This fact alone, however, is insufficient 
for proving that time cannot be infinitely divisible, 
because the existence of distinct, successive moments 
briefer than the minimum threshold – and hence impossible 
to experience as successive - is consistent with the finite 
divisibility of time. Hence if his only reason for 
rejecting infinite divisibility is that it renders the 
experience of time impossible, he would also have to reject 
the finite divisibility of time in burning coal scenarios. 
To avoid doing so, Hume must have critiques of infinite 
divisibility that do not concentrate on the experience of 
time.      
The temporal minima argued for by the grain of sand 
and inkspot experiments are phenomenological and cognitive 
in nature. If the infinite divisibility of time is 
logically consistent with the existence of these 
phenomenological temporal minima, then Hume fails to 
adequately refute the mathematicians whom he opposes. To 
successfully refute them, Hume must show how the infinite 
divisibility of time is not logically consistent with the 
existence of the temporal minima, and he attempts to do 
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this with the third reductio.  The third reductio 
accomplishes this task by demonstrating that finite 
divisibility is a necessary condition for temporal 
successiveness. For time to be successive at all – whether 
it is perceived as such or not – it must be finitely 
divisible. If time is truly successive, there must be 
temporal minima of a logical sort as well, even if these 
logical temporal minima are much briefer than the 
perceptual, phenomenological minima established by the 
grain of sand and inkspot experiments.                        
Concluding Remarks 
As we saw above, Hume defends the existence of 
temporal minima in two different ways. His phenomenological 
approach involves showing how the experience of time 
requires temporal minima. His logical approach involves the 
use of three reductios, each of which provides reasons for 
thinking that the concept of time being infinitely 
divisible is contradictory. Given the fact that Hume 
devotes much more attention in T 1.2 to the arguments he 
develops for the phenomenological approach, it is clear 
that Hume is more interested in discussing the experience 
of time than he is in speculating on the metaphysical 
nature of time. 
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Despite his greater interest in the phenomenology of 
time, Hume’s attempts to prove the existence of temporal 
minima require him to take a purely logical approach to the 
issue as well, which he does in the form of the three 
reductios. Without these reductios, Hume would, at best, 
only be able to prove that the experience of time requires 
temporal minima. Without the reductios, Hume has no way of 
countering the possibility that his philosophical opponents 
can consistently agree with the claim that the experience 
of time requires temporal minima and still remain committed 
to the infinite divisibility of time. In other words, his 
opponents could agree that the mind experiences time 
successively, and yet still insist that time is infinitely 
divisible. To truly refute the continuous view of time 
espoused by his opponents, Hume must provide reasons for 
thinking that no finite duration could be infinitely 
divisible. He attempts to do this via his three reductios. 
The first two of these reductios apply also to space, 
whereas the third reductio pertains exclusively to time. A 
crucial theme running through the third reductio is that 
time must consist of distinct, indivisible moments in order 
to exist successively. Any number of coexistent moments 
would preclude time from being successive. Thus coexistence 
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contradicts the very nature of time. Hume also believes, 
just as strongly, that coexistence contradicts the very 
nature of causality. Causes also occur successively. In my 
next chapter, I will explore the reason why Hume thinks 
this must be the case.    
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Chapter Three  
The Temporal Priority Argument and its Implications 
 Introduction 
In T 1.3.2, Hume tries to identify the impression that 
gives rise to our idea of causation. To do this properly, 
he needs to discover the relations that are essential to 
causes and effects. As is well-known, the three relations 
he identifies as essential to causes and effects are 
contiguity, temporal priority, and necessary connection. Of 
course, Hume believes the necessary connection relation is 
much more important for his endeavor than contiguity and 
temporal priority, because “an object may be contiguous and 
[temporally] prior to another, without being consider’d as 
its cause” (T 1.3.2.11). Obviously, Hume is right about 
that, but he does not seem to realize that necessary 
connection alone is not sufficient for his task either. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide reasons why the 
temporal priority relation, the relation by which causes 
precede their effects in time, is far more significant to 
Hume’s project than Hume appreciates.   
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The Temporal Priority Argument  
 At T 1.3.2.7, Hume develops an argument which purports 
to demonstrate that all causes must precede their effects 
in time. For the sake of simplicity and convenience, I will 
refer to this argument as the Temporal Priority Argument 
(TPA). The TPA appears in the following passage:  
 
The second relation I shall observe as essential to 
causes and effects, is not so universally 
acknowledg’d, but is liable to some controversy.‘Tis 
that of PRIORTY of time in the cause before the 
effect. Some pretend that ‘tis not absolutely 
necessary a cause shou’d precede its effect; but that 
any object or action, in the very first moment of its 
existence, may exert its productive quality, and give 
rise to another object or action, perfectly co-
temporary with itself. But beside that experience in 
most instances seems to contradict this opinion, we 
may establish the relation of priority by a kind of 
inference or reasoning. ‘Tis an establish’d maxim both 
in natural and moral philosophy, that an object, which 
exists for any time in its full perfection without 
producing another, is not its sole cause; but is 
assisted by some other principle, which pushes it from 
its state of inactivity, and makes it exert that 
energy, of which it was secretly possest. Now if any 
cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect, 
‘tis certain, according to this maxim, that they must 
all of them be so; since any one of them, which 
retards its operation for a single moment, exerts not 
itself at that very individual time, in which it might 
have operated; and therefore is no proper cause. The 
consequence of this wou’d be no less than the 
destruction of that succession of causes, which we 
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observe in the world; and indeed, the utter 
annihilation of time. For if one cause were co-
temporary with its effect, and this effect with its 
effect, and so on, ‘tis plain there wou’d be no such 
thing as succession, and all objects must be co-
existent36(T 1.3.2.7).    
 
I propose that the best way to decipher this cryptic 
passage is to treat the “established maxim” (hereafter EM) 
as a partial definition of a cause. It specifies a 
necessary condition something must satisfy to be properly 
referred to as a cause.  
  There are three main reasons why EM should be 
construed as definitional. First, Hume’s main task in T 
1.3.2 is to discover the essential components of the idea 
of causation. The comments he makes throughout the section 
strongly suggest that he is aiming to construct a 
definition of causation. This is especially clear in 
paragraphs nine and ten, where he argues that contiguity 
and succession (temporal priority) are not sufficient by 
themselves for such a definition – because one object may 
be contiguous and prior to another without being the cause 
of the latter - and then challenges the reader to 
                                                          
36
  This last sentence supports an argument I made in Chapter 2, namely, that in Hume’s ontology, all 
things are either coexistent or successive.   
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articulate a better, non-circular definition. Hence the 
passage in which TPA appears is a part of a section of the 
Treatise in which Hume is clearly investigating a good way 
to define causation. These considerations provide a good 
reason to interpret TPA - and hence EM, since EM is the 
logical basis for TPA - as being a component of that 
investigation. 
 The second reason why EM should be read as offering a 
partial definition of “cause” concerns the use of TPA 
within the passage itself. Shortly before launching into 
TPA, Hume makes clear that he intends to challenge those 
who think “’tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou’d 
precede its effect,” with TPA. The fact that Hume opposes 
these people obviously means that he thinks the temporal 
priority of a cause to an effect is absolutely necessary to 
the concept of a cause, and, consequently, an indispensible 
part of the definition of “cause.” Hence Hume clearly 
thinks that the temporal relationship a cause has with its 
effect must constitute part of the concept of a cause, and 
since EM asserts that something cannot properly be labeled 
a cause unless it exhibits a certain kind of temporal 
relationship with its effect, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that Hume intended EM to serve as a partial 
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definition which lays out a necessary condition all causes 
must satisfy.   
 The third reason one should interpret EM as a 
definition is simply that refusing to do so renders the 
most crucial inference of TPA – the idea that, if any cause 
can be simultaneous with its effect, then every cause must 
be simultaneous with its effect – unintelligible. Although 
the argument cannot work without that inference, the 
inference can be valid only if one takes EM to be offering 
a definition of “proper cause.”             
 With these necessary preliminary remarks about EM out 
of the way, we can now proceed to the argument itself. In 
the following paragraphs, I offer my own paraphrase of the 
TPA in which I include the implicit premises and 
assumptions that play a crucial role in the argument. I 
will also expand upon some of the premises that are 
explicitly stated, in an attempt to elucidate them and make 
Hume’s reasoning as I understand it more transparent.   
My Paraphrase of the TPA 
A cause that is perfectly co-temporary (that is, 
simultaneous) with its effect is one in which both the 
cause and its effect exist in the same moment.  There is no 
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moment at which the cause exists but the effect does not.  
The presence of the cause, C, at time t1, guarantees the 
presence of the effect, E, at t1.   
 A cause that is successive and contiguous with its 
effect is one in which the cause does not exist in the same 
moment as the effect. There is at least one moment at which 
the cause exists but the effect does not. Two moments are 
required for successive causation to occur, one for the 
cause and one for the effect. The presence of C at t1 
guarantees the presence of E at t2. By definition, 
successive causes precede their effects in time.  
Obviously, successive causes require more time (two 
moments) to produce their effects than causes that are 
perfectly simultaneous with their effects, which only 
require one moment.   
 Consequently, if any cause is able to be perfectly 
simultaneous with its effect, then no successive cause 
conforms to the definition of cause laid out in EM. Since 
no cause can produce its effect in less time than a 
simultaneous cause produces its effect, this must mean 
that, if any cause can be perfectly simultaneous with its 
effect, every cause must be simultaneous with its effect.       
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 If all causes are simultaneous with their effects, 
then causal succession would not exist. Since all 
successions are temporal, and time is successive, the 
nonexistence of causal succession implies both the 
nonexistence of time and the nonexistence of all 
successions. It is an obvious fact that successions exist, 
since we observe and experience them. Therefore, it is not 
the case that all causes could be simultaneous with their 
effects. It follows that no cause can be simultaneous with 
its effect. Since causes exist, all causes are successive – 
they precede their effects in time.   
 Critical Responses to TPA  
 In “Hume’s Argument that Causes Must Precede Their 
Effects,” Munsat sets out to explain precisely why Hume 
thinks that, if any cause is simultaneous with its effect, 
then all causes must be. He summarizes Hume’s insight by 
claiming, “In summary, the argument is this: if a cause 
could be co-temporary with its effect, then anything short 
of co-temporary counts as a ‘delay,’ and hence is in 
violation of the maxim” (Munsat 342). I think Munsat’s 
interpretation of this inference is correct, but Munsat’s 
objection to the TPA indicates a lack of understanding on 
his part of Hume’s theory of time.  
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 Munsat objects to the TPA on the grounds that it fails 
to demonstrate that there would be no succession at all if 
all causes were simultaneous with their effects. At the 
very most, Munsat argues, Hume’s premises can only show 
that there would be no causal succession. Munsat does not 
seem to realize that a consequence of Hume’s conception of 
time – a compound abstract idea of succession qua 
successive – is that all successions are temporal.37 This is 
an implicit assumption in the TPA, and Hume cannot derive 
his conclusion from his premises without it. This is one 
way in which Hume’s theory of time affects his TPA. There 
is another, far more significant influence his theory of 
time has on the TPA, however, and to explore this 
influence, we must look at a potentially devastating 
objection to Hume’s account of causation as contiguous.   
 In “On the Notion of Cause,” Russell constructed a 
dilemma which he considered fatal to any theory of 
causation which holds that causes are contiguous with their 
effects. The dilemma is as follows:   
 
                                                          
37
  For more information on this consequence of Hume’s conception of time, consult the first chapter of 
this dissertation.   
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No two instants are contiguous, since the time series 
is compact; hence either the cause or the effect 
must……endure for a finite time……but then we are faced 
with a dilemma: if the cause is a process involving 
change within itself, we shall require (if causality 
is universal) causal relation between its earlier and 
later parts; moreover, it would seem that only the 
later parts can be relevant to the effect, since the 
earlier parts are not contiguous to the effect, and 
therefore……cannot influence the effect. Thus we shall 
be led to diminish the duration of the cause without 
limit, and however much we may diminish it, there will 
still remain an earlier part which might be altered 
without altering the effect, so the true cause……will 
not have been reached……If, on the other hand, the 
cause is purely static, involving no change within 
itself, then, in the first place, no such cause is to 
be found in nature, and in the second place, it seems 
strange……that the cause, after existing placidly for 
some time, should suddenly explode into the effect, 
when it might just as well have done so at any earlier 
time, or have gone unchanged without producing its 
effect. This dilemma, therefore, is fatal to the view 
that cause and effect can be contiguous in time” 
(Russell 174-201).   
 
The basic outline of the dilemma is as follows: 
1. Time is infinitely divisible. 
2. If causes are contiguous with their effects, then the 
causes are either dynamic and undergo change, or they 
are purely static and do not change.  
3. If causes are dynamic, there must be causal 
relationships between their earlier and later parts.  
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4. Only the later parts of the causes can be contiguous 
with the effects.  
5. Only the later parts can be causally relevant to the 
effects.  
6. The duration of the later parts could always be 
diminished in such a way that the truly causally 
relevant part will never be identified.  
7. No causes are purely static. 
8. No causes can exist idly without producing their 
effects.  
9. If causes are contiguous with their effects, then they 
either could never be identified, or they could not 
exist as causes.  
10. Causes cannot be contiguous with their effects in 
time.   
 
Since Hume advocates a theory of causation in which cause 
and effect can be contiguous in time, Russell’s dilemma 
poses an extremely grave threat to that theory unless Hume 
has the philosophical resources required to decisively 
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refute the dilemma. Before exploring possible defenses Hume 
could use against the dilemma, it is important to dwell on 
the dilemma to make sure the argument presented therein is 
clear.  
 The first horn of the dilemma presupposes the 
continuity of time. Given this assumption, the time during 
which any cause that undergoes change within itself (the 
change here is the act of producing the effect) is 
infinitely divisible. According to any contiguous theory of 
causation, the moment in which the effect exists 
immediately follows and is contiguous with the moment in 
which the cause exists; in other words, if C is a 
contiguous cause that produces E, then if C exists at time 
t1, then E exists at time t2. If time is infinitely 
divisible, however, then there can be no moment which 
immediately follows and is contiguous with the moment in 
which C exists. C’s duration could always be divided into 
briefer moments, and a contiguous theory of causation is 
committed to the idea that only the temporal part of C 
which immediately precedes E can generate E. Since time is 
continuous, there is no temporal part of C which 
immediately precedes E, and consequently the true cause of 
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E will never be found. If causes are contiguous with their 
effects and time is continuous, causes cannot exist.     
 The second horn of the dilemma represents a situation 
which violates Hume’s “established maxim.” A static cause 
is a cause which exists in its full perfection for a 
certain period of time without producing its effect. Both 
Hume and Russell think that no such static causes exist.  
 Since both horns of the dilemma attack the notion of 
contiguous, successive causes, and both horns purport to 
prove that no such causes can exist, one might interpret 
the dilemma as an attempt to prove that all causes are 
simultaneous with their effects. Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 
in their extremely detailed analysis of the dilemma, resist 
this interpretation. They claim:  
  
The moral Russell and others apparently draw is not 
that all causes and effects are contemporaneous.  
Rather, they maintain that Hume’s criterion of 
contiguity and his two assumed axioms38 are so rigid 
that, when conjoined with normal assumptions about the 
continuity of time, they entail that all causes and 
effects are either contemporaneous or separated by a 
finite time-interval – the very possibilities that 
                                                          
38
  Given the context of the passage, it seems that the “two assumed axioms” are both components of the 
established maxim.   
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Hume denounces as absurd” (Beauchamp and Rosenberg 
196).   
 
Beauchamp and Rosenberg think Russell’s dilemma fails to 
threaten Hume’s theory of causation. They employ two 
different strategies to defend Hume’s theory from the 
dilemma.     
 One strategy they employ exposes an inconsistency in 
Russell’s reasoning: Russell assumes events exist, “yet one 
consequence of his argument is a denial that events exist” 
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg 197). They attempt to prove this 
inconsistency by replacing the word “cause” in Russell’s 
original argument with “event.” Since Russell’s dilemma is 
internally inconsistent, it obviously cannot be used to 
refute the possibility of contiguous causation.  
 The second strategy they employ to defend Hume’s 
theory from Russell’s dilemma is much more complex and 
obscure than the first. It involves an attempt to show that 
successive, contiguous causation is compatible with 
temporal continuity. The dilemma assumes that a lack of a 
temporal interval between events makes those events 
simultaneous. If I understand Beauchamp and Rosenberg’s 
argument correctly, their solution seems to involve proving 
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that non-simultaneous events can also lack a temporal 
interval. They suggest that two events can be both 
contiguous and successive without a temporal interval 
between them if one event begins at exactly the same moment 
when the other ends:  
Since the series of point-instants is dense, there 
exists an infinite number of instants between any two 
instants. Accordingly, in order to avoid the problem 
of temporal gaps, it must be maintained that, at a 
minimum, contiguous causes perish and their effects 
begin in the same instant. That is, the terminal 
instant and the commencement instant must be identical 
(Beauchamp and Rosenberg 190).   
   
Suppose, for example, that a cause, C, begins at instant t1 
and ends at instant t2. C can still be successive and 
contiguous with its effect, E, if E begins at instant t2.  
In that case, C would end at exactly the same instant E 
begins. C and E would temporally overlap at t2.  
 In the above scenario, C and E are both contiguous and 
successive. They are contiguous and successive in the sense 
that a part of C happens before E begins at t2, and both C 
and E exist for more than one instant. The only instant 
they have in common is t2, at which the temporal history of 
C and the temporal history of E overlap. If C and E were 
completely simultaneous, all of the instants at which they 
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exist would temporally overlap. Hence they are not 
completely simultaneous. Since there is also no temporal 
interval between C and E, this example illustrates a cause-
effect pair which is contiguous and successive, lacks a 
temporal interval between the cause and effect, and yet is 
not completely simultaneous.   
Closer examination of Beauchamp and Rosenberg’s 
proposal indicates that it fails to defend Hume’s theory of 
causation from Russell’s dilemma. For their “solution” to 
work, both C and E must be divisible into temporal slices.  
This poses a problem for them because they agree with 
Russell that time is infinitely divisible. This means that, 
between any two temporal slices, there are an infinite 
number of other slices. For their solution to be coherent, 
it must be possible to distinguish the overlapping slice 
(in my example above, the overlapping temporal slice is t2) 
from the non-overlapping temporal slices. Doing so involves 
placing the temporal slices into an order such that one can 
identify which slice precedes or succeeds another. If one 
were to lay out all of the instants at which C and E exist 
on a straight line to represent a temporal continuum, how 
would be able to locate t2? It cannot be before or after any 
other instant. It could not be located or identified. What 
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evidence, then, could Beauchamp and Rosenberg produce to 
establish that such an instant exists?   
 These reflections show that, even if Beauchamp and 
Rosenberg’s solution works, it cannot be used as a way to 
defend Hume, because Hume’s understanding of temporal 
successiveness does not allow the moment at which one event 
ends and the moment in which an event contiguous to and 
distinct from the first event begins to be one and the same 
moment. Recall that at T 2.3.7.5, Hume remarks, “every part 
[of time] must appear single and alone, nor can regularly 
have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is 
suppos’d to have been immediately precedent.” Since there 
can be no moment that is immediately precedent to the 
overlapping moment, the overlapping moment cannot exist.   
The obvious, and easy, way to defend Hume from 
Russell’s dilemma is to deny that time is continuous.  
Without the assumption that time is infinitely divisible, 
the dilemma is impotent. As I discussed in Chapter Two, 
Hume firmly believes that time is not infinitely divisible, 
and attempted to prove it in multiple ways. By combining 
Hume’s arguments against temporal continuity with his TPA, 
a defender of Hume’s theory of causation can easily defend 
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that theory against Russell’s dilemma and other similar 
objections.   
 Ironically, although Beauchamp and Rosenberg are aware 
that Hume opposed temporal continuity, they completely 
dismiss Hume’s thoughts on the matter as insignificant. In 
a footnote, they write, “Hume does defend a doctrine of 
‘indivisible parts’ of space and time, though these 
arguments are weak and hard to understand. The temporal 
discontinuity thesis would now be almost universally 
rejected by philosophers……we shall eventually show that 
nothing of importance turns on these arguments” (Beauchamp 
and Rosenberg 189, fn 21). Obviously, Hume’s arguments 
supporting discrete time are much more important for his 
theory of causation than Beauchamp and Rosenberg realize.   
 Kline also believes that Beauchamp and Rosenberg’s 
solutions do not work. In “Humean Causation and the 
Necessity of Temporal Discontinuity,” he points out that 
Beauchamp and Rosenberg believe that events take time, 
which must mean that they have beginnings and endings. If 
time is infinitely divisible, however, events cannot have 
beginnings and endings. Russell’s argument shows that “the 
idea of a cause with some particular duration d is not 
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defensible” because “the duration of the cause is 
indefinitely diminishable” (Kline 554). 
 Kline argues that the other approach Beauchamp and 
Rosenberg take to the dilemma, that of charging it with 
internal inconsistency, also fails, but his reason for 
thinking this is very unclear. If I am interpreting Kline 
correctly, his position seems to be as follows. Russell’s 
argument entails that events do not exist only because it 
contains certain assumptions about what contiguity means – 
assumptions with which Beauchamp and Rosenberg agree.  
These assumptions, when combined with the presupposition 
that events exist, lead to the claim that events do not 
exist. Without these assumptions about contiguity, the 
argument is not internally inconsistent. Instead of 
indicating a problem for Russell’s argument, therefore, the 
conclusion that events do not exist actually threatens the 
position Beauchamp and Rosenberg defend!  The implication 
that no events exist is “far from being logically 
pernicious” and is, in fact, “quite an elegant attack on 
contiguity” (Kline 554).       
 Kline discusses both horns of Russell’s dilemma and 
explains how Hume’s view of causation can easily survive 
both. The first horn only works if one assumes that time is 
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infinitely divisible. As should be clear by now, Hume does 
not share this assumption, so the first horn poses no 
threat to Hume. The second horn focuses on a temporal gap 
between the cause and the effect. Such a temporal gap 
violates Hume’s “established maxim” and renders any causal 
theory allowing such a gap vulnerable to Russell’s dilemma.  
If time is discrete, however, there would be no such 
temporal gap between the cause and the effect, the cause 
and the effect would be perfectly contiguous, and Hume’s 
theory survives the dilemma (Kline 552-553).            
 Russell’s dilemma is not the only philosophical threat 
to Hume’s insistence that all causes are successive and 
contiguous. Kant’s famous example of a lead ball resting on 
a cushion, thereby denting the cushion, is often considered 
to be an example of a situation in which a cause and its 
effect are completely simultaneous. The ball causes the 
indentation in the cushion, yet no time elapses at all 
between the ball’s presence on the cushion and the 
appearance of the indentation. Fogelin analyzes this famous 
example and investigates the extent to which it undermines 
Hume’s account of causation. Fogelin holds that the 
possibility of simultaneous causation threatens Hume’s 
position. On a regularity theory of causation, which Hume 
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maintains, there must be a way of distinguishing causes 
from effects. Hume distinguishes causes from effects by 
invoking the notion of temporal priority. All causes always 
precede their effects. If some causes can be simultaneous 
with their effects, then there must be another way of 
distinguishing causes from effects besides temporal 
priority. Hume’s theory of causation cannot introduce 
anything else to make the distinction possible, thus 
revealing a weakness in his theory (Fogelin 331).   
 Fogelin reconstructs Hume’s TPA as follows:  
  
(1) Some causes are simultaneous with their effects. 
– Assumption.   
(2) All causes could be simultaneous with their 
effects. – A Generalization Argument.   
(3) All causes are simultaneous with their effects. – 
Via the “established maxim.”  
But since Hume holds (3) is manifestly false, he 
concludes that we must deny the assumption (1) that 
leads to it. We may therefore conclude: (4) No cause 
is simultaneous with its effect (Fogelin 336).   
 
Fogelin raises three objections to the TPA: he asserts that 
the inference from (1) to (2) is invalid, he claims that 
(4) is false, and he maintains that Hume was wrong to 
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accept (2) because it threatens Hume’s argument (Fogelin 
337).   
 Fogelin writes:  
 
The inference from the first claim to the second 
depends upon the assumption that simultaneous 
causation and successive causation are 
conceptually on a par. That is, we are asked to 
think of two independent kinds of causal 
relations, those where the cause and effect are 
successive and those where they are simultaneous.  
It is only on this assumption of conceptual 
independence that the generalization argument 
from some are to all could be is valid.  
But……this assumption of conceptual independence 
is false. Furthermore, the notion of a cause 
simultaneous with its effect is parasitic on the 
notion of a cause that precedes its effect, and 
so even if we could have a world where all causes 
precede their effects, we could not have a world 
where all causes are simultaneous with them……in 
such a world there would be no basis for 
distinguishing causes and effects (Fogelin 334).   
    
Fogelin believes very strongly that all causes could not be 
simultaneous with their effects. After constructing and 
analyzing two theoretical examples in which all causes are 
simultaneous with their effects, Fogelin concludes that a 
world in which all causes are simultaneous with their 
effects is a world in which no causal relations exist. 
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Understanding this apparently paradoxical conclusion 
necessitates a close examination of his two examples.   
In the first example, Fogelin asks his readers to 
“take our world – with a lead ball resting on a cushion – 
and stop all motion” (Fogelin 335). Fogelin argues that, 
due to the cessation of all motion, “the law of gravity and 
the laws of elasticity no longer hold in this world, and 
once we recognize this, we simply give up the idea that the 
ball causes a depression in the pillow” (Fogelin 335). The 
physical laws which enable balls to dent cushions would 
cease to function in the absence of motion.   
The second example is also set in this world, with the 
lead ball resting upon a cushion. Then “eliminate, for all 
times, everything save the ball, the cushion, and the 
earth. These three items remain forever in their fixed 
relative positions. This is the only news concerning this 
universe……there is nothing in this universe that provides a 
basis for a distinction between cause and effect and, 
therefore, causal relations do not obtain within it” 
(Fogelin 335). Causal relations require certain facts about 
the world to obtain; they presuppose that the world 
possesses certain ontological features. These features do 
not and cannot exist in a world devoid of motion.  
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 In both of these examples, Fogelin argues that a world 
in which only simultaneous causation exists would be so 
different from our world in terms of the physical laws that 
obtain in that world that there would be no ontological 
basis for distinguishing causes from effects. For this 
reason, causal relations would not exist in such a world.     
Fogelin’s comments very strongly suggest that 
successive causation is the paradigm example of causation. 
If Fogelin’s comments are correct, simultaneous causation 
cannot really be considered ‘proper’ causation. In both of 
Fogelin’s examples, no time elapses. No temporal succession 
occurs in either example. His examples support the idea 
that temporal succession could not exist in a world in 
which all causes are simultaneous with their effects. Hume, 
of course, completely agrees, and his TPA makes exactly the 
same claim!   
 As Fogelin’s examples clearly show, simultaneous 
causation is not just conceptually dependent upon 
successive causation, but also ontologically dependent upon 
successive causation. More precisely, it is dependent upon 
the physical features (physical properties, physical laws, 
etc) of the world which can only exist if temporal 
successiveness exists. A world without temporal succession 
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would lack these physical features, thus precluding causal 
relations from existing.   
If Fogelin’s examples work, they imply that gravity, 
elasticity, and other such physical and structural 
properties of the world cannot function without temporal 
successiveness. The mere act of removing temporal 
successiveness from the world (via the “universal freeze”) 
in the first example resulted in the cessation of gravity 
and elasticity. This seems to suggest that the physical 
features of the world depend upon temporal successiveness, 
but not vice-versa.   
To understand how this is so, consider a world in 
which everything that is thrown moves up instead of down 
everywhere in the universe. Gravity either would not exist 
or would not function in that world, but temporal 
succession would clearly still exist, since the thrown 
objects would move upward successively – the thrown objects 
would not be able to move at all if temporal succession did 
not exist.   
 There is good reason, therefore, to believe that 
temporal succession is more basic than the other physical 
laws and properties Fogelin mentions. If Fogelin is right 
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that a world with only simultaneous causation would have no 
true causal relations, one can explain this fact by 
pointing to the lack of temporal succession in that world. 
Causal power depends on a certain set of physical 
properties and laws which, in turn, depend upon temporal 
succession. This means that the causal power of causes that 
are simultaneous with their effects also depends upon 
temporal succession. Since simultaneous causes, by 
definition, are not successive, this is tantamount to 
claiming that causes simultaneous with their effects are 
not genuine causes.   
This poses a problem for Fogelin who, despite his 
insistence that the concept of simultaneous causation is 
dependent upon the concept of successive causation, and his 
belief that a world in which all causes exist 
simultaneously with their effects would lack all causal 
relations, still believes that both successive and 
simultaneous causation exist in the actual world. If my 
arguments above are sound, there is reason to doubt that 
causes simultaneous with their effects can be referred to 
properly as “causes.” Such causes derive their causal power 
from temporal succession. It is impossible by definition 
for them to be successive. Hence they are either not causes 
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at all, or are not causes the same way that successive 
causes are. The word “cause” cannot be applied equally to 
both successive causes and causes simultaneous with their 
effects. They cannot both be considered proper causes. If 
the word “cause” has the same meaning when applied to each 
one, then they cannot both be causes.   
This is the insight Hume is trying to express with his 
remark that if any cause may be co-temporary with its 
effect, every cause must be co-temporary with its effect. 
If Hume is correct, whatever enables causes to operate as 
causes – that is, whatever is the source of their causal 
power – must be described, at least in part, by the 
temporal relationship causes have with their effects. The 
established maxim makes a cause’s temporal relationship 
with its effect part of the very concept of a cause. Since 
successive causes and causes simultaneous with their 
effects have temporal relationships with their effects that 
are mutually exclusive – the former always precede their 
effects by definition, the latter always exist 
simultaneously with their effects by definition – it is 
impossible for both kinds of causes to be proper causes.  
The above reflections indicate that Fogelin’s 
interpretation of Hume’s TPA is not completely accurate. 
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Hume does not seriously entertain the possibility that all 
causes could be simultaneous with their effects. Hume would 
agree with the arguments Fogelin presents as to why it is 
impossible for all causes to be simultaneous with their 
effects, especially since one implication of those 
arguments is that time would not exist if all causes are 
simultaneous with their effects, which is one of the very 
same reasons Hume claims all causes cannot be simultaneous 
with their effects!  
The statement Fogelin interprets as a “generalization 
argument”- “all causes could be simultaneous with their 
effects”- is actually the consequent of a conditional 
statement. This is clear not only from what has been said 
above, but also from the way Hume explicitly stated the 
premise in question: “If any cause may be perfectly co-
temporary with its effect, ‘tis certain, according to this 
maxim, that they must all of them be so” (T 1.3.2.7). 
Fogelin interprets the premise as expressing two separate 
propositions: “Some causes are simultaneous with their 
effects” and “All causes could be simultaneous with their 
effects.” By articulating the premise this way, he turns 
the antecedent of a conditional statement into a particular 
affirmative statement with existential import. He then 
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claims that Hume accepts the second proposition but should 
not, because it is false.     
A more accurate way to read the premise is to construe 
it as a conditional statement in an argument that takes the 
form of modus tollens. I propose that the main inference of 
this part of the TPA should be read as:  
1. If any cause can be simultaneous with its 
effect, then every cause must be simultaneous 
with its effect.   
2. It is impossible for every cause to be 
simultaneous with its effect.   
3. Therefore, it is not the case that any cause 
can be simultaneous with its effect.     
The problems with Fogelin’s three objections are now clear. 
His claim that the inference from “some causes are 
simultaneous with their effects” to “all causes could be 
simultaneous with their effects” is invalid presupposes 
that Hume asserts both propositions and uses them as 
premises in his TPA. As we have seen, this is not the case. 
It is just as fallacious to interpret “if any cause can be 
simultaneous with its effect, then every cause must be 
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simultaneous with its effect” as asserting both “any cause 
can be simultaneous with its effect” and “every cause must 
be simultaneous with its effect” as it would be to 
interpret the proposition “If I am a mother, then I have 
children” as asserting “I am a mother” and “I have 
children.”  The sentence “If any cause can be simultaneous 
with its effect, then every cause must be simultaneous with 
its effect” expresses a single proposition, not two.   
Hume never infers the proposition “all causes could be 
simultaneous with their effects” from any statement in his 
argument, because no such premise appears in his argument! 
In fact, a crucial part of the TPA consists in negating 
that proposition. Obviously, then, the claim that Hume 
fallaciously inferred that false proposition is mistaken in 
multiple ways; Hume never uses that proposition as a 
premise, and therefore cannot be accused either of 
invalidly inferring it or of assenting to it.   
 As for the claim that the conclusion of TPA - that no 
causes are simultaneous with their effects – is false, one 
must specify what definition of “cause” one is using. One 
way to paraphrase the conclusion in a very Humean spirit 
would be to articulate it as “No cause that is co-temporary 
with its effect can properly be called a ‘cause’.” As we 
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have seen, Fogelin’s own arguments lend support to this 
position!   
Lennon criticizes the TPA and makes a mistake similar 
to Fogelin’s. He thinks Hume’s TPA suffers from two 
ambiguities which undermine its effectiveness. The first 
ambiguity concerns the best way to interpret the 
established maxim. Lennon thinks the maxim can be 
interpreted in two different ways. It can be interpreted as 
“an imposition of a priori constraints on what can be 
constantly conjoined” (Lennon 348), or it can be 
interpreted as “an a posteriori methodological precept 
concerning the discovery of what as a matter of fact are 
constant conjunctions” (Lennon 348). Lennon argues that the 
first interpretation of the established maxim “is 
inconsistent with all Hume’s arguments that causal claims 
are founded only in experience” (Lennon 348), and 
consequently favors the second interpretation.   
When I first discussed my interpretation of the 
established maxim, I explained why I think the maxim should 
be read as specifying a necessary condition that all true 
causes must satisfy. Thus I am much more sympathetic to the 
first interpretation Lennon mentions than the second. 
Lennon approaches the established maxim in a way that would 
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make it a strictly empirical proposition, one that can be 
denied without resulting in a contradiction. The arguments 
I presented earlier in this chapter reveal the problems 
involved with interpreting the maxim that way.    
The second ambiguity Lennon finds in the TPA is that 
it “equivocates on the notions of cause and sufficiency” 
(Lennon 349). This objection is itself ambiguous, since 
Lennon never clarifies the distinction between cause and 
sufficiency, and, in the paragraph in which he introduces 
this objection, spends far more time discussing Russell’s 
dilemma than he does developing the objection. Despite 
this, several comments he makes throughout his essay 
strongly suggest that his objection is as follows. Hume 
uses interchangeably two rival, incompatible notions of 
what causal sufficiency entails. The first notion assumes 
that a cause sufficing for its effect entails that if the 
cause, C, is at time t1, then the effect, E, is also at t1. 
The second notion assumes that a cause sufficing for its 
effect entails that if C is at t1, then E is at t2.39     
                                                          
39
  Lennon’s discussion of an objection Stroud raises to the TPA leads me to reconstruct Lennon’s 
equivocation charge this way.  The discussion in question occurs on page 350 of Lennon’s “Veritas Filia 
Temporis: Hume on Time and Causation.”    
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By insinuating that Hume seriously assented to the 
first conception of causal sufficiency, Lennon makes a 
mistake which closely resembles Fogelin’s belief that Hume 
thought all causes could be simultaneous with their 
effects. Hume does not advocate the first notion of causal 
sufficiency and cannot, because that notion is identical to 
the description of a cause that is simultaneous with its 
effect! If C is a cause that is simultaneous with its 
effect, then it would be true by definition to claim that, 
if C is at t1, then E is at t1. Claiming that C is 
simultaneous with E and then denying that E is present 
whenever C is present would lead to a contradiction.  
Consequently, while Hume does not and cannot interpret 
causal sufficiency as entailing “If C is at t1, then E is at 
t1,” anyone who believes that genuine causes truly can be 
simultaneous with their effects must interpret causal 
sufficiency in just that way. Analyzing causal sufficiency 
in this manner, however, leads to a serious problem – the 
inability to distinguish a cause from an effect.       
To see why this is the case, consider this passage 
from Daniton’s Time and Space:  
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……in any given concrete situation where a cause c 
produces an effect e, if we say that in the given 
circumstances, c is both necessary and sufficient for 
e, then since the relationship “necessary and 
sufficient” is symmetrical, we are clearly committed 
to holding that e is necessary and sufficient for c. 
For example, suppose a spark ignites a fire. In the 
circumstances (oxygen present, water absent, no other 
flames, etc) the fire would not have occurred if the 
spark had been absent, so the spark was necessary for 
the fire. It is also true that, in the circumstances, 
the spark was sufficient for the fire (nothing else 
was needed). Now look at the situation in another way. 
In these circumstances, for the fire to ignite the 
spark had to occur, so the fact that the fire did 
ignite guarantees that the spark occurred: the fire is 
sufficient for the spark. Also, since the occurrence 
of the spark guarantees the fire will ignite, the 
spark couldn’t occur without the fire, so the fire is 
necessary for the spark. These two events, the cause 
and the effect, are thus related to one another in a 
perfectly symmetrical way. If this applies generally, 
what could possibly distinguish any cause c from an 
effect e other than the fact that c occurs earlier 
than e? (Dainton 52-53).   
 
Since “necessary and sufficient” clearly is a symmetrical 
relationship, and Dainton’s reasoning is valid if 
“necessary and sufficient” is a symmetrical relationship, 
there is good reason to suspect that his arguments do apply 
generally.   
In particular, they would apply especially well to 
cases where causes are simultaneous with their effects. 
Consider, for example, the famous Kantian example of a lead 
ball resting on a cushion. While this example is often 
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interpreted as refuting Hume’s conclusion that all causes 
precede their effects in time, Dainton’s insight regarding 
the symmetrical nature of the “necessary and sufficient” 
relationship illuminates key aspects of the example which 
make it, and all other examples like it, completely unable 
to threaten Hume’s position on successive causation.   
 The Kantian example is constructed in such a way that 
the ball is sufficient for the dent in the cushion. In 
other words, if the lead ball is present, the dent is also 
present. Nothing else was needed for the dent to appear 
besides the ball. The ball is also necessary for the dent, 
since, given the circumstances described in the example, 
the dent in the cushion could not have formed without the 
ball. Hence the lead ball is both necessary and sufficient 
for the dent in the cushion.   
Since the necessary and sufficient relationship is 
symmetrical, however, exactly the same reasoning shows that 
the dent in the cushion is also necessary and sufficient 
for the ball. The circumstances described in the example 
indicate that the very presence of the ball on the cushion 
guarantees that the dent in the cushion will form. If the 
ball is present, so is the dent. This means that if the 
dent in the cushion is not there, the lead ball is not 
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there either. The ball could not appear without the dent 
(otherwise, it would be false to say that the presence of 
the ball guarantees the dent in the cushion). Thus the dent 
is necessary for the ball.  Under the conditions specified 
by the example, the ball cannot be resting on the cushion 
without the dent appearing, which implies that the presence 
of the dent in the cushion guarantees the presence of the 
ball. If the dent is present, so is the ball. Since the 
dent is present, the ball is also present. It necessarily 
follows that the dent is sufficient for the ball. Hence 
both the ball and the dent in the cushion are necessary and 
sufficient for each other.             
As discussed above, any description of a cause that is 
simultaneous with its effect necessarily entails that if 
the cause is present at time t1, then the effect is present 
at t1. This implies, however, that the cause is necessary 
and sufficient for its effect. Since the necessary and 
sufficient relationship is symmetrical, if the cause is 
necessary and sufficient for the effect, the effect is also 
necessary and sufficient for the cause. If one describes 
the productive power of a cause solely in terms of 
sufficiency, it would be impossible to distinguish a cause 
from its effect. Exactly the same reasons one would use to 
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argue that a certain object or event is a cause and the 
other an effect also enable one to argue that the other 
object or event is the cause and the initial one is the 
effect. It is very unclear what distinguishing factor one 
can identify in such a situation that would enable one to 
identify the cause and the effect. If no such 
distinguishing factor exists or can be found, there would 
be no way to differentiate between the relata in a 
simultaneous causal relationship, and if there is no way to 
distinguish the relata, what evidence would one have that 
the causal relation truly is a causal relation?   
Obviously, in the absence of any means for 
distinguishing the relata in a simultaneous causal 
relationship, there would be no evidence that the relation 
is a causal relation. Any defender of simultaneous 
causation, then, must have a way to differentiate causes 
and effects. Dainton’s analysis of the symmetrical nature 
of necessity and sufficiency reveals that any attempt to 
explain causal relationships in terms of necessity and 
sufficiency will suffer from an inability to distinguish 
between causes and effects.  
Such an inability to distinguish between causes and 
effects is not restricted just to the necessary and 
137 
 
sufficient relationship, however. It is a problem which 
affects any theory of causation which attempts to explain 
causation in terms of any symmetrical relationship. The 
necessary and sufficient relationship is symmetrical, as 
Dainton showed, but it is not the only symmetrical 
relationship, and it is not the only symmetrical 
relationship philosophers have used to analyze causation. 
Hence any philosopher who develops a theory of causation 
that relies solely on symmetrical relationships to explain 
causation will encounter difficulty in distinguishing 
between causes and effects. Consequently, even theories 
which do not allow simultaneous causation will still suffer 
from that problem, unless they can identify a 
nonsymmetrical relationship which can serve as the means of 
distinguishing between causes and effects. As I will now 
show, Hume does not appear to fully appreciate this fact.    
Concluding Remarks 
The inability to distinguish between causes and 
effects poses a particularly severe challenge to accounts 
of causation which allow causes to exist simultaneously 
with their effects, because what enables causes to act as 
causes when they exist simultaneously with their effects 
can only be explained in terms of symmetrical relationships 
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that would obtain between the causes and the effects 
equally. Distinguishing a cause from an effect requires an 
asymmetrical relationship, one which causes and effects do 
not partake in equally. The temporal priority of causes to 
their effects is one such asymmetrical relationship, and it 
is the factor Hume uses to distinguish between causes and 
effects. It is extremely unclear what other asymmetrical 
relationship besides temporal priority Hume or anyone else 
could use in developing an account of what enables causes 
to be causes.   
Consequently, the temporal priority relation is much 
more important to Hume’s causal theory than he realizes. 
Hume believes that the necessary connection relation is the 
most important relation that composes the concept of a 
cause, and so devotes far more time discussing it and 
exploring it than he does with the relations of contiguity 
and temporal priority. The problem, however, is that the 
necessary connection relation is a symmetrical relation 
insofar as, for any cause C, and for any effect, E, if C is 
necessarily connected to E, then E is also necessarily 
connected to C. Claiming that a cause has a necessary 
connection with its effect while also claiming that the 
effect does not have a necessary connection with its cause 
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results in a contradiction. The necessary connection 
relation, while obviously crucial to Hume’s conception of 
causation, is not sufficient, because he cannot use it to 
explain the difference between causes and effects.40 
Hume’s quest to identify the origin of the idea of 
causation cannot succeed unless he can distinguish between 
causes and effects. After all, “’Tis impossible to reason 
justly, without understanding perfectly the idea concerning 
which we reason” (T 1.3.2.4), and perfectly understanding 
the idea of causation requires an understanding of the 
distinction between causes and effects.   
These considerations strongly suggest that the 
Temporal Priority Argument (TPA), the argument by which 
Hume attempts to establish that all causes precede their 
effects in time, is much more significant the Hume 
acknowledges. Immediately after he presents the TPA, he 
tells the reader, “If this argument [TPA] appears 
satisfactory, ‘tis well. If not, I beg the reader to allow 
me the same liberty, which I have us’d in the preceding 
                                                          
40
  Contiguity, another relation Hume believes constitutes the concept of causation, is also a symmetrical 
relation, and therefore cannot be used to distinguish between causes and effects either.   
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case41, of supposing it such. For he shall find, that the 
affair is of no great importance” (T 1.3.2.8). Such a 
remark clearly indicates that Hume was not aware that he 
must argue for the temporal priority of causes to their 
effects, or his project will fail. There are many other 
reasons why Hume should not dismiss his TPA as nonchalantly 
as he does.   
For example, a crucial implicit premise in the TPA is 
that all successions are temporal. Without this assumption, 
he cannot infer the “utter annihilation of time,” and of 
succession in general, from the lack of causal 
successiveness. The idea that all successions are temporal 
is a consequence of his conception of time, since he views 
time as a compound abstract idea of succession qua 
successiveness. Hume never abandons this conception of time 
in the Treatise or his other texts, so it is obviously 
important to him.   
Russell’s dilemma and the challenge it poses to any 
proponent of successive, contiguous causation – such as 
Hume himself – reveals yet another reason why Hume should 
not dismiss his TPA so carelessly. The dilemma clearly 
                                                          
41
  The “preceding case” refers to the argument in which Hume tries to prove that all causes are 
contiguous with their effects.   
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shows that if time is continuous, then it would be 
impossible to distinguish causes from effects. Defending a 
conception of causes as successive and contiguous – another 
conception Hume never abandons in the Treatise - 
necessitates advocating a discrete view of time. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, Hume does exactly that. Hume 
believes in the discrete view of time so confidently that 
he thinks denying it leads to contradictions and logical 
absurdities. His TPA rests upon that discrete view of time.   
Clearly, the TPA contains assumptions and concepts 
that are absolutely crucial to Hume’s project regarding the 
idea of causation and its origin. Far from being “of no 
great importance,” the argument is of the utmost 
importance!  
Unfortunately for Hume, his immensely important TPA 
suffers from a major problem that has not been discussed by 
commentators, and appears to have gone entirely unnoticed. 
This problem is that the TPA is inconsistent with Hume’s 
critique of the causal maxim, which is another crucial 
aspect of Hume’s theory of causation. The next chapter will 
discuss the ways in which the TPA contradicts the critique 
of the causal maxim.   
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Chapter Four 
Hume’s Critique of the Causal Maxim 
 Introduction 
 The last chapter focused on the Temporal Priority 
Argument (TPA), the argument by which Hume attempts to 
prove that all causes precede their effects in time. That 
argument requires time and causation to be very closely 
connected. This close connection between temporality and 
causality poses a serious difficulty for Hume’s critique of 
the causal maxim, a principle which states that whatever 
begins to exist must have a cause. This critique requires 
time and causation to be separable and distinct in ways 
that violate Hume’s claims in TPA. Understanding the ways 
in which Hume’s critique of causal maxim is inconsistent 
with his TPA, however, requires a detailed analysis of the 
critique itself, as well as the epistemic and ontological 
principles Hume uses to develop it.  
 Hume thinks the causal maxim is true, but he also 
thinks it is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, meaning 
that it can be denied without contradiction. There is 
historical evidence that Hume agrees with the causal maxim.  
In 1754, Hume wrote a letter to Dr. John Stewart, a 
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Professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of 
Edinburgh. In a volume published by the Philosophical 
Society of Edinburgh, Stewart accused Hume of arguing that 
something can begin to exist without a cause. Hume 
responded:  
 
Allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd 
a Proposition as that any thing might arise without a 
cause: I only maintain’d, that our Certainty of the 
Falsehood of the Proposition proceeded neither from 
Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source.  
That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island as 
Sicily; for these Propositions, I affirm, we have no 
demonstrative nor intuitive Proof. Would you infer 
that I deny their Truth, or even their Certainty? 
There are many different kinds of Certainty; and some 
of them as satisfactory to the mind, tho perhaps not 
so regular, as the demonstrative kind.42   
 
Hume’s critique of the causal maxim, then, does not consist 
in proving that the maxim is false. It does, however, 
involve arguing that the concept of a beginning of 
existence (which is a particular kind of effect) and the 
concept of a cause of existence are distinct and separable 
in specific ways. If these concepts are not distinct and 
                                                          
42
  Norman Kemp Smith devotes the Appendix to the eighteenth chapter of his The Philosophy of David 
Hume to a discussion of this letter.  The appendix contains the entire letter.  The quoted passage appears 
on page 413 of Smith’s text.   
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separable in the ways Hume thinks they are, Hume’s critique 
of the causal maxim fails. A careful analysis of the 
critique reveals that the concepts of a beginning of 
existence and a cause of existence are not separable and 
distinct they way Hume thinks they are, and if they were, 
that fact would render his critique of the causal maxim 
inconsistent with his TPA.   
 Hume’s Critique of the Causal Maxim  
There are two main arguments Hume uses to show that 
the causal maxim is neither self-evident nor demonstrable.  
The first, much simpler argument begins with Hume’s 
assertion that “All certainty arises from the comparison of 
ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are 
unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same” (T 
1.3.3.2). The relations of which Hume speaks are 
resemblance, proportions in quantity and number, degrees of 
any quality, and contrariety.   
 A natural relation is a quality by which two ideas are 
connected together in the imagination, and the one 
naturally introduces the other (T 1.1.5.1). A philosophical 
relation is “any particular subject of comparison, without 
a connecting principle” (T 1.1.5.1). The causal maxim does 
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not imply any of these relations, so it is not intuitively 
certain (T 1.3.3.2).   
 The second argument Hume uses to show that the causal 
maxim is neither self-evident nor demonstrable is much more 
complex and significant for Hume’s overall project, and so 
has received far more attention from commentators than the 
first argument. For this reason, I will focus exclusively 
on the second argument for the remainder of this chapter. 
This second argument, which I shall call the Critique of 
the Causal Maxim (hereafter CCM), proceeds as follows:  
 
But here is an argument, which proves at once, that 
the foregoing proposition [the causal maxim] is 
neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can 
never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every 
new existence, or new modification of existence, 
without showing at the same time the impossibility 
there is, that any thing can ever begin to exist 
without some productive principle; and where the 
latter proposition cannot be prov’d, we must despair 
of ever being able to prove the former. Now that the 
latter proposition is utterly incapable of a 
demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by 
considering, that as all distinct ideas are separable 
from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect 
are evidently distinct, ‘twill be easy for us to 
conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, 
and existent the next, without conjoining to it the 
distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The 
separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from 
that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible 
for the imagination; and consequently the actual 
separation of these objects is so far possible, that 
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it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is 
therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning 
from mere ideas; without which ‘tis impossible to 
demonstrate the necessity of a cause (T 1.3.3.3).   
 
When simplified and clarified, Hume’s CCM can be 
reconstructed as follows:  
(1) The truth of the causal maxim can be demonstrated if 
and only if the impossibility of something beginning 
to exist without a cause can be demonstrated.   
(2) All distinct ideas are separable from each other. 
[Separability Principle]   
(3) The idea of a cause and the idea of an effect are 
distinct.  
(4) It is possible to conceive of an object beginning to 
exist without a cause.   
(5) The imagination can separate the idea of a cause 
from the idea of a beginning of existence.   
(6) Whatever is conceivable is possible. [Conceivability 
Principle, operating as an implicit premise]  
(7) The actual separation of a beginning of existence 
from a cause of existence is possible. (5,6) 
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(8) Separating a beginning of existence from a cause of 
existence implies no contradiction.   
(9) The separation of a beginning of existence from a 
cause of existence cannot be refuted from mere 
ideas. (8)  
(10) The causal maxim cannot be demonstrated.   
 
The CCM employs two principles which are extremely 
important for Hume’s philosophy as a whole: the 
Conceivability Principle and the Separability Principle. 
Although I mentioned these principles briefly in Chapter 
One, the pivotal role they play in the CCM warrants a much 
more thorough discussion of each principle. Examining each 
principle in detail will illuminate both how the CCM is 
supposed to work and why it does not.   
 The Conceivability and Separability Principles  
 Hume’s first description of the Conceivability 
Principle occurs at T 1.2.2.8, where he writes, 
 
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that 
whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea 
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of possible existence, or, in other words, that 
nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can 
form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence 
conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We 
can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and 
therefore regard it as impossible.   
 
Hume provides a much briefer description of the 
Conceivability Principle at T 1.4.5.35, where he claims 
“’Tis an evident principle, that whatever we can imagine, 
is possible.”   
These articulations of the Conceivability Principle 
indicate that there are limitations on what the mind can 
conceive. The mind cannot conceive of or imagine anything 
that would involve a contradiction. The very concept of a 
mountain contains within it the concept of a valley, and 
consequently it is not possible to conceive of a mountain 
existing without a valley. According to the Conceivability 
Principle, this implies that the existence of a mountain 
without a valley is impossible. Nothing about the concept 
of mountain requires the mind to imagine it being golden or 
any other specific color, so it is possible to 
conceptualize a mountain having whatever color one wishes.  
Because there is nothing contradictory about the concept of 
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a golden mountain, it is possible for golden mountains to 
exist.   
 Hume formulates his Separability Principle as follows:  
…whatever objects are different are distinguishable, 
and…whatever objects are distinguishable are separable 
by thought and imagination. And we may here add, that 
these propositions are equally true in the inverse, 
and that whatever objects are separable are also 
distinguishable, and that whatever objects are 
distinguishable are also different (T 1.1.7.3).   
 
After stating his Separability Principle, Hume provides an 
example of how it works by invoking it to prove that there 
is no difference between the length of a line and the line 
itself. “The precise length of a line,” Hume writes,  
 
…is not different nor distinguishable from the line 
itself… nor the precise degree of any quality from the 
quality. These ideas, therefore, admit no more of 
separation than they do of distinction and difference.  
They are consequently conjoin’d with each other in the 
conception; and the general idea of a line, 
notwithstanding all our abstractions and refinements, 
has in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of 
quantity and quality (T 1.1.7.3).   
 
Hume’s discussion of the precise length of a line indicates 
that the Separability Principle is closely connected to the 
Conceivability Principle. Because a line cannot be 
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distinguished or separated from its particular length, it 
cannot be conceived without that length. This means that it 
is not possible for a line to exist separately from its 
precise length, or from any length at all. A similar 
situation occurs with mountains and valleys. A mountain 
cannot be conceived to exist without a valley because the 
concept of a mountain and the concept of a valley are not 
separable. These reflections show that, whenever two 
concepts are separable, it is possible for their referents 
to exist separately in reality, and whenever two concepts 
are not separable, it is not possible for their referents 
to exist separately in reality.   
 In his discussion of personal identity, Hume uses this 
consequence of the Conceivability Principle and the 
Separability Principle to show that perceptions are 
substances. The passage in which he develops this argument 
employs both the Conceivability Principle and the 
Separability Principle in a way that makes their 
ontological implications clear:  
 
Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; and whatever 
is clearly conceiv’d, after any manner, may exist 
after the same manner. This is one principle [the 
Conceivability Principle], which has already been 
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acknowledged. Again, every thing, which is different, 
is distinguishable, and every thing which is 
distinguishable, is separable by the imagination.  
This is another principle [the Separability 
Principle]. My conclusion from both is, that since all 
our perceptions are different from each other, and 
from everything else in the universe, they are also 
distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as 
separately existent, and may exist separately, and 
have no need of anything else to support their 
existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as 
this definition explains a substance (T 1.4.5.5).   
 
Hume uses the Separability Principle to support his 
contention that perceptions “may exist separately” and do 
not require “anything else to support their existence.” 
Thus the Separability Principle clearly entails that if two 
things are separable, each one can exist without the other.  
The Conceivability Principle claims that the two distinct 
things can be conceived to exist separately from each 
other. Hence both principles have conceptual and 
ontological implications which can be articulated as 
follows. If A and B are separate concepts, then:  
1. A can be conceived without conceiving B.   
2. The referent of A can be conceived to exist without 
conceiving the referent of B to exist.  
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3. It is possible for the referent of A to exist without 
the referent of B.   
4. B can be conceived without conceiving A.   
5. The referent of B can be conceived to exist without 
conceiving the referent of A to exist.   
6. It is possible for the referent of B to exist without 
the referent of A.   
 
Understanding these implications of the Conceivability 
Principle and the Separablity Principle is essential for 
comprehending not only the CCM itself, but also some common 
objections to it. Noonan’s objection,43 for example, 
mentions the two principles explicitly, and argues that 
they are not sufficient to support the conclusion of the 
CCM.          
Noonan’s Objection to the CCM, and Possible Humean 
Responses 
Noonan does not agree with the CCM.  He claims that:  
 
                                                          
43
  The objection appears on pages 61 to 62 of his 2007 book Hume.   
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The argument is fallacious. Given the Separability and 
Conceivability Principles any object X, whose coming 
into existence is the effect of a particular cause C, 
might have come into existence in the absence of C.  
But it does not follow that X might have come into 
existence without any cause. For it is compatible with 
the argument that in order for X to exist some cause 
must bring it into existence even if there is no 
particular cause which must bring X into existence if 
X is brought into existence (Noonan 61-62).     
  
Noonan’s objection can be articulated in a different way.  
Suppose that X comes into existence by C1, a specific, 
particular cause. Noonan interprets the Separability and 
Conceivability Principles as implying that X can be 
conceived to exist without C1, and therefore it is possible 
for X to exist without C1. Noonan argues, however, that this 
does not entail that X could come into existence without 
any cause at all. At most, Hume’s critique of the causal 
maxim proves that X and C1 are both conceptually and 
ontologically separable, but it does not follow from this 
that X is conceptually and ontologically separable from 
every cause. Perhaps another cause, C2, would have brought X 
into existence if C1 did not.   
For example, suppose I fall off my bike one day and, 
by doing so, bruise my arm. According to Noonan’s 
objection, Hume’s reasoning would allow me to infer that 
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the bruise on my arm could have come into existence even if 
I did not fall off my bike, but it would not allow me to 
infer that the bruise could have no cause at all. The same 
bruise could have resulted from me being accidentally hit 
by a bad pitch in a baseball game, for instance. The bruise 
could have resulted from many different causes. Merely 
proving that it could have come into existence without one 
of these causes does not entail that it could have come 
into existence without any of them. Hume’s argument shows 
only that X could exist and be conceived to exist without 
the particular cause that actually produced it. It does not 
show that X could exist and be conceived to exist without 
any cause whatsoever. Hence insofar as the critique of the 
causal maxim attempts to prove that any object or event 
could exist and be conceived to exist without any cause, 
the critique fails.   
Although Noonan is correct that proving that X may 
exist or be conceived to exist without the cause which 
actually produced it is not sufficient for proving that X 
could exist or be conceived to exist without any cause at 
all, his objection does not successfully refute Hume’s 
critique of the causal maxim. The main problem with 
Noonan’s objection occurs in its final sentence: “For it is 
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compatible with the argument [the critique of the causal 
maxim] that in order for X to exist some cause must bring 
it into existence even if there is no particular cause 
which must bring X into existence if X is brought into 
existence.” There are two possible ways of interpreting 
this sentence. The first way is to interpret Noonan as 
claiming that Hume’s critique of the causal maxim (CCM) 
fails to demonstrate the ontological and conceptual 
separability and independence of X from each and every 
particular cause that may have produced it if the cause 
that actually produced it did not. The second way is to 
interpret Noonan as claiming both that it is possible to 
form an idea of “some cause” which is not the idea of any 
particular cause, and that the existence of this non-
particular, indeterminate, “some cause” is compatible with 
the CCM.   
The final sentence in Noonan’s objection is false 
under both possible interpretations. Noonan concedes that, 
given the Separability Principle and the Conceivability 
Principle, the CCM shows that the idea of a beginning of 
existence can be separated from the idea of a particular 
cause of existence. That one concession undermines Noonan’s 
objection. If CCM works, it works when applied to the idea 
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of any particular cause. If C1 is the one particular cause 
which brought X into existence, and C2 is another particular 
cause which could have brought X into existence if C1 did 
not, the same reasoning which proves the separability of X 
and C1 also proves the separability of X and C2.   
My example above about the cause of the bruise on my 
arm when I fall off my bike makes this point clear. If it 
is true that the bruise could have existed separately and 
independently of the event in which I fall off my bike, 
then it is also true that it could have existed separately 
and independently of the event in which I get hit by a 
baseball. In the example, the bruise already comes into 
existence without the baseball hitting my arm, which 
obviously shows that that the bruise is both conceptually 
and ontologically separable from the act of being hit by a 
baseball. The same reasoning proves the separability of X 
and C3, X and C4, and X and any other particular cause that 
could have produced X. Since none of them are the actual 
cause of X, it is obviously true to say that X could exist 
and be conceived to exist without them. Hence if the CCM 
successfully proves that X is separable from the particular 
cause which actually produced it, by that very fact the CCM 
also successfully proves that X is separable from any other 
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particular cause. Therefore, if one interprets the final 
sentence of Noonan’s objection as implying that Hume’s CCM 
fails to demonstrate the ontological and conceptual 
separability and independence of X from each and every 
particular cause that may have produced it if the cause 
that actually produced it did not, then the sentence is 
false.   
The sentence is also false if one interprets it as 
claiming that CCM permits the existence of “some cause” of 
X that is not any particular, specific cause. Just as, 
given Hume’s Conceivability and Separability Principles, 
one cannot think of a line without thinking of it having a 
particular length, one cannot think of “cause” in general, 
but can only think of a particular cause. The only kind of 
cause one can conceive is a particular cause. Hume’s 
philosophy does not allow for the idea of a cause in 
general, considered separately from any determinate 
qualities. Any cause one conceives must be a particular 
cause with determinate properties. When Noonan claims that 
“in order for X to exist some cause must bring it into 
existence even if there is no particular cause which must 
bring X into existence,” and that this is compatible with 
the CCM, he clearly assumes that it is possible to form the 
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idea of “some cause” that is not the idea of any particular 
cause; this cause would be a non-particular cause with 
indeterminate properties. The existence of such a cause, as 
well as the mere idea of such a cause, is not consistent 
with some of the very same epistemic and metaphysical 
principles – the Conceivability Principle and the 
Separability Principle – which serve as the foundation of 
the CCM. Thus Noonan is clearly wrong to suggest that the 
existence of such an indeterminate, non-particular cause is 
compatible with the CCM.  
Noonan’s objection uses the Separability and 
Conceivability Principles, but does not challenge them. 
Instead, it assumes they are true, and attempts to show 
that they do not provide sufficient support for the CCM’s 
conclusion. Other commentators, however, attack the 
principles directly, often in a variety of ways. Stroud is 
one such commentator.    
Stroud’s Objections to the CCM and Dicker’s Responses 
Stroud claims that Hume’s argument is circular.  
According to Stroud, Hume uses the concept of 
contradictoriness to explain the distinctness of ideas, but 
also uses the concept of distinctness to explain 
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contradictoriness. Hume uses the term “distinct” in a way 
which suggests that two ideas are distinct if and only if 
they can be separated without a contradiction. This leads 
to a problem: when interpreted in this way, Hume’s claim 
that the idea of a beginning of existence and the idea of a 
cause of existence are distinct means only that they can 
separated without contradiction – but that is the very 
thing Hume is trying to prove! He needs an argument which 
proves that those ideas can be separated without 
contradiction; clearly, if the only proof he provides for 
this assertion is that the ideas are distinct, and if that 
means the ideas are distinct only because they can be 
separated without contradiction, then Hume is arguing in a 
circle (Stroud 47).   
Stroud thinks that Hume’s conception of 
contradictoriness is just as ambiguous as his conception of 
distinctness. He discusses the example of a proposition 
Hume thinks cannot be denied without contradiction: “Every 
husband has a wife.” Stroud acquired this example from T 
1.3.4.8, where Hume examines an argument often given to 
prove the causal maxim. The argument is simply that every 
event must have a cause because every effect, by 
definition, must have a cause. Hume agrees that every 
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effect has a cause by definition, but he argues that this 
fact does not allow one to infer that every event must have 
a cause. Hume claims it is true by definition that every 
husband has a wife, but this truth does not imply that 
every man has a wife, since not every man is a husband. In 
the same way, Hume argues, the fact that every effect has a 
cause by definition does not imply that every event must 
have a cause. Instead of using the assertion that every 
husband has a wife to reject attempted proofs of the causal 
maxim, Stroud explores the reasons why it is impossible to 
deny this proposition without contradiction, but the 
proposition “every beginning of existence must have a 
cause” can be denied without contradiction. “Every husband 
has a wife” cannot be denied without contradiction because 
the very concept of a husband must include within it the 
notion of a having a wife. In other words, the idea of 
being a husband and the idea of having a wife are not 
distinct concepts. They cannot be separated, for they are 
the same concepts. This means, however, that the sameness 
or distinctness of ideas is being used to explain 
contradictoriness. The problem with doing so is obvious:  
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……the notion of sameness or distinctness of ideas is 
being used in the test for contradictoriness, whereas 
contradictoriness was originally invoked to explain 
the sameness or distinctness of ideas. Hume really has 
no non-circular argument on his part at all. He thinks 
that he can start from the “evident” distinctness of 
two ideas, but he never says how he can recognize that 
distinctness (Stroud 48).   
 
After criticizing Hume’s concept of distinctness – 
which obviously is essential for the Separability Principle 
- Stroud attempts to show that the Conceivability Principle 
is false. This particular objection is very common in the 
literature on Hume’s Conceivability Principle and appears 
in different versions. All of them use Goldbach’s 
Conjecture to challenge the Conceivability Principle.  
Goldbach’s Conjecture asserts that every even number 
greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes.  
Mathematicians have been unable to either prove or disprove 
Goldbach’s Conjecture, even after centuries of trying. Due 
to the kind of proposition it is, however, if the 
Conjecture is true, it is necessarily true, and if it is 
false, it is necessarily false.     
Stroud’s version of the objection focuses on the 
provability of Goldbach’s Conjecture. If it is true, then 
it cannot possibly be false, and hence it would be 
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impossible to disprove it. If it is false, then it cannot 
possibly be true, in which case proving it would be 
impossible. While the truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture 
is currently unknown, it is possible to conceive of someone 
proving it to be true, and equally possible to conceive of 
someone disproving it by finding a counterexample. In one 
of those instances, however, what one conceives is, in 
fact, impossible. Thus the idea that whatever is 
conceivable is possible is false (Stroud 50).   
Stroud speculates a possible defense Hume could 
provide to this objection, and argues that it would not 
work. Hume might, Stroud claims, plausibly respond that the 
Conceivability Principle asserts only that whatever can be 
conceived without contradiction is possible. If Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is true, then conceiving it being disproven 
would involve a contradiction, and therefore disproving it 
would not be conceivable after all. Likewise, if Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is false, then conceptualizing it being proven 
true would involve a contradiction, and therefore could not 
be conceived. Stroud thinks this approach would not help 
Hume, because Hume has not provided a non-circular account 
of contradictoriness (Stroud 50).   
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In Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, Dicker 
attempts to defend Hume’s CCM from Stroud’s objections. 
Before he does so, however, he develops his own 
reconstruction of the CCM. Since he repeatedly refers back 
to this reconstruction in his responses to Stroud, it is 
necessary to reproduce Dicker’s reconstruction of the CCM 
here. Dicker interprets the CCM as follows:   
 
(1) All distinct ideas are separable from each other 
(premiss).   
(2) The idea of a cause of existence is a distinct idea 
from the idea of a beginning of existence (premiss).   
(3) We can conceive of something beginning to exist 
without a cause (from (1) & (2)).   
(4) Nothing that we can conceive implies a contradiction 
(suppressed premiss).44   
(5) “X began to exist and X had no cause” does not imply a 
contradiction (from (3) & (4)).   
(6) If p does not imply a contradiction, then we cannot 
demonstrate that p is impossible (suppressed premiss).   
(7) We cannot demonstrate that a beginning of existence 
without a cause of existence is impossible (from (5) & 
(6)).   
(8) We can demonstrate that whatever has a beginning of 
existence must have a cause of existence only if we 
can demonstrate the impossibility of a beginning of 
existence without a cause of existence (premiss).   
                                                          
44
  This is one way to formulate Hume’s Conceivability Principle.   
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(9) We cannot demonstrate that whatever has a beginning of 
existence must have a cause of existence (from (7) & 
(8)).45    
 
                      
After reconstructing Hume’s argument this way, Dicker 
proceeds to summarize Stroud’s objections to it. Dicker 
claims Stroud argues both that Hume’s reasoning by which he 
supports (7) is circular, and that (4), the Conceivability 
Principle, is actually false (Dicker 140). An analysis of 
Dicker’s responses to Stroud indicates that they do not 
completely succeed in defending Hume from them.      
 When discussing Stroud’s first objection, that Hume’s 
support of (7) is circular, Dicker asserts:  
 
He [Stroud] has certainly shown that 
sameness/distinctness of ideas, conceivability, 
contradiction, and possibility are interdependent 
notions……it is questionable, however, that there is a 
vicious circularity in using some of these notions to 
clarify the others……Hume’s case for (7) would be 
viciously circular only if none of (2) or (3) or (5) 
had any independent plausibility; but in fact each of 
them is independently plausible, and so steps (1) – 
(7) are better seen as exhibiting the interconnections 
between the notions involved than as a linear defense 
of (7) (Dicker 141-142).   
 
                                                          
45
  Dicker, p. 140.   
165 
 
Dicker never explains why he thinks (2), (3), or (5) are 
independently plausible. Perhaps what he means is simply 
that Hume has other methods at his disposal to support 
those problematic premises besides invoking the notion of 
contradictoriness. If this is what Dicker means, he is 
correct. Stroud’s first objection is based entirely upon a 
particular interpretation of the Separability Principle.  
In particular, Stroud interprets the Separability Principle 
in strictly conceptual terms – two ideas are distinct if 
and only if conceiving one without the other does not 
result in a contradiction. By interpreting Hume this way, 
it is no wonder why he thinks Hume argues in a circle by 
using the distinctness of ideas to explain 
contradictoriness and vice-versa. As we have seen earlier, 
however, the Separability Principle has an ontological 
component as well. Hume could also claim that two ideas are 
distinct if and only if their referents can exist 
separately from each other, or if the existence of either 
referent does not presuppose or guarantee the existence of 
the other. The idea of a mountain and the idea of a valley 
are not distinct in this sense; the actual objects 
themselves are not separable in reality, so the ideas of 
those objects are not distinguishable, and therefore not 
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distinct. This way of characterizing the distinctness of 
ideas does not involve contradictoriness. Dicker is right, 
then, that the premises have plausibility which does not 
rely on the notion of contradictoriness – the ontological 
aspects of the Separability Principle can be used to 
support them.   
 Focusing on the ontological dimensions of the 
Separability Principle may save Hume’s argument from the 
particular circularity charge that Stroud raises, but only 
at the cost of making the argument vulnerable to another 
kind of circularity. How does one know if two objects are 
separable in reality? If the answer is simply that two 
objects are separable in reality if and only if the ideas 
of those objects are distinguishable, the question then 
becomes how one can tell if the ideas of those objects are 
distinguishable. Without invoking contradictoriness, the 
only other option would be to claim that the ideas of those 
objects are distinguishable only if the objects themselves 
can exist separately from each other – which, of course, 
leads to a circularity. Thus even though Dicker is right 
that Hume can support the problematic premises without 
using the notion of contradictoriness, the other means Hume 
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has available to him to do so leads to another kind of 
circularity.  
 As with his response to Stroud’s claim that Hume’s 
justification for (7) is circular, Dicker’s response to 
Stroud’s attack of the Conceivability Principle is only 
partially successful. In his response, Dicker argues that 
Stroud focuses exclusively on conceiving someone claiming 
to have proven or disproven Goldbach’s Conjecture, and not 
on the truth or falsity of Goldbach’s Conjecture. There is 
a difference, Dicker claims, between conceiving someone 
claiming to have proven Goldbach’s Conjecture and 
conceiving Goldbach’s Conjecture being true. One can 
conceive of a person claiming to have proven that 1 + 1 = 
3, for example, “but it does not follow that one can 
conceive that 1 + 1 = 3” (Dicker 142).  
 Dicker is correct both that Stroud’s objection focuses 
on the conceivability of someone claiming to have proven 
Goldbach’s Conjecture true or false, and that there is a 
difference between conceiving someone claiming to have 
proven Goldbach’s Conjecture and conceiving Goldbach’s 
Conjecture being true. In fact, there is a significant 
difference between conceiving someone claiming to have 
proven p to be true and conceiving p to actually be true. 
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Consequently, Stroud’s objection does not work. It is 
perfectly possible, and consistent, to imagine someone 
claiming to have proven Goldbach’s Conjecture to be true 
and to also conceive of Goldbach’s Conjecture being false.  
The truth value of Goldbach’s Conjecture is not dependent 
upon one’s claims to have proven or disproven it. After 
all, one can claim to have proven it, and be mistaken.   
 Dicker’s response to Stroud’s Goldbach’s Conjecture 
argument, however, only works against Stroud’s particular 
version of that objection. Many philosophers have used 
Goldbach’s Conjecture in attempt to refute Hume’s 
Conceivability Principle, and many of their arguments do 
not focus on one’s claiming to have proven or disproven the 
conjecture at all. Consider, for example, Jacquette’s 
discussion of this method of refuting the Conceivability 
Principle:  
 
The standard objections to conceivability or 
imagination as a test for possibility are those 
involving a priori, and especially mathematical, 
ideas. In a version of the criticism originally owing 
to Thomas Reid and revived by Saul A. Kripke, it is 
supposed to be possible to conceive or imagine both 
that Goldbach’s unproven conjecture that every even 
number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes is 
true, and alternatively that the conjecture is false.  
All that is needed is to imagine both that the 
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generalization holds for every such even number, and 
that somewhere on the distant reaches of the number 
line there is an unknown even number that is not the 
sum of two primes. Yet, since presumably either 
Goldbach’s conjecture or its negation is impossible, 
either the conjecture or its negation is conceivable 
but not possible. It seems to follow that 
conceivability or imaginability, especially in 
mathematical and other synthetic a priori matters, is 
a faulty criterion of possibility (Jacquette 163).   
 
This version of the objection clearly does not rely on any 
person claiming to have proven or disproven anything, and 
thus is not vulnerable to Dicker’s response to Stroud’s 
version of the same objection. A strong defense of Hume 
from Stroud’s Goldbach Conjecture objection would work 
against every version of the objection, not just Stroud’s.  
Dicker does not provide such a defense.   
 Anyone familiar with Hume’s epistemology, however, 
could easily provide this type of defense. Neither the 
truth nor the falsity of Goldbach’s Conjecture are 
conceivable on Humean grounds. In order to conceptualize 
the conjecture being false, one must be able to imagine an 
even number greater than two that cannot be expressed as 
the sum of two primes. One must have an impression of, or 
at least form an image of, this special number. To date, no 
one has ever been able to do this, so Hume would claim that 
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it is not possible to conceptualize the conjecture being 
false. Furthermore, the mere ability to imagine a number 
that contradicts the conjecture would, by itself, be 
sufficient to actually disprove the conjecture! For that 
reason, it would be impossible to conceptualize the 
conjecture being false if it is actually true. Similar 
reasoning reveals why Hume would doubt that it is possible 
to conceptualize the conjecture being proven true. How 
could one conceive of it being proven true without also 
imagining the actual proof? Since no such proof has ever 
been developed, there is no way one can acquire the 
impression of, and therefore the idea of, that proof. 
Hume’s epistemological principles would lead him to deny 
that it is possible to conceive either the truth or the 
falsehood of Goldbach’s Conjecture, and without granting 
that possibility, any version of that objection cannot 
refute the Conceivability Principle.46     
 The above discussion illustrates the ways in which 
Dicker’s responses to Stroud’s objections are not fully 
adequate. Dicker is right that the most important premises 
                                                          
46
  Jacquette develops a simpler, but very similar, defense of Hume. He also suggests that Hume could 
avoid the objection by adopting an intuitionist approach to mathematics, but mentions that there is no 
textual evidence that Hume would be amicable to such a strategy. See  David Hume’s Critique of Infinity, 
pp. 163 – 164.   
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in the CCM have independent plausibility, but the only 
Humean way to give them plausibility besides relying on the 
notion of contradictoriness only leads to a different kind 
of circularity. Dicker is also correct that Stroud’s 
version of the Goldbach’s Conjecture objection centers 
around the possibility of conceiving someone claiming to 
have proven the conjecture, but as we have seen, there are 
versions of the objection which do not suffer from this 
problem. Hume can be successfully defended against the 
Goldbach’s Conjecture objection, but not through Dicker’s 
response alone. It is very unclear how Hume could defend 
himself against the modified circularity objection I 
discussed earlier. Even if Hume can successfully defend his 
position against that objection and all others like it, 
however, another major difficulty remains with his CCM that 
neither he nor any other commentator have even recognized, 
let alone attempted to resolve – his critique of the causal 
maxim is inconsistent with his Temporal Priority Argument.   
 How the Critique of the Causal Maxim is Inconsistent 
with the Temporal Priority Argument  
The Separability Principle and the Conceivability 
Principle both play an extremely important role in Hume’s 
Critique of the Causal Maxim (CCM). As I have shown 
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earlier, these principles imply that, if A and B are 
distinct and separable ideas, then it must be possible to 
conceive of A without B and vice-versa. If B could not be 
conceived independently of A, and could not be conceived to 
exist independently of A, then A and B are not separable 
and distinct in the Humean sense of those terms.   
 This simple fact has profound implications for the 
CCM. That argument focuses on the distinction between the 
concept of a beginning of existence and the concept of a 
cause of existence. Hume firmly believes that it is 
possible to conceptualize a beginning of existence without 
conceptualizing a cause of existence. He thinks it is 
logically possible for something to begin to exist without 
a cause, and that asserting this does not result in a 
contradiction. In other words, Hume would claim that the 
following three propositions are consistent with each 
other:  
(1) X did not exist at time t1.   
(2) X began existing at time t2.   
(3) The beginning of X’s existence never had a cause.   
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If Hume’s CCM works, (3) does not contradict (1) and (2).  
I will assume for the sake of argument that the CCM works. 
This means that it is possible to conceptualize something 
beginning to exist without a cause or, in other words, a 
beginning of existence that is not associated with a cause 
of existence.   
 If beginning of existence and cause of existence are 
truly separable and distinct concepts, however, it must 
also be possible to conceptualize something being caused to 
exist without beginning to exist. When applied to the 
concepts of a beginning of existence and a cause of 
existence, the Separability Principle and the 
Conceivability Principle entail that the following three 
propositions are also consistent with each other: 
(4) X did not exist at time t1.  
(5) X was caused to exist at time t2.  
(6) The existence of X never had a beginning.   
The obvious problem, of course, is that propositions 
(4) through (6) are clearly not consistent! If X was caused 
to exist at t2, then X’s existence began at t2, since it is 
obviously absurd to suggest that something can remain non-
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existent once it is caused to exist. Hence (6) contradicts 
(5). When Hume discusses the concept of a beginning of 
existence in his CCM, he describes it in such a way that 
the contradiction between (6) and (4) and (5) becomes 
crystal clear and impossible to avoid. Recall that 
immediately after explaining what the Conceivability and 
Separability Principles mean, Hume asserts that since “the 
ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ‘twill be 
easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this 
moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the 
distinct idea of a cause or productive principle” (T 
1.3.3.3). With this remark, Hume obviously identifies a 
beginning of existence as a process by which an object is 
non-existent one moment, and existent the next, which is 
exactly the situation described in (4) and (5).  
Hume’s description of a beginning of existence 
illustrates the way in which his CCM is inconsistent with 
his Temporal Priority Argument (TPA). For Hume, if 
something begins to exist, it did not exist at one moment, 
and then exists at the following moment. In order for an 
object to be non-existent one moment and existent the next, 
there must be at least two moments which exist in 
succession. A beginning of existence requires temporal 
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succession. The Separability Principle states not only that 
distinct things can be conceptually separated, but also 
that they can be ontologically separated as well. If A and 
B are separable, both can exist completely separately from 
each other. If Hume is correct that beginnings of existence 
and causes of existence are separate concepts, then it must 
be possible for there to be beginnings of existence even if 
there are no causes of existence. As discussed in chapter 
3, for Hume all causes must be successive. One of the 
crucial premises in the TPA states that the complete 
absence of causal succession entails “the utter 
annihilation” of temporal succession. Consequently, if 
there were no causes of existence, there would be no 
beginnings of existence either. Obviously, if the TPA is 
sound, beginnings of existence and causes of existence are 
not nearly as separable as Hume requires them to be for his 
CCM to work.  
The CCM entails that time and causation are 
ontologically independent of each other. The TPA entails 
that they are not. The two arguments are clearly not 
consistent with each other, but Hume cannot abandon either 
one without rejecting epistemological principles which are 
crucial for his entire philosophy.     
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Clearly, Hume’s assertion that “the separation, 
therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning 
of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination” is 
inconsistent with his TPA. If the premise is true, the TPA 
must be unsound; if TPA is sound, the premise must be 
false.   
Hume cannot resolve the difficulty by merely rejecting 
the TPA. In the previous chapter, I presented several 
reasons why Hume cannot trivialize the TPA as lightly as he 
does in the Treatise. Even if Hume dismisses his own TPA in 
spite of those reasons, however, another problem remains 
for his CCM. In the CCM, he describes a beginning of 
existence in terms of an object being non-existent one 
moment and existent the next. By interpreting a beginning 
of existence in this way, he precludes the possibility of 
conceptualizing a cause of existence without a beginning of 
existence. The “actual separation” of a cause and a 
beginning of existence is not “plainly possible for the 
imagination,” because the very concept of a cause of 
existence as Hume characterizes it contains the concept of 
a beginning of existence. This would remain true even if 
Hume completely discards the TPA, or never developed the 
TPA in the first place.   
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Concluding Remarks  
Hume’s critique of the causal maxim relies on the 
assumption that the idea of a cause and the idea of an 
effect are distinct from each other. In the context of the 
causal maxim, the kind of effect Hume is most interested in 
is a beginning of existence. Hume’s critique of the causal 
maxim stands or falls with his belief that the idea of a 
cause of existence is distinct from, and therefore can 
exist separately from, the idea of a beginning of 
existence. If these ideas truly are as separable as Hume 
requires them to be for his CCM to work, then his CCM 
contradicts his TPA. Another problem facing Hume is that he 
characterizes a beginning of existence in such a way that 
the concept of a cause of existence necessarily entails the 
concept of a beginning of existence, making the kind of 
distinction Hume wants between them impossible. Hence 
Hume’s problematic premise that the idea of a cause of 
existence is separable from the idea of a beginning of 
existence is either true but incompatible with his TPA, or 
false. 
While it is true that the idea of a cause and the idea 
of an effect are not nearly as distinct as Hume thinks they 
are, the ideas are still distinguishable from each other. 
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As seen in the previous chapter, all causes qua causes 
precede their effects in time. All causes exhibit this 
asymmetrical temporal relationship with their effects. When 
the effect in question is a beginning of existence, this 
means that the cause of that beginning of existence must 
precede the beginning of existence in time. In other words, 
if a cause, C, causes an object to begin existing at time 
t2, then C must have existed at time t1. This method of 
distinguishing a cause of existence from a beginning of 
existence involves placing them within a temporal order. 
Such an approach does not allow causes of existence and 
beginnings of existence to possess the kind of separability 
they would have to have for the CCM to work. Hume was 
correct that the idea of a cause of existence and the idea 
of a beginning of existence are distinct, but he was wrong 
about what that distinctness consists in, and what it 
entails.   
This chapter and the previous chapter investigated the 
relationship between Hume’s theory of time and his theory 
of causation. The following chapter will explore the 
connection between Hume’s conception of time and his theory 
of induction.   
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 Chapter Five  
The Phenomenal Succession of Time and its Influence on 
Induction 
Introduction  
Hume’s theory of induction is one of the most famous 
aspects of his entire philosophy. The vast literature on 
Hume’s account of induction tends to focus on his discovery 
of the problems concerning the epistemic justification of 
induction. Although such issues are unquestionably 
important and worthy of study, not enough emphasis has been 
given to the role Hume’s theory of time plays in the 
formation of inductive inferences. The relationship between 
Hume’s theory of time and his theory of induction is also 
important and worthy of study, because the mind must 
experience time in a very specific way in order for it to 
engage in the mental operations required for induction. 
More specifically, for the mind to form inductive 
inferences the way Hume thinks it does, the mind must 
experience time discretely, successively, and flowing from 
the past to the present and from the present to the future. 
This successive, unidirectional manner of experiencing time 
makes induction possible. 
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Understanding why the process of induction as Hume 
describes it requires and presupposes a particular way of 
experiencing time necessitates an analysis of T 2.3.7 and T 
2.3.8, in which Hume discusses the manner in which people 
experience time, why they experience it that way, and what 
effects that manner of experiencing time has on the 
imagination and the passions. For the purposes of clarity 
and convenience, I will refer to this mode of experiencing 
time as the phenomenal succession of time (PST) in order to 
distinguish it from the natural succession of time, the 
nature of time considered independently of the mind’s 
experience of it. What is important for Hume is not just 
the fact that people experience time successively, but also 
that this phenomenal succession of time has a certain 
direction: it moves from the past to the present to the 
future. As will become clear later in this chapter, the 
mental processes employed in induction require PST to have 
this direction.   
The Phenomenal Succession of Time   
At T 2.3.7 and T 2.3.8, Hume investigates the effects 
contiguity in space and time has on the passions. What is 
contiguous has a stronger impact, in terms of force and 
vivacity, than what is remote. Remote things exert a weaker 
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influence on the passions “by reason of the interruption in 
our manner of conceiving them” (T 2.3.7.3). Observation of 
human behavior indicates that this is true:  
 
...we find in common life, that men are principally 
concern’d about those objects, which are not much 
remov’d either in space or time, enjoying the present, 
and leaving what is afar off to the care of chance and 
fortune. Talk to a man of his condition thirty years 
hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is to 
happen tomorrow, and he will lend you attention” (T 
2.3.7.3).   
 
When Hume speaks of something being “remov’d either in 
space or time,” he is referring to something being removed 
in space or time from one’s present position in space and 
time. One’s current condition in the present is, for the 
lack of a better term, the mind’s default mode, and when 
the mind imagines anything at a certain point in time, it 
always does so relative to the present.   
 Many of Hume’s comments illustrate this principle. For 
example, at T 2.3.7.1, Hume writes:  
 
There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to 
us, either in space or time, shou’d be conceiv’d with 
a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other 
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object, in its influence on the imagination. Ourself 
is intimately present to us, and whatever is related 
to self must partake of that quality47……where an object 
is so far remov’d as to have lost the advantage of 
this relation……[the idea of the object] becomes still 
fainter and more obscure” (T 2.3.7.1).   
 
Hume makes the same idea even more explicit in the next 
paragraph, where he claims, “the imagination can never 
totally forget the points of space and time, in which we 
are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of 
them from the passions and the senses, that however it may 
turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is 
necessitated every moment to reflect on the present” (T 
2.3.7.2).   
When the imagination does “turn its attention to 
foreign and remote objects,” it does so successively, in a 
way which always refers back to the present. Hume describes 
the process as follows:  
 
……in the conception of those objects, which we regard 
as real and existent, we take them in their proper 
                                                          
47
  By making this claim, Hume reiterates a virtually identical assertion he establishes earlier in Book 2 of 
the Treatise: “’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present 
with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that ‘tis not 
possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it.  Whatever object, therefore, is 
related to ourselves must be conceiv’d with a like vivacity of conception” (T 2.1.11.4).    
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order and situation, and never leap from one object to 
another, which is distant from it, which are 
interpos’d betwixt them. When we reflect, therefore, 
on any object distant from ourselves, we are oblig’d 
not only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the 
intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, 
but also to renew our progress every moment; being 
every moment recall’d to the consideration of 
ourselves and our present situation. ‘Tis easily 
conceiv’d, that this interruption must weaken the idea 
by breaking the action of the mind, and hindering the 
conception from being so intense and continu’d, as 
when we reflect on a nearer object. The fewer steps we 
make to arrive at the object, and the smoother the 
road is, this diminution of vivacity is less sensibly 
felt, but still may be observ’d more or less in 
proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty” 
(T 2.3.7.2).   
 
The fewer steps the mind must pass through to arrive at the 
object, the closer it is, and the more intense and 
vivacious the imagination’s idea of that object will be. 
The more steps the mind passes through, the more remote the 
object is, and the weaker the idea of that object will be. 
Thus the larger the distance between a person and the 
object, the fainter the mind’s ideas of that object will 
be.    
A great distance in time weakens ideas and passions 
much more than an equal distance in space. Hume claims that 
this is due to the different properties of space and time. 
Since the points of space are coexistent, the mind can 
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easily experience many of them at once. Temporal parts 
cannot coexist; they must be successive. The longer the 
succession, the harder it is for the imagination to trace 
all of the steps. Each temporal part (moment) must be 
completed before the next one can appear in the 
imagination. Hume concludes that “By this means any 
distance in time causes a greater interruption in the 
thought than an equal distance in space, and consequently 
weakens more considerably the idea, and consequently the 
passions; which depend in a great measure, on the 
imagination, according to my system”(T 2.3.7.5).   
After explaining why a distance in time has a greater 
effect on the imagination and passions than an equal 
distance in space, he asserts that that a distance in the 
past weakens the passions more than a distance in the 
future does (T 2.3.7.6). The past weakens the passions more 
than the future because “We always follow the succession of 
time in placing our ideas, and from the consideration of 
any object pass more easily to that, which follows 
immediately after it, than to that which went before it” (T 
2.3.7.7). Hume thinks historical narratives illustrate this 
phenomenon. If event A occurred prior to B in reality, 
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historians will very rarely “break the order of time” and 
discuss B prior to discussing A (T 2.3.7.7).   
When conceiving any object, the imagination always 
begins with “the present situation of the person.” If the 
object the imagination considers is in the past,  
 
……the progression of the thought in passing to it from 
the present is contrary to nature, as proceeding from 
one point of time to that which is preceding, and from 
that to another preceding, in opposition to the 
natural course of the succession. On the other hand, 
when we turn our thought to a future object, our fancy 
flows along the stream of time, and arrives at the 
object by an order, which seems most natural, passing 
always from one point in time to that which is 
immediately posterior to it. This easy progression of 
ideas favors the imagination, and makes it conceive 
its object in a stronger and fuller light, than when 
we are continually oppos’d in our passage, and are 
oblig’d to overcome difficulties arising from the 
natural propensity of the fancy. A small degree of 
distance in the past has, therefore, a greater effect, 
in interrupting and weakening the conception, than a 
much greater [degree of distance] in the future. From 
this effect of it on the imagination is deriv’d its 
influence on the will and passions”(T 2.3.7.8).   
 
The above passage implies that temporal succession exists 
independently of the mind. Hume explicitly acknowledges 
this at T 1.3.14.28, where he writes, “As to what may be 
said, that the operations of nature are independent of our 
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thought and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have 
observ’d, that objects bear to each other the relations of 
contiguity and succession……and that all this is independent 
of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding.” 
The phenomenal succession of time (PST) follows the natural 
succession of time. Because of this, any mental operation 
which requires the reversal of PST is inherently more 
difficult for the mind to execute than a mental operation 
which conforms to it.  
Hume uses this principle to explain why it is the case 
that, when the mind considers two points in time equally 
distant from each other, one in the future and one in the 
past, the point in future will exert greater influence over 
the imagination than the point in the past. When we imagine 
ourselves situated at a point between the present and the 
future, we experience the future approaching towards us and 
the past retreating from us, and becoming more distant. 
Since the mind naturally likes to progress from one moment 
to the next moment following it, “we rather choose to fix 
our thought on the point of time interpos’d betwixt the 
present and the future, than on that betwixt the present 
and the past. We advance, rather than retard our existence; 
and following what seems the natural succession of time, 
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proceed from past to present, and present to future” (T 
2.3.7.9). Consequently, “we conceive the future as flowing 
every moment nearer us, and the past as retiring” (T 
2.3.7.9). We consider the future as constantly advancing 
and the past as constantly retreating, becoming more 
distant. This is because “the fancy anticipates the course 
of things, and surveys the object in that condition, to 
which it tends, as well as in that, which is regarded as 
the present” (T 2.3.7.9).   
As shown above, it is more difficult for the 
imagination to situate itself at a point in the past than 
at a point in the future, since the natural progression of 
temporal succession flows from the past, to the present, to 
the future, and the imagination follows this natural 
succession of time. A mental operation which opposes this 
natural order of time will weaken the imagination, as well 
as the passions. In the very next section, T 2.3.8, Hume 
adds that this weakening effect is limited to short 
distances in the past. Very long distances in the past have 
the opposite effect upon the imagination – they strengthen 
it!48   
                                                          
48
  Hume is well aware of the fact that his claim that very long distances in the past strengthen the 
imagination appears to be inconsistent with his comments in the previous section. When he introduces 
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Hume explains this unexpected result in terms of 
people’s natural responses to difficult challenges. “’Tis a 
quality very observable in human nature,” he claims, “that 
any opposition, which does not entirely discourage or 
intimidate us, has rather a contrary effect, and inspires 
us with a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity.” 
This is because “In collecting our force to overcome the 
opposition, we invigorate the soul, and give it an 
elevation with which otherwise it would never have been 
acquainted” (T 2.3.8.4).  
While Hume never explicitly states precisely how one 
can determine what counts as a small distance in the past 
and what counts as a great distance in the past, the 
examples he uses to support his points strongly suggest 
that, by a great distance in the past, he means antiquity. 
Hume observed that people tend to venerate ancient artwork 
and artifacts much more than they do contemporary ones, and 
he thinks this phenomenon is due to the fact that the sheer 
difficulties involved with conceptualizing points in time 
so far removed from the present that the soul is 
invigorated by the challenge, and rises to meet it. A great 
                                                                                                                                                                             
section 8, he states that he intends to study the “reverse” of the phenomena he explored in section 7. He 
also remarks that “the curiousness of the subject” – the effects a long distance in the past has on the 
imagination – allows him to digress and investigate it in more detail.   
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distance in the past, then, clearly seems to involve a 
point in the past long before any of one’s contemporaries 
existed.  
Veneration for our ancestors and ancient artifacts is 
not the only psychological process that requires the mind 
to experience time in a specific way. Induction, as Hume 
characterizes it, also requires the mind to experience time 
successively, in a particular order: from the past to the 
present to the future.    
The Relationship between the Phenomenal Succession of 
Time and Induction 
Induction, as Hume describes it in the Treatise, is a 
psychological process that is based upon past experience, 
and involves inferring the existence or condition of one 
object that is not present from an object that is present.  
Hume describes this process and provides an example of it 
at T 1.3.6.2, where he writes: 
 
We remember to have had frequent instances of the 
existence of one species of objects; and also 
remember, that the individuals of another species of 
objects have always attended them, and have existed in 
a regular order of contiguity and succession with 
them. Thus we remember to have seen that species of 
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object we call flame, and to have felt that species of 
sensation we call heat. We likewise call to mind their 
constant conjunction in all past instances. Without 
any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the 
other effect, and infer the existence of the one from 
the other. In all those instances, from which we learn 
the conjunction of particular causes and effects, both 
the causes and effects have been perceiv’d by the 
senses, and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein 
we reason concerning them, there is only one perceiv’d 
or remember’d, and the other is supply’d in conformity 
to our past experience.”   
  
There is an undeniable temporal dimension to induction. 
PST, the property by which the imagination projects itself 
from the past to the present and from the present to the 
future, shares many similarities with the psychological 
process by which the mind makes inductive inferences. In 
his Abstract to the Treatise, Hume claims that “all our 
reasonings in the conduct of life,” and “all our belief in 
history” as well as “all philosophy,” are based upon “the 
inference from cause to effect” (Abstract 10). As mentioned 
above, Hume argues that historical narratives support his 
claim that the imagination naturally tends to pass from one 
object to one that immediately follows it, instead of the 
object immediately preceding it. This suggests that the 
inference from cause to effect and the passage of the 
imagination from an object to its successor are similar 
processes.   
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Another similarity consists in the fact that, when 
engaged in inductive reasoning, the mind “anticipates” the 
future. As an example, Hume discusses a hypothetical man, 
such as Adam from the bible, who has never previously 
experienced a billiard ball colliding with another billiard 
ball. Upon seeing such a collision for the first time, Adam 
would not infer that the second ball will move. Only 
experience could make him expect the second ball to move in 
such situations. “If he had seen a sufficient number of 
instances of this kind,” Hume claims, “whenever he saw the 
ball moving towards the other, he would always conclude 
without hesitation that the second would acquire motion.” 
This is because “his understanding would anticipate his 
sight, and form a conclusion suitable to his past 
experience” (Abstract 12). Hume repeats the same idea three 
paragraphs later when he remarks, “When I see a billiard-
ball moving towards another, my mind is immediately carried 
by habit to the usual effect, and anticipates my sight by 
conceiving the second ball in motion” (Abstract 15).   
In the above examples of induction from the Abstract, 
the mind projects itself into the future by conceptualizing 
a condition of the second ball that has not yet happened, 
and hence is not yet perceivable to the senses. PST as Hume 
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describes it involves exactly the same process. Recall 
that, when Hume explained why a distance in the past does 
not have the same effect on the mind than an equal distance 
in the future, he claimed that “the fancy anticipates the 
course of things, and surveys the object in that condition, 
to which it tends, as well in that, which is regarded as 
the present” (T 2.3.7.9). Obviously, “the course of things” 
is the future, and the condition to which the object tends 
will be instantiated in the future, or at least is expected 
to be instantiated in the future. Thus in both the examples 
of inductive inferences regarding the billiard balls and 
PST, the mind directs itself toward the future and 
conceptualizes an event or condition that is currently 
inaccessible to the senses.   
Such a process, which plays such a crucial role in 
induction, involves a psychological transfer from the past 
to the future. Hume explicitly acknowledges this several 
times. Consider, for example, his remark that “All our 
reasonings concerning the probability of causes are founded 
on the transferring of past to future” (T 1.3.12.19). 
Another example occurs in the section “Of the Probability 
of Causes,” where Hume writes:  
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We may observe, that the supposition, that the future 
resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any 
kind, but is deriv’d entirely from habit, by which we 
are determin’d to expect for the future the same train 
of objects, to which we have been accustom’d. This 
habit or determination to transfer the past to the 
future is full and perfect; and consequently the first 
impulse of the imagination in this species of 
reasoning is endow’d with the same qualities” (T 
1.3.12.9).  
 
In this passage, Hume claims that the assumption that the 
future resembles the past results from the process by which 
the mind transfers the past to the future, which clearly 
means that the latter is more fundamental and basic than 
the former.   
Transferring the past to the future is the process 
involved with all inductive inferences, and works as 
follows. After experiencing multiple instances of A-type 
objects followed by B-type objects in the past, the mind 
comes to expect that every A-type object it experiences 
from that point on will continue to be followed by a B-type 
object. In the present, an A-type object appears, alone and 
unaccompanied by a B-type object. The mind will then 
“anticipate the sight” and believe that a B-type object 
will appear as well. By doing so, the mind transfers the 
past to the future – it “transfers” the constant 
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conjunction of A-type objects and B-type objects it has 
experienced in the past to the future.   
Notice how, in the process described above, the mind 
progresses from the past to the present to the future. That 
is the same direction in which PST flows. Clearly, then, 
inductive reasoning exemplifies and requires PST. It is 
important to note, however, that while induction 
exemplifies PST, it is not identical to PST. PST is more 
basic and fundamental than induction. This is because the 
mind does not need to experience a constant conjunction of 
anything, or make any inferences about anything, to 
experience time successively from the past to the present 
to the future.  
Suppose A occurs at time t1, B occurs at time t2, and C 
occurs at time t3. When the mind experiences A, B, and C, it 
experiences A first, then B, then C, in that order. By 
doing so, it moves from one point in time to the next and 
then to the one after that, successively. The mind does not 
need to experience a constant conjunction of A-type 
objects, B-type objects, and C-type objects for this 
process to take place. In fact, it can move from A to B to 
C even if A, B, and C never appear again. Moreover, A, B, 
and C may not be causally related to each other in any way, 
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yet the mind can still experience them successively in this 
manner. This is what makes PST more basic than the mental 
process of transferring the past to the future, which 
occurs during induction. Induction is a more complicated 
process that requires PST but also requires other things 
besides PST. Hence PST is a necessary condition for 
induction, but not a sufficient condition. One cannot 
engage in inductive reasoning without experiencing time 
successively, but one can experience time successively 
without engaging in induction.   
Careful analysis of Hume’s comments regarding 
induction helps explain precisely why PST is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of inductive inferences. At 
its most basic level, induction involves inferring the 
existence of objects that are not currently present to the 
senses or the imagination from objects which are. According 
to Hume, “’tis therefore by EXPERIENCE49 only, that we can 
infer the existence of one object from that of another” (T 
1.3.6.2). As I discussed in Chapter 2, in Hume’s ontology, 
all existing things either coexist or exist successively.  
Likewise, our experience of objects also comes in two 
different modes: we can experience things coexisting, or 
                                                          
49
  This word is capitalized in the original text.  
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experience them successively. Induction requires us to 
experience things successively. Hume explicitly 
acknowledges this fact when he describes the role 
experience plays in the formation of inductive inferences. 
He claims that “We remember to have had frequent instances 
of the existence of one species of objects; and also 
remember, that the individuals of another species of 
objects have always attended them, and have existed in a 
regular order of contiguity and succession with them” (T 
1.3.6.2). At T 2.3.7, Hume claims that we experience the 
points of space as coexistent, but we can only experience 
time successively. Since every succession, for Hume, is 
temporal, induction requires a successive experience of 
time. 
Further evidence that induction requires successive 
experience concerns the fact that the object about which we 
infer is not currently present to the senses or the 
imagination. Hume makes this point clear when he writes:  
 
In all those instances, from which we learn the 
conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the 
causes and effects have been perceiv’d by the senses, 
and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein we 
reason concerning them, there is only one perceiv’d or 
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remember’d, and the other is supply’d in conformity to 
our past experience” (T 1.3.6.2) 
 
For the mind to engage in induction, it must experience 
only one type of object that it has repeatedly experienced 
being accompanied by another type of object in the past, 
which means that the accompanying object is not currently 
present, either to the senses or the imagination. Such a 
situation could never happen without successive 
experiences. If the mind experienced all objects as 
coexistent, there would never be a scenario in which an 
object typically accompanied by another type of object in 
the past would fail to accompany it in the present. The act 
of experiencing any objects or spatial points as coexistent 
entails that all of the objects or points are present to 
the mind at once. If the mind’s experience of all objects 
were coexistent, then an object’s “usual attendant” must be 
present before the mind, but if it is, there is no reason 
for the mind to make any inductive inferences about it!  
 Induction requires the mind to make an inference about 
something it has not yet experienced or perceived based 
upon what it already has experienced or perceived. If A and 
B coexist, both would be present in the mind at once. That 
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one single instance of A and B accompanying each other 
would not be sufficient for the mind to experience a 
constant conjunction of A-type objects and B-type objects. 
Such a constant conjunction necessitates repetition of A-
type objects and B-type objects. Since repetition of 
anything obviously requires succession, constant 
conjunction also requires succession.  
 The fact that constant conjunction requires repetition 
and repetition requires succession reveals another way in 
which induction is dependent upon PST. For the mind to form 
inductive inferences properly, the objects it repeatedly 
experiences must be as temporally contiguous to each other 
as possible. The greater the temporal distance between one 
pair of accompanying objects and the next pair of similar 
accompanying objects, the more difficult it is for the mind 
to experience a constant conjunction between them. Hume 
recognizes this:  
 
……’twill readily be allow’d, that the several 
instances we have of the constant conjunction of 
resembling causes and effects are in themselves 
entirely independent, and that the communication of 
motion, which I see result at present from the shock 
of two billiard balls, is totally distant from that 
which I saw result from such an impulse a twelve-month 
ago. These impulses have no influence on each other. 
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They are entirely divided by time and place; and the 
one might have existed and communicated motion, tho’ 
the other never been in being (T 1.3.14.18).   
 
In the above example, Hume experiences one billiard ball 
communicating motion to another, and then has a similar 
experience a year later. Neither instance could possibly 
influence the other, due to the temporal distance 
separating them. This is exactly what one would expect, 
given Hume’s remarks in T 2.3.7 regarding the inherent 
difficulty of tracing any long succession, and the fact 
that when tracing any succession of events, the mind must 
pass through each intermediate step in that succession in 
sequential order(T 2.3.7.2). Considering the number of 
intermediate steps Hume’s mind would have to pass through 
in a year-long succession, it is not surprising that he 
would not consider the two instances of one billiard ball 
moving another to be conjoined in any way. If the only 
examples Hume ever experienced of billiard balls moving 
each other were the two discussed in the above passage; 
separated by a year-long succession in which many other 
events occurred, it is clear he would never be able to make 
any inductive inferences about billiard balls moving each 
other. 
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A year-long succession is too far removed from the 
present to influence the imagination strongly enough for 
induction to occur. Recall that at T 2.3.7.1, Hume claims 
that spatially and temporally contiguous objects exert a 
strong affect on the imagination because they are close to 
– that is, they relate to or serve as a matter of concern 
for - our present condition, which is always inevitably 
something the imagination contemplates. Remote objects have 
a far weaker effect upon the imagination because they 
exhibit a much fainter and weaker relation to the present 
than contiguous objects do. At T 2.3.7.2, Hume claims that 
the reason for this is that the imagination must not only 
pass through each intermediate step in a succession, but 
also relate back to, and contemplate, the present with each 
intermediate step. Needless to say, the more steps a 
succession contains, the more difficult it will be for the 
mind to carry out this process, and so the more remote an 
object is from the present, the weaker its effects upon the 
imagination will be. Conversely, the fewer steps a 
succession contains, the more contiguous it is with the 
present, and the stronger its influence on the imagination 
will be.  
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 How this process of constantly tracing each step of a 
temporal succession and comparing it to the present 
influences induction should now be clear. “All kinds of 
reasoning from causes to effects,” Hume asserts, “are 
founded on two particulars, viz. the constant conjunction 
of any two objects in all past experience, and the 
resemblance of a present object to any one of them” (T 
1.3.12.25). Hume then proceeds to claim,  
 
The effect of these two particulars is, that the 
present object invigorates and enlivens the 
imagination; and the resemblance, along with the 
constant union, conveys this force and vivacity to the 
related idea; which we are therefore said to 
believe……If you weaken either the union or 
resemblance, you weaken the principle of transition, 
and of consequence that belief, which arises from it 
(T 1.3.12.25).  
 
Temporally remote objects weaken both the constant union 
and the resemblance of the past objects to the present 
object. The more temporally remote objects are, the harder 
it is for the imagination to relate the steps of the 
succession from the present to the objects back to the 
present, and thus the harder it is for the mind to 
recognize the resemblance between the past objects and the 
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present object. The more contiguous objects are with the 
present, the easier it is for the imagination to identify a 
resemblance between those objects and an object in the 
present, and hence the easier it is for the mind to 
construct inductive inferences. 
 While analyzing the mental processes required for 
induction in terms of the mind’s experience of time helps 
illuminate these processes, it also reveals some unresolved 
tensions in Hume’s thought which have not been fully 
appreciated or recognized. One of these problems involves a 
potential inconsistency concerning the future’s 
relationship to the present and our attitude toward this 
relationship. The other concerns an unexpected consequence 
of Hume’s analysis of PST which contradicts some of his 
beliefs about causal inferences.  
Unresolved Tensions 
Hume’s remarks about our attitudes regarding the 
future in Book One of the Treatise are not always 
consistent with his claims regarding the same topic in Book 
Two. An excellent example of this discrepancy concerns the 
influence a point in time has on the passions by virtue of 
its closeness or remoteness to the present. In “Of 
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contiguity and distance in space and time,” T 2.3.7, Hume 
explicitly argues that the more remote something is from 
the present, the weaker its effect will be on the 
imagination and the passions:  
 
Here then we are to consider two kinds of objects, the 
contiguous and the remote; of which the former, by 
means of their relation to ourselves, approach an 
impression in force and vivacity; the latter by reason 
of the interruption in our manner of conceiving them, 
appear in a weaker and more imperfect light. This is 
their effect on the imagination. If my reasoning be 
just, they must have a proportionate effect on the 
will and passions. Contiguous objects must have an 
influence much superior to the distant and remote. 
Accordingly we find in common life, that men are 
principally concern’d about those objects, which are 
not much remov’d either in space and time, enjoying 
the present, and leaving what is afar off to the care 
of chance and fortune. Talk to a man of his condition 
thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak 
of what is to happen to-morrow, and he will lend you 
attention” (T 2.3.7.3)50 
 
In the above passage, Hume explains our lack of regard and 
concern for the future in terms of the remoteness of the 
future relative to the present. The more distant the future 
date is, the less concern we will have for it, due to its 
lack of contiguity with the present.  
                                                          
50
  This is a longer excerpt of a passage I quoted earlier in this chapter.   
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 Much earlier in the Treatise, at T 1.3.9.13, Hume also 
discusses people’s lack of interest in the distant future, 
but he provides a very different explanation for this 
phenomenon:  
 
As resemblance, when conjoin’d with causation, 
fortifies our reasonings; so the want of it in any 
very great degree is able almost entirely to destroy 
them. Of this there is a remarkable instance in the 
universal carelessness and stupidity of men in regard 
to a future state, where they show as obstinate an 
incredulity, as they do a blind credulity on other 
occasions……the vulgar……have nothing like what we can 
call a belief of the eternal duration of their 
souls……as belief is an act of the mind arising from 
custom, ‘tis not strange the want of resemblance 
shou’d overthrow what custom has establish’d, and 
diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter 
principle increases it. A future state is so far 
remov’d from our comprehension, and we have so obscure 
an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after 
the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we 
can invent, however strong in themselves, and however 
much assisted by education, are never able with slow 
imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a 
sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather 
choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea 
we form of our future condition, deriv’d from its want 
of resemblance to the present life, than to that 
deriv’d from its remoteness. For I observe, that men 
are every where concern’d about what may happen after 
their death, provided it regard this world; and that 
there are few to whom their name, their family, their 
friends, and their country are in any period of time 
entirely indifferent.   
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In this passage, Hume explains incredulity in and lack of 
concern for a distant future state – in this case, the 
afterlife – in terms of its lack of resemblance to the 
present life. He explicitly denies that the remoteness of 
that future state is the reason for the incredulity. Hume 
argues that, in spite of the obvious remoteness of the next 
life in comparison to the present life, most people still 
care deeply about what will happen to their reputation, 
their friends, their family, and their country after they 
die. According to Hume, people care about these things 
because they are all a part of, and therefore, resemble, 
the present life.  
 By refusing to attribute incredulity in the afterlife 
to latter’s remoteness from the present life, Hume offers 
an explanation that conflicts with the one he provides in T 
2.3.7.3 and other paragraphs in that section, where he 
posits remoteness from the present as the reason for our 
indifference regarding the far future. His claim that 
people do care about their post-mortem condition to the 
extent that it resembles the present life is problematic, 
because Hume’s comments in T 2.3.7 all pertain to the 
present life, yet he still attributes indifference about 
the future to its remoteness.     
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Hume unknowingly makes this problem more acute at T 
2.3.7.9, where he explores whether two points of time 
equally distant from the present have the same effect on 
the imagination, and ultimately concludes that they do not. 
He argues that different points in time equally distant 
from the present would have the same effect on the 
imagination if PST did not exist:  
 
When from the present instant we consider two points 
of time equally distant in the future and in the past, 
‘tis evident, that, abstractly consider’d, their 
relation to the present is almost equal. For as the 
future will sometime be present, so the past was once 
present. If we cou’d, therefore, remove this quality 
of the imagination [PST], an equal distance in the 
past and in the future, wou’d have a similar 
influence. 
 
Without PST, two points of time equally distant in the 
future and the past would have the same effect upon the 
imagination. This is because both points would be equally 
removed from the present; they would both exhibit the same 
relation to the present. By asserting that the equally 
distant points in time would have the same effect, Hume 
clearly assumes that remoteness in relation to the present 
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determines the strength or weakness of a point in time’s 
influence on the imagination.  
 A possible way to resolve the difficulty might be to 
claim that remoteness causes a lack of resemblance; the 
more remote a point in time is, the less it will resemble 
the present. Some support for this claim comes from the 
fact that, as I argued earlier, large distances in time 
disrupt the mental processes involved with induction, and 
consequently, make the mind far less likely to assume that 
the future will resemble the past. Although it is not clear 
if this completely resolves the problem, it seems to be a 
good place to start.   
 Another unresolved problem concerns the relationship 
between PST and causal inferences. Hume repeatedly claims 
throughout T 2.3.7 that mental operations which require the 
imagination to oppose PST and project itself from the 
present to a short distance in the past are much more 
difficult for the imagination than mental operations which 
conform to PST. As discussed in Chapter 3, Hume believes 
that all causes must precede their effects in time, and 
causal succession presupposes temporal succession. This 
means that any mental operation by which the mind begins 
with a cause and then infers or moves its consideration to 
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the effect necessarily involves a psychological movement 
from one moment to the moment immediately following it, 
which is exactly the order in which the mind experiences 
time when it functions in accordance with PST.  
 Since all causes qua causes temporally precede their 
effects, all effects qua effects temporally succeed their 
causes. This obviously means that an inference from an 
effect to a cause must involve a psychological movement 
from one moment in time (the moment at which the effect 
exists) to a moment immediately preceding it (the moment at 
which the cause exists). Such a mental act directly opposes 
PST, as well as the natural succession of time. As 
mentioned above, all mental acts done in conformity with 
PST are much easier to perform than mental acts which do 
not. Inferences from causes to effects conform to PST. 
Inferences from effects to causes, however, do not. For 
Hume’s remarks regarding PST in T 2.3.7 to be consistent 
with his belief that all causes temporally precede their 
effects, it must necessarily be the case that inferences 
from effects to causes are much more difficult for the mind 
to perform than inferences from causes to effects.  
Hume, however, does not recognize this consequence of 
his own theories. Many of his comments throughout the 
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Treatise – especially at T 1.3.6.2, T 1.3.6.7, and T 
1.3.12.25 – very strongly suggest that inferences from 
effects to causes are just as easy for the mind to perform 
as inferences from causes to effects. He seems to assume 
that the same psychological and phenomenological processes 
are involved with each type of inference, and that each 
type of inference exerts the same degree of power over the 
imagination and passions. Of course, the processes involved 
are not the same – inferences from causes to effects 
conform to PST, inferences from effects to causes oppose it 
– and the imagination and passions are affected differently 
to different degrees in each kind of inference; moving from 
cause to effect is easier for the imagination than moving 
in the opposite direction. Hume not only fails to realize 
this, but also makes comments which directly contradict 
this inescapable consequence of his theories. An excellent 
example of this occurs in Hume’s twentieth footnote in the 
Treatise, where he claims, “We infer a cause immediately 
from its effect; and this inference is not only a true 
species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others” (T 
1.3.7.5). To be consistent, Hume would have to say that the 
inference from effects to causes is not the strongest kind 
of inference, but rather one of the weakest, due to the 
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fact that such an inference opposes PST, which makes all 
mental operations easier to perform.  
 It is not clear if Hume could liberate himself from 
this problem without sacrificing a major component of his 
philosophy. The problem arises out of an incompatibility 
between his theory of induction, his belief that all causes 
temporally precede their effects, and his belief that any 
mental operations which conform to PST are easier to 
conduct than mental operations which do not. Of these, the 
first is by far the best-known, and is one of the major 
crowning achievements of Hume’s philosophical career. His 
belief that all causes precede their effects, as well as 
the argument he uses to support this belief, is not nearly 
as well-known, but – as I argued in Chapter 3 – nonetheless 
constitutes a very significant component of his philosophy. 
Hume’s beliefs regarding the mind’s experience of and 
attitude toward the past, present, and future is very 
rarely discussed, even by Hume scholars. This does not mean 
that Hume could jettison these beliefs about time without 
sacrificing something he might consider far more important, 
however. As I tried to show in this chapter, Hume’s account 
of the process by which the mind produces inductive 
inferences presuppose certain beliefs about the phenomenal 
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succession of time, and some of these beliefs are the very 
same ones which give rise to the problem.  
 Concluding Remarks – How This Chapter Relates to the 
Previous Chapters  
 This chapter focused primarily on the experience of 
time, and how that experience of time influences inductive 
reasoning. In particular, it discussed how the imagination 
has a natural tendency to progress from the past to the 
present and from the present to the past, and how the 
processes required for inductive reasoning function better 
when they proceed in harmony with this tendency. In 
carrying out this task, I made reference to some of the 
concepts discussed and analyzed in Chapter Three, such as 
Hume’s belief that all causes must precede their effects in 
time, as well as a concept that was introduced in Chapter 
One yet continued to play an important role in Chapter 
Three – the idea that all successions are temporal in 
Hume’s philosophy. The ideas presented in Chapter Two 
regarding the finite divisibility of time are also 
pertinent for the topic of this chapter, however.       
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the mind cannot 
experience time successively if time is infinitely 
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divisible. This is because the infinite divisibility of 
time entails that between any two moments are an infinite 
number of other moments. No moment would have an immediate 
predecessor or an immediate successor, which would 
obviously preclude the mind from experiencing moments 
successively, since doing so presupposes that each moment 
has an immediate predecessor and an immediate successor.  
Since the mind must experience time successively to 
form inductive inferences, this means induction cannot 
occur unless time is discrete and discontinuous. To 
understand why this is the case, consider one of Hume’s 
example of an inductive inference: repeatedly experiencing 
one billiard ball moving another, being presented with an 
instance of one ball approaching another, and then 
concluding without hesitation that the second ball will 
move. If time is infinitely divisible, then between the 
moment at which ball A collides with ball B and the moment 
at which ball B begins to move, there would be an infinite 
number of moments. When the mind experiences any temporal 
succession, it must not only trace all of the individual 
steps of the succession, but also compare them to the 
present. How could it ever possibly accomplish this task if 
the succession it is experiencing contains an infinite 
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number of steps? Furthermore, how would the mind ever join 
together ball A and ball B, since there would be an 
infinite number of moments between them? Obviously, it 
could not ever complete its tracing of the succession, and 
it would never associate the balls, and every other pair of 
billiard balls which resemble them, in a way it would need 
to for induction to be possible.  
These reflections provide a reason why Hume could not 
escape from the second unresolved problem mentioned above 
by rejecting his beliefs about the mind’s experience of 
time. The idea that time is discrete and discontinuous – 
and therefore, only finitely divisible – is extremely 
important to him, and he never abandoned that belief. That 
specific property of time determines how the mind 
experiences it, and the manner in which the mind 
experiences time plays a crucial role in the formation of 
inductive inferences.51  
                                                          
51
  While the literature on Hume’s account of induction is very vast, I have not yet come across any source 
that seemed to even notice that Hume’s theory of induction requires a particular conception of, and a 
specific mode of experiencing, time. Many commentators, however, have argued that Hume’s purposes 
for discussing inductive reasoning were more psychological than epistemological. These commentators – 
such as Craig, Livingstone, Strawson, Wright, as well as many others – tend to depict Hume as a naturalist 
instead of a skeptic. Exploring the arguments they give to support their naturalized vision of Hume is far 
beyond the scope of my project; a thorough examination of all the interpretative issues involved would 
require a dissertation in and of itself. Dicker’s analysis of induction in Hume’s Epistemology and 
Metaphysics acknowledges both the naturalist and the more traditional, skeptical interpretations of 
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One issue discussed in my first chapter that was 
conspicuous by its absence in this chapter was the Humean 
account of memory. Hume never discusses the role memory 
plays on our attitudes regarding the past in T 2.3.7 and 
2.3.8 This is an extremely strange omission on Hume’s part, 
since memory undeniably exerts a tremendous influence over 
our experience of time, and those sections pertain 
specifically to our experience of and attitudes toward the 
past, present, and future. An exciting area of additional 
research would be to investigate whether Hume’s account of 
memory can help solve some of the unresolved tensions I 
discussed earlier. Such an investigation would require some 
degree of speculation about the strength of memory’s impact 
on the imagination and passions in comparison to PST.    
The relationship between PST and memory is just one 
unanswered question left over from my study of Hume’s 
theory of time. I will discuss some other unanswered 
questions in my concluding chapter.
                                                                                                                                                                             
Hume, refuses to support either one, and then argues for an interpretation which combines aspects of 
both. Dicker spends a significant amount time exploring the psychological aspects of Hume’s account of 
induction.  Inasmuch as my discussion of Hume’s theory of induction also focuses on the psychological 
dimensions of induction, I am still contributing something of value to the endless debates in Hume 
scholarship over Hume’s naturalism and skepticism.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion  
 The Philosophical Motivations behind this Dissertation  
 Despite Hume’s significant contributions to the 
history of philosophy, many dimensions of his thought have 
not been sufficiently explored. His theory of time is one 
such rarely-studied aspect of his philosophy. Even well-
known commentators on Hume have not given Hume’s theory of 
time all of the attention and consideration it deserves.  
 When these commentators do discuss Hume’s philosophy 
of time, they always focus on particular aspects of it and 
fail to even mention others. For example, Jacquette’s David 
Hume’s Critique of Infinity provides extremely detailed 
analyses of the arguments Hume develops to prove that time 
is finitely divisible, but never discusses how contiguity 
and distance in time affects the passions and the 
imagination, or why Hume believes every cause must 
temporally precede its effect. In contrast, Beauchamp and 
Rosenberg’s Hume and the Problem of Causation, which is a 
very influential book in Hume scholarship, does study 
Hume’s reasons for thinking that all causes must be prior 
to their effects, but explicitly dismisses Hume’s arguments 
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against the infinite divisibility time as too weak and 
esoteric to deserve serious consideration from 
philosophers. After stating their reasons for ignoring 
Hume’s arguments for the discreteness of time – arguments 
which constitute the subject matter of an entire chapter in 
Jacquette’s book - in a footnote, Beauchamp and Rosenberg 
never discuss them again.  
 This disdain for Hume’s arguments against the infinite 
divisibility of time also occurs in Flew’s “Infinite 
Divisibility in Hume’s Treatise,” which, like Hume and the 
Problem of Causation, has also exerted a strong influence 
over Hume scholarship, as evidenced by the sheer number of 
responses it has received. Although Flew fiercely opposes 
Hume’s positions regarding the infinite divisibility of 
time, he does consider them important enough to examine in 
detail. By focusing primarily on Hume’s arguments against 
the continuity of time, he never even considers how Hume’s 
belief in temporal discontinuity affects other aspects of 
Hume’s philosophy, such as Hume’s theory of causation and 
induction.  
 Even Hume scholars who mostly agree with or are 
sympathetic to Hume’s stance on temporal discreteness 
completely neglect equally important components of Hume’s 
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theory of time. Baxter exemplifies this phenomenon in his 
Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise. 
Because of the sheer number of pages Hume’s Difficulty 
devotes to the idea of time, how Hume thinks we acquire it, 
the arguments against infinite divisibility, and the 
relationship between time and identity in Hume’s thought, 
one can argue that Hume’s Difficulty is the most in-depth 
and detailed study of Hume’s conception of time currently 
in publication. Baxter is aware of this himself, as he 
remarks that since “there has been no in-depth study of 
Hume’s view of identity,” and “there has been no in-depth 
study of Hume’s account of time,” he intends Hume’s 
Difficulty “to supply these deficiencies by being the first 
focused study of Hume on time and identity” (Baxter 1). 
Despite his intense and protracted focus on time, however, 
Baxter’s primary concern in Hume’s Difficulty is Hume’s 
account of identity, not Hume’s account of time. Baxter’s 
main argument is that Hume discovered a serious, unresolved 
problem with the very concept of numerical identity, and 
that understanding this problem necessitates an 
understanding of Hume’s theory of time. Thus Baxter 
subordinates his discussion of Hume’s theory of time to his 
analysis of Hume’s conception of identity and the problem 
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with that conception. Baxter only discusses the components 
of Hume’s philosophy of time that are directly relevant to 
numerical identity. Consequently, he leaves several 
important issues in Hume’s temporal theory completely 
unexplored, such as the link between time and causation, 
and the effects of temporal contiguity and remoteness on 
the imagination.52  
 This brief excursion into the secondary literature 
regarding Hume’s conception of time should have made clear 
to the reader that no text currently in publication 
features a detailed analysis of both the fundamental 
aspects of Hume’s theory of time and the influence that 
said theory exerts on other, far better-known components of 
Hume’s overall philosophy, especially his descriptions of 
causation and induction. The literature which even bothers 
to mention that Hume has a theory of time tends to either 
dismiss it as unimportant, or focus extensively on one 
aspect of it and neglect the others. One of my intentions 
in writing this dissertation was to rectify this problem by 
providing a detailed, in-depth study of all of the major 
components of Hume’s theory of time, so that anyone 
                                                          
52
  Baxter does quote a sentence from T 2.3.7.5 on page 29, but he does so only to support an implicit 
premise in Hume’s third reductio argument against infinite divisibility.  He never discusses or even 
mentions what the topic of that section of the Treatise is.  
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conducting research on this underappreciated aspect of 
Hume’s thought would be able to have access to a much 
fuller, more complete picture of Hume’s temporal theory 
than is currently available in other texts.  
 Synopsis of Dissertation 
 I carried out my goal of establishing this more 
thorough study of Hume’s philosophy of time over the course 
of five chapters. My first chapter begins with a brief 
discussion of crucial principles of Hume’s epistemology. 
Doing so is necessary because the arguments presented in 
the later chapters presuppose knowledge of those 
principles. My next task in Chapter One involves clarifying 
precisely what time is for Hume. I argue that time for Hume 
is a compound abstract idea of succession qua succession. 
An important consequence of this view, which is a recurring 
theme in subsequent chapters, is that all successions are 
temporal for Hume. Another consequence of this conception 
of time is that a persistent worry raised by many 
commentators on Hume – that Hume’s conception of time 
violates his Copy Principle, one of Hume’s most important 
epistemic principles – is unnecessary. Hume explicitly 
claims that the Copy Principle does not apply to compound 
ideas, only simple ones. Hence the common concern that 
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Hume’s notion of time contradicts his own Copy Principle is 
ill-founded.  
 A significant portion of Chapter One features my 
response to Baxter, who interprets Hume as arguing that 
distinct moments of differing temporal lengths can coexist. 
Baxter, well aware of Hume’s repeated insistence that the 
parts of time do not and cannot coexist, defends his 
interpretation of Hume by claiming that the members of a 
succession (the moments constituting the succession) cannot 
coexist with other members of the same succession, but they 
can coexist with the members of another succession. Baxter 
thinks this qualification is consistent with Hume’s 
numerous denials that moments can coexist.  
I strongly disagree with Baxter’s interpretation, and 
raise a series of arguments against it. The most important 
one concerns the fact that any two successions can easily 
be reinterpreted as being members of a larger succession 
which contains them both. Since the members of both sub-
successions would be members of the same, larger 
succession, and both Hume and Baxter explicitly state that 
moments in the same succession can never coexist, Baxter 
must deny the possibility that distinct moments of 
differing temporal lengths could coexist.  
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In the second chapter, I analyze Hume’s arguments for 
temporal minima, which are discrete, indivisible “parts” of 
time. Hume calls these temporal minima “moments,” and he 
employs two different strategies to argue for their 
existence. The first is a phenomenological approach, in 
which he uses thought experiments to present reasons for 
thinking that our experience of time requires temporal 
minima. The second strategy is primarily logical, and 
consists of three arguments by which Hume attempts to prove 
that the very concept of the infinite divisibility of any 
finite thing – either spatial or temporal – is 
contradictory. These arguments take the form of reductio ad 
absurdums. I defend the first and third of these arguments 
from objections which have commonly be raised against them 
in the secondary literature. By far the most important 
objection, made famous by Flew, accuses Hume of 
misunderstanding what infinite divisibility entails. I 
discuss arguments developed by authors who disagree with 
Flew, and then raise my own objections to his position. 
Throughout the chapter, I explain how infinite divisibility 
is incompatible with succession, and consequently how time 
cannot be successive if it is infinitely divisible.  
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 Hume’s belief that time is not and cannot be 
infinitely divisible plays a pivotal role in his theory of 
causality. In Chapter Three, I elucidate the link between 
temporal discreteness and causation. I do this by analyzing 
the Temporal Priority Argument, an argument Hume gives to 
prove that all causes, qua causes, must precede their 
effects in time. Hume believes causation is successive, and 
because all successions are temporal, causal successions 
and temporal successions are very closely connected for 
Hume – so much so that one could not exist without the 
other. Since causal succession implies temporal succession, 
and temporal succession requires an atomistic conception of 
time, causal succession requires discrete, atomistic time.  
 After discussing Hume’s Temporal Priority Argument, I 
explain why the temporal priority of causes to their 
effects is much more important for Hume’s project than Hume 
realizes. Hume thinks that temporal priority, contiguity, 
and necessary connection are the three essential components 
of the concept of a cause, but repeatedly emphasizes that 
necessary connection is the most important of the three. I 
argue that the temporal priority of causes to their effects 
is at least as important as necessary connection, if not 
more so, for the following reasons. A crucial part of 
223 
 
Hume’s theory of causation is that causes and effects must 
be conceptually distinct. If there is no way to distinguish 
between causes and effects, his theory of causation does 
not work. Both contiguity and necessary connection are 
symmetrical relationships; both causes and effects exhibit 
both relationships the same way to the same degree. If all 
of the relationships between causes and effects are 
symmetrical, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to distinguish between them. Temporal priority of causes to 
their effects, however, is an asymmetrical relationship. 
The asymmetrical nature of the relationship makes a 
distinction between causes and effects possible. Hume does 
not have other means of distinguishing causes from effects 
at his disposal, so he must rely on temporal priority.  
 Hume’s belief that causes and effects are conceptually 
distinguishable also features prominently in his critique 
of the causal maxim. The causal maxim states that whatever 
begins to exist must have a cause. In Chapter Four, I 
discuss Hume’s critique of this maxim, and reveal a problem 
with it. Although Hume agrees with the maxim, he thinks it 
can be denied without contradiction. He claims that the 
concept of a cause of existence is distinct from the 
concept of a beginning of existence, and so the two 
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concepts can be separated from each other. This means that 
asserting that something began existing without a cause is 
not self-contradictory.  
 To support this position, Hume uses his Separability 
Principle and his Conceivability Principle, which are two 
important principles in his epistemology and ontology. By 
examining Hume’s descriptions and uses of these principles, 
I show how they entail that if X is separable from Y, then 
Y must be equally separable from X. When applied to the 
critique of the causal maxim, this means that if the 
concept of a beginning of existence is separable from the 
concept of a cause of existence, then the concept of a 
cause of existence must be equally separable from the 
concept of a beginning of existence. The Separability and 
Conceivability principles imply that something can be 
caused to exist without beginning to exist. Based upon 
Hume’s descriptions of a cause of existence, however, it is 
self-contradictory to claim that something can be caused to 
exist without beginning to exist. The concept of a cause of 
existence as Hume articulates it contains the concept of a 
beginning of existence. Hume does not use the word “cause” 
in a way that would enable something to be caused to exist 
without beginning to exist. Consequently, a beginning of 
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existence and a cause of existence are not nearly as 
separable from each other as they need to be for the 
critique of the causal maxim to work. Neither Hume nor his 
commentators in the secondary literature seem to have 
realized this.  
 In Chapter Five, I explore the link the between Hume’s 
theory of time and his account of induction. I begin the 
chapter by examining T 2.3.7 and T 2.3.8, sections of the 
Treatise in which Hume describes what I call the Phenomenal 
Succession of Time (PST), which is the imagination’s 
natural tendency to progress from the past to the present 
and from the present to the future. I explain how PST 
influences the imagination and the passions. I then argue 
that the mental processes required for the production of 
inductive inferences need PST in order to function 
properly. PST is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of induction. One unexpected consequence of induction’s 
reliance upon PST is that inferences from effects to causes 
must be much more difficult for the mind to perform than 
inferences from causes to effects. This is due to the fact 
that all causes temporally precede their effects, so when 
the mind begins with an effect and then shifts its 
attention to the cause of that effect, the mind opposes 
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PST. Hume claims that any mental operation which opposes 
PST is much more difficult to perform than mental 
operations which conform to it.        
Hume is not aware of this consequence of his own 
theory, as evidenced by numerous passages in which he very 
strongly suggests that both types of inferences are equally 
easy. The secondary literature is not aware of this problem 
either. Virtually everything written about Hume and 
induction tends to focus on the famous problem of induction 
which Hume discovered. Very few sources mention anything 
even remotely relevant to the influence Hume’s theory of 
time has on his account of induction. This is unfortunate, 
because the relationship between time and induction in 
Hume’s thought raises several questions which deserve 
careful consideration and exploration.  
 Possibilities for Further Research  
 One aspect of this relationship between time and 
induction in Hume’s thought which warrants further research 
is what effect, if any, reversing the direction of PST 
would have on the formation of inductive inferences. If we 
experienced time moving into the past instead of the 
future, would this reversed experience of time affect our 
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ability to generate inductive inferences, and if so, how? A 
related issue concerns whether or not it is possible for 
the phenomenal succession of time that we experience to be 
in opposition to the natural succession of time. Hume 
distinguishes between the natural succession of time and 
PST, remarks that the latter conforms to the former, yet 
never contemplates the possibility that the two successions 
of time could be opposed. Since Hume himself remained 
silent on these issues, any investigation into what his 
philosophy has to say about them will obviously be purely 
speculative. From a metaphysical standpoint, however, these 
sorts of issues are too important to ignore.  
 It is not completely surprising that Hume said nothing 
about the possibility of a reversed PST, since the 
naturalistic and empiricist tendencies in his philosophy 
would not give him a reason to inquire into that topic. 
What is truly surprising, however, is that Hume never 
discusses the role memory plays in PST. Memory obviously 
exerts a tremendous influence over our beliefs in and 
attitude toward the past. For this reason, Hume should have 
discussed memory vis-à-vis PST.53 The very same naturalistic 
                                                          
53
  Hume does mention the relationship between memory and time very briefly in T 1.1.3 and 1.3.5, but 
his  main goal in these sections is to explore the differences between memory and the imagination. For 
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and empirical tendencies which precluded him from 
contemplating possible worlds in which the direction of PST 
is reversed should have compelled him to explore the link 
between memory and PST. Attempting to determine what that 
link may possibly be would be difficult, but it would also 
be important, because it would help to illuminate some 
poorly-understood and under-studied aspects of Hume’s 
thought.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
reasons I tried to make clear in both the present chapter and the previous chapter, the relationship 
between memory and the order of time deserves a more thorough analysis than the extremely brief 
treatment he gives this topic in these sections.  
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